WITHDRAWN: HSP-XXX: Establish House of Stake Operational & Proposal Co-Funding Budget for 2026

House of Stake Proposals
21

On Software ($27.9k), Cost Reduction and Strategic Tradeoffs

Software ($27.9k)

There have been several questions around the SaaS budget, e.g.

why does a 2-person team need $27K for 9 months of subscriptions?
(@paulofonseca / Telegram)

Here’s more context:
At HoS, we’re currently using Google, Notion, GitHub, Vercel/Railway, NEAR AI, Claude Enterprise, and Slack. Nothing unusual.

We’re also not a 2-person team. We’re ~7 contributors today (including Agora and NEAR dev support for houseofstake.org), and we regularly collaborate with additional stakeholders per proposal (e.g. for execution, reporting, and KPI tracking).

That’s how the estimate was derived:

Blockquote
Assumptions

  • ~$10–30 per user/month
  • Multiple users per proposal (execution stakeholders)
  • Multiple tools required (PM, infra, LLMs, legal)
  • Multiple proposals in Season #1

Example
Per proposal:
$20 × 10 users × 3 tools × 9 months = $5,400
× 5 proposals ≈ $27.9K

Actuals may vary (fewer users or more proposals until end of Dec 2026), but ~$27.9K is a reasonable estimate for Season #1.

Cost Reduction Potential*

Over the past days, I’ve been verifying opportunities to reduce costs by leveraging existing infrastructure and licenses.

Potential adjustments:

  • IT & Infrastructure: $68.25K → $58.5K
    Removing after-hours / 24/7 support and relying solely on the budget buffer (incl. triggering SC/SecC confirmation if needed, delaying response time)

  • Data & Insights: $54K → $12K
    Using NF resources for most data/AI needs (keeping $12K for gaps)

  • Compliance Tools: $76.2K → $51.3K
    Using NF licenses (Juro) instead of duplicating setup

  • Software: $27.9K → $0
    Using NF licenses

→ Total reduction potential: $104.65K

:warning: This is not about removing budget items, because they are not required. It’s primarily a shift to shared NF infrastructure.

Strategic trade-off

This raises a broader question on direction:

a) Maximize for independence: build up our own, independent capabilities as soon as possible (in licenses, services, and bandwidth), and carry the associated costs
b) Maximize for cost efficiency: rely on NF infrastructure wherever possible, avoiding any duplication

I’ll confirm and finalize the reductions with NF early next week and will get back with an update. In the meantime, please share your perspective on this trade-off @everyone.

4 Likes
22

For clarity, I’ll once again ask why a monthly billing schedule was multiplied by the number of proposals.

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23

Thank you very much for you answers and addressing community concerns clearly!

I have a clearer picture of this proposal now, and leaning towards approving it.

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24

I really appreciated it would be a good discussion for the sake of accountabilities.

@Mayor_of_Pumpopolis @Rosalia

For what I’m percieve, this is a way to ratified HoS Budget into the newly handed treasuries, which is previously funded from Near Foundations, which is will elevate the current standings for HoS as an Independent entity separate from the Foundations.

But I’ll really appreciated the discussion on how make the budgeting is more reasonable and cost effective, as @DDeAlmeida stated “Skin in Game” is just added Administration Layer, which I really think it’s not: based on my previous statement.

The Goal is to move HoS towards more independent entirely. Which I think would beneficial for the communities, to tapping any funding proposal that would benefit NEAR.

1 Like
25

Sure, and perhaps the best way to move forward would be to start with a leaner approach. From that point we can gauge how effective this process is for the community. Starting with an expansion seems a bit preemptive.

The lack of clarity around basic arithmetic isn’t encouraging. Instead of explaining the SaaS billing figure, it was removed entirely? This doesn’t help us move forward with trust building.

There are other issues and questions I’d like answered. For now, I’m still waiting for clarification on why a monthly billing schedule was multiplied by the number of proposals.

2 Likes
26

Hi @Mayor_of_Pumpopolis happy to clarify:

As mentioned, different proposals involve different stakeholders in execution. While we operate with a lean core team, each proposal requires coordination with multiple external parties, and these vary case by case.
To illustrate:

  • HSP-002: Meta Pool (proposal lead), Gauntlet (data & analysis), small validators (reward recipients), NF Finance (funding), HoS directors & accounting (approvals)
  • HSP-003: Meta Pool, Linear, Hot (staking integration), Gauntlet (data & analysis), Security Council (veNEAR allocations), NF Finance (funding), Agora (frontend staking and rewards claiming frontend), HoS directors & accounting (approvals)
  • HSP-007: Sal (SVRN), Kendall (Proximity), Proximity Finance (payouts), NEAR One (performance reports, monthly), 8-21 node operators (monthly), NF Finance, Ops manager, HoS directors & accounting (approvals)

Across all of these, we coordinate via Slack, share documentation via Google Workspace, take notes (Gemini), and run analysis using LLMs (NEAR AI, OpenAI).
Since we’re dealing with private/sensitive data, we need proper access controls and user management. Many times we can grant guest access, but in some cases we need a paid enterprise license per contributor/API/project (estimate: up to 40 stakeholders in a single proposal, 10 paid licenses on average per proposal).
And because each proposal brings in a different set of people and access requirements, these tools don’t fully overlap. That’s why I’m modeling the licenses per proposal, not just per month.
More details in my previous post.
Hope this clarifies the rationale.

…SaaS billing figure, it was removed entirely?

As stated: Over the past days, I’ve been verifying opportunities to reduce costs by leveraging existing infrastructure and licenses.

→ Total reduction potential: $104.65K

:warning: This is not about removing budget items, because they are not required. It’s primarily a shift to shared NF infrastructure.
This raises a broader question on direction:

a) Maximize for independence: build up our own, independent capabilities as soon as possible (in licenses, services, and bandwidth), and carry the associated costs
b) Maximize for cost efficiency: rely on NF infrastructure wherever possible, avoiding any duplication

More details in my previous post.

1 Like
27

Hey Angela! If you wanna earn the trust, I do believe you could show the transparency report on how House of Stake spend money at the moment for contractors like Agoda, Hack Humanity, etc. they all completely stopped sharing all reports ones you step on the role. I do believe there are a lot of unclear experiences. Some of them definitely can be reduced after building the core product and paperwork as well all social media and engagement are managing very poorly.

Aslo the first way to decentralization should be sorting out security and screening committee members rather one the huge budget.

2 Likes
28

Per Proposal Multiplier

I appreciate the detailed historical context, but the volume of text doesn’t clarify the specific logic of the per-proposal multiplier. The provided answer seems to be in response to an alternative question which was not asked: “Could you please provide an alternative method of estimation?”

Overlap is a concern when you multiply a monthly billing schedule by the number of proposals. To explicitly spell it out, it effectively pads the budget by overlapping static seats. Example: a single static seat for 9 months is now billed at the rate for 45 months, 1seat*9months*5proposals=45months of billing. This over bills the community for 36 months.

There are also temporal concerns for padding the budget. Example: A “collaborator” joins for a single proposal at month six. In real terms, if this user cannot be accommodated by a guest account, a single month of billing is due. Not 9 months or 45 months. Again, this is a troubling and misleading way to present your budget.

A higher standard of transparency is required when requesting funds. Even more so when the amounts exceed $1M for 9 months of meetings.

False dichotomy

This is a misleading framing. We are expected to believe that there are only two alternatives. Either we accept these astronomical sums, rationalized by questionable arithmetic, or we are to believe that the HoS will be dependent on the NF.

First of all, it remains to be demonstrated that the HoS would be meaningfully independent of the NF in either case.

The most damning indictment of this set of false alternatives, is that people all around the world seem to be able to collaborate, chat and share files (with per user permissions) without a heavy SaaS budget. Resourceful organizations operate effectively within their means by effectively budgeting themselves. These are the behaviors which inspire confidence, not scrutiny.

An “Option C” might look like:

Use alternative platforms. Share files with granular user based permissions for free on Google Drive. Create and manage private chats on any number of free services. Google Workspaces offers a free tier for nonprofits. If the nonprofit designation doesn’t apply, then that is another indictment of this process. We can reasonably expect that a resourceful organization would structure itself to take advantage of such offers.

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I won’t attribute intent here. To many the outcome may appear as an attempt to pad the budget. Perhaps this is simply an oversight or a lack of command of basic arithmetic. Mistakes happen and we can all appreciate that. However in the context of a $1M+ budget for 9 months, the community is entitled to a higher standard.

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29

Update - Transparency Report

Hi all! I promised a proposal update with cost reductions early this week. I’m on it… currently in the thrilling phase of “waiting for confirmations”. :hourglass_done:

In the meantime, a quick glimpse into my life as Head of Governance:

On one side: Anon builders, let’s call them Ken. Ken is a one-man DAO. Runs on open-source, vibes, and sheer willpower. No overhead, no process, just shipping. It’s worked for Ken forever, so if something doesn’t work that way elsewhere… clearly the system is broken (or everyone else is).
Ken posts about it. Often.

On the other side, we have service firms, let’s call them BigCorpish.inc. They operate in enterprise land, where the rule is: “you need this, or you can’t do international business.” Invoices and fee updates arrive… whenever they feel like it. Budgets going over by $10K? Barely worth a mention. Totally normal.
From their perspective, it’s hard to imagine a world where people don’t operate like this. They send terms accordingly.

And in the middle… there’s me. Translating between Ken and BigCorpish.inc, while trying to keep budgets, expectations, and sanity intact.

It’s less a role, more a survival skill. :upside_down_face:

Update: Adding a TL;DR

18a93d47-178e-4804-937f-3959c9efaf90
18a93d47-178e-4804-937f-3959c9efaf901402×1122 479 KB

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31

:prohibited: Flagging this comment as not appropriate

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32

Thank you so much, @AK_HoG for continuing to work on this proposal to balance both the benefits and costs for the HoS; I look forward to reading the updated proposal.

Regarding your question to the community about the strategic trade-off between Option A (Full Independence) and Option B (Maximum Efficiency), I would like to suggest an Option C: Functional Independence. This approach balances fiscal responsibility with the sovereign requirements of a Treasury Governance Engine.

1. Utilize Shared Resources: I fully support leveraging shared licenses for general ‘back-office’ software (e.g., Slack, Google Workspace, Notion). There is minimal strategic risk in sharing these administrative tools during Season #1, and the cost savings are meaningful. This is a pragmatic way to meet the community’s request for increased efficiency.

2. Maintain Independent Execution Infrastructure: However, for HoS to deliver on Institutional-Grade Settlement, our core ‘Engine room’ (e.g., GitHub, Vercel, Security/Custody tools) should remain independent. Execution Sovereignty is essential; the code and the keys that drive our settlement engine cannot sit behind an external IT firewall. To ensure our Execution Reliability and Security Robustness targets are met, this infrastructure must be functionally autonomous and directly controlled by the HoS.

3. Targeted Data Capability & Fiduciary Neutrality: While existing resources are excellent for general analytics, I suggest we retain a baseline of independent Data & Insights bandwidth. This is about fiduciary neutrality and establishing proper checks and balances.

Now that the HoS has been entrusted with our own treasury, we also have the fiduciary duty to maintain its own set of eyes on the data. We must have the internal capability to independently verify protocol revenues and perform specialized economic evaluations, such as analyzing unit economics or settlement trends, without relying on external priorities. This ‘Trust but Verify’ model ensures our governance decisions are seen as objective, neutral, and fiduciarily sound.

By utilizing shared resources for general G&A while retaining independent technical and verification capabilities, we achieve significant cost reductions without creating dependencies in our core mandate. Thks!

1 Like
33

First, thanks to AK and the HoS team for putting this together and for the willingness to keep pushing proposals forward. The work it takes to evolve House of Stake into NEAR’s Treasury Governance Engine, with operational independence, security infrastructure, and aligned incentives, is needed, and the urgency to ship it matters.

Sharing some thoughts ahead of the vote.

On framing

I’d like to see HoS continue to push as the main driving organization toward NEAR’s decentralization, rather than ceding that role back to centralized decision-making. The Skin-in-the-Game mechanism is a meaningful step in that direction, co-investment is one of the cleanest ways to make HoS behave as a principal rather than an agent allocating someone else’s capital. The underlying instinct here is right.

I’ve read the discussion so far and won’t relitigate the operational-budget questions others have raised on the per-proposal multiplier and SaaS line items. The recent “Functional Independence” framing, shared back-office tooling, independent execution infrastructure, and a “trust but verify” data capability, strikes me as a useful middle path between full independence and full reliance on NF, and I’ll wait for AK’s promised cost-reduction update before engaging further on those line items. My comments here are deliberately scoped to the Skin-in-the-Game mechanism, which I think deserves dedicated attention separate from the operational structure.

Three questions I’d want better answered before this becomes operational, and I think the broader community would benefit from the team’s explicit response:

  1. What is HoS investing in? Is co-funding scoped to proposals that advance a user-owned future for NEAR: protocol decentralization, public goods, user-controlled infrastructure, developer ownership, or is it indiscriminate?

  2. What’s the ROI? How does HoS define and measure return on its co-investment, and how do those returns flow back into future allocation decisions?

  3. What is HoS actually doing with the capital? Where does it sit, who controls it, how is it disbursed, and how is it reported?

Reading the proposal against these questions

On #1 Scope. As drafted, the 15% co-fund “applies to all funding proposals approved during Season #1.” There are no thematic guardrails or eligibility criteria. A marketing spend, a vendor contract, and a user-owned-infrastructure grant would all receive the same treatment. If the rationale for co-funding is to ensure HoS has skin in decisions that shape NEAR’s decentralization arc, the scope should reflect that thesis. I’d suggest adding explicit focus areas, proposals advancing protocol decentralization, public goods, or user-owned infrastructure, with any exceptions justified in writing in the quarterly report.

On #2 ROI. The KPIs section lists Execution Reliability, Transparency, Compliance Readiness, and Security Robustness. All operational, all about how HoS runs, none about the outcomes of the proposals it co-funds. “Skin in the game” only changes behavior if there’s a feedback loop. I’d suggest adding at least one portfolio-level outcome metric, for example, “% of co-funded proposals that hit stated milestones by end of Season #1”, plus a published end-of-season portfolio review (not only allocation reporting). The “trust but verify” data capability raised earlier in the thread maps directly onto this: independent verification bandwidth is exactly what HoS would need to honestly grade its own co-funded portfolio. Without that outcome layer, the mechanism risks reading as a slogan rather than a discipline.

On #3 Capital handling. The general Treasury & Custody arrangement (Fireblocks, multisig, Foundation Directors accountable, Security Council consulted) is reasonable for operations. But the Skin-in-the-Game pool isn’t ring-fenced or separately custodied in the proposal, it sits inside the broader treasury structure. If the point is visible economic exposure, the pool should live at a published on-chain address anyone can monitor, with disbursement events reported transparently. The quarterly allocation report is a good start; the address would close the loop.

On the conflict-of-interest disclosure

The team handled this transparently, disclosing that the Head of Governance is contracted by NEAR Foundation and will abstain from voting is the right move, and I appreciate it being stated upfront. One structural observation in the same constructive spirit: the same role is also listed as the Responsible party for the Skin-in-the-Game mechanism in the RACI and is authorized to select vendors. Abstaining from the vote is appropriate, but the operating arrangement still concentrates responsibility narrowly across origination, execution, and vendor selection. As HoS matures, it would strengthen the institution to have additional operational checks, for example, Foundation Directors or the Security Council jointly accountable for Skin-in-the-Game disbursement decisions, not only consulted on treasury custody. This is less about any individual and more about the standing architecture HoS is establishing now and inheriting later.

Suggested amendments

To summarize, three asks I’d love to see addressed, either in this proposal or as a fast-follow:

  1. Eligibility criteria / thematic priorities for the co-funding pool, anchored in NEAR’s decentralization thesis.

  2. At least one outcome KPI and an end-of-season portfolio review for co-funded proposals.

  3. A ring-fenced, publicly addressable on-chain location for the $500k Skin-in-the-Game pool, plus joint operational accountability beyond a single role.

Closing

The direction this proposal sets is the right one, and the bounded-by-Season-#1 review clause means we’re committing to an experiment, not a permanent structure. Alongside the cost-reduction update AK has signaled is coming, I’d ask the team to address the three Skin-in-the-Game points above. With those refinements, I’d be ready to support the proposal. Without them, I’d want a clearer sense of how the team plans to handle them before a yes.

Thanks again to AK and the team for the work and the openness to feedback.

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34

Hi everyone,

This proposal has been updated to a new version incorporating community feedback. See changelog for details.

The minimum feedback period before Screening Committee approval and voting starts today and runs until May 11, 2026 according to HoS’s Proposal and Voting Procedures.

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35

Hi @yadirab, thanks for the questions!

The updated proposal addresses many of them. I’ll follow up on the rest in a separate post shortly.

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36

First of all, let me express my deepest :heart_hands: sympathy for your struggles in fulfilling your duties in this paid role. I hope we can all stand in solidarity and support of your struggles.

There’s nothing personal in my critiques of mathematics, the budget or the overall results delivered. I expressed similar concerns over the NDC. We all know what a debacle that turned out to be.

:white_check_mark: Big corporations can budget themselves differently than a small group.

:cross_mark: This doesn’t excuse or explain the overages.

I like the precedent of including cute memes here. However, if the “Ken” characterization was targeted at myself, it is not only off-topic, but inaccurate. It isn’t hard to get it wrong here. In your own words, you described “Ken” as an anon builder. Presuming the background of an anonymous person tells us more about your imagination than the budget.

We still do not have a coherent explanation for:

  1. The per-proposal multiplier :cross_mark:
  2. The misleading false dichotomy :cross_mark:
  3. Why on-chain governance meetings needed 24/7 IT support :cross_mark:

Moving forward with a reduced budget is an improvement. I would recommend further cuts. The lack of accountability remains concerning.

37

Thank you so much for this thorough revision, @AK_HoG . I particularly appreciate the move to a ‘Functional Independence’ model.

By leveraging shared resources for administrative tools while maintaining sovereign control over our Execution Infrastructure, I believe we are striking the right balance between fiscal responsibility and institutional security. The explicit inclusion of Fiduciary Neutrality in our Data & Insights capability is a vital standard that is needed for the HoS, as it assumes oversight of protocol revenues.

Your revision successfully addresses my concerns regarding execution reliability and the ‘Trust but Verify’ mandate. I am ready to support this Season #1 budget for an on-chain vote. Tks!

1 Like
38

Hi @yadirab thanks again for your questions on the Skin-in-the-Game mechanism, they are very relevant, happy to provide answers.

HoS’s investment scope is defined by its mandate as NEAR’s Treasury Governance Engine (see House of Stake 2.0).
The Constitutional Documents, which define the mandate-guided evolution of HoS, were ratified by tokenholders in February.

The mandate is intentionally narrow and focused on economics. Every proposal has to align with it, and the Screening Committee makes sure that bar is met.

According to this mandate, House of Stake will focus on proposals around Ecosystem Value Accrual & Economic Sustainability:

  • Exploring approaches to ecosystem value accrual
  • Exploring approaches to managing NEAR ecosystem assets in the long-term interest of the protocol. (such as top-level accounts)
  • Evaluating approaches to long-term economic sustainability, including responsible governance of protocol economic parameters.

This blog post and this forum post provide more details.

Co-funding scope. The 15% co-fund applies only to funding proposals that are approved through HoS governance in Season #1. By definition, these proposals have already passed mandate alignment via the Screening Committee. So the co-fund isn’t indiscriminate, it follows the mandate filter.

The Skin-in-the-Game mechanism only provides co-funding to proposals that have passed. That means it’s ultimately up to tokenholders to evaluate whether a proposal meets their expectations in terms of ROI and overall value to the ecosystem—and to vote accordingly.

We intentionally don’t define a standard ROI/KPI. If you look at past proposals, they differ quite a bit:

  • HSP-003 focused on increasing the amount of NEAR locked in the system, measuring success through things like total veNEAR supply and the percentage of staked NEAR migrated to House of Stake (see details here).
  • HSP-007 focused on building out MPC node infrastructure, with success measured through metrics like monthly active MPC node count (see details here).

Even with just these two examples, the difference in goals and KPIs is clear. Because of that, it makes more sense for proposal authors to define their own KPIs, explain the expected ROI of HoS’s Skin-in-the-Game, and discuss it with tokenholders. Tokenholders can then make an informed decision when voting. Once a proposal passes, and only then, the mechanism is triggered and funds are disbursed from the Co-Funding Pool.

The latest proposal update adds more detail here:

  • Quarterly reporting — A comprehensive report covering KPIs, budget usage, buffer utilization, co-funding allocations, and functional independence.

This will include HoS wallet addresses so fund flows can be tracked transparently. It also makes sense to hold the budget allocated for co-funding in a separate address for clarity.

In fact, the process already includes these checks:

  • Whether a proposal should pass, and receive HoS co-funding, is decided by tokenholders through the full, ratified governance process. That’s why tokenholders are listed as accountable, they have the final say.
  • The Head of Governance executes the co-funding mechanism, but only after a positive tokenholder vote.
  • HoS Directors and the Security Council, as well as the Screening Committee are also involved as part of the checks defined in the proposal process.

So decision-making, execution, and oversight are split across different actors within the governance framework so that no single entity can decide on any co-funding allocation.

Summary

This proposal is making a commitment that the House of Stake takes responsibility for making sound funding decisions, it does not, however, decide on specific allocations itself. The allocation is subject to the checks and balances defined in the House of Stake’s Proposal Process.

Overall, it’s great to see so many thoughtful questions around the Skin-in-the-Game mechanism. It clearly shows that when there’s real skin in the game, voters engage more deeply and evaluate proposals more thoroughly. That level of scrutiny is a key ingredient for making House of Stake successful.

Definitely the right direction, thank you for your questions @yadirab. :rocket:

2 Likes
39

Hi all,

We’ve just published an updated version of the House of Stake Operations Budget Proposal for 2026/2027.

You can find it here:

It’s about:

Lean Governance

Many DAOs talk about “lean governance” today.

Too often, that becomes a first step toward re-centralization, where key decisions and asset management gradually move back to a foundation, council, or small group of key leaders.

At House of Stake, we also need to go lean. But we mean something different.

House of Stake has a clear mandate: becoming NEAR’s Treasury Governance Engine, an independent body focused on economic policy. We have a Constitution and policy framework that were ratified by the community in February with 100% support, and we remain committed to that mandate.

When we talk about lean governance, we mean that governance operations should adapt to decision demand.

Our product is not software. Our product is legitimate, transparent, and well-informed decision-making in the best interest of NEAR. If demand for decisions is low, the operational apparatus supporting those decisions should be lean as well.

Why we’re reducing the budget

Since mid-April, when we published the first budget proposal, we have had six proposal authors preparing for a vote. We were running proposal clinics and workshops, while building the operational capacity needed to support several promising initiatives.

Since then, some proposals have been postponed, while others have not yet reached the proposal stage. As a result, governance activity has remained lower than expected.

We therefore propose a much leaner setup: We agreed with the NEAR Foundation that, until proposal flow increases sustainably, House of Stake will avoid building standalone operational infrastructure where suitable resources already exist. This way, we’ll preserve as much of House of Stake’s treasury as possible for future demand.

We will leverage NF capabilities wherever appropriate, particularly for:

  • Software and operational licenses

  • KYC/KYB infrastructure

  • Payment rails

  • Data and analytics

  • Legal support

At the same time, House of Stake will maintain independence in areas that are core to its mission:

  • Legal compliance and financial reporting for the House of Stake Foundation

  • Treasury management and transaction security through NEAR’s Trezu infrastructure

  • Dedicated governance, operations, and IT support where independent capacity is required, or where NF resources are limited.

Updated operating budget

The revised annual operations budget is:

$196,000 USD plus 60,000 NEAR

This represents approximately 23.16% of the original budget request in April.

Unlike previous budget proposals, this budget covers a full 12-month operating period rather than the remainder of 2026. We are nearly halfway through the year already, making the reduction even more significant. We remain committed to reduced costs if governance activity and proposal demand require it.

Removing Skin in the Game

We are also proposing to remove the Skin-in-the-Game mechanism.

This is not because the mechanism itself lacks merit. Rather, at this stage it remains unclear whether, when, and to what extent protocol revenues will be distributed through House of Stake in the foreseeable future.

Rather than implementing a mechanism without a clear use case, we believe it is better to revisit it when conditions justify it.

Removing the buffer

Finally, we have removed the operational buffer.

NF has confirmed it can support genuine emergency situations. Any additional costs arising from future proposals should be included and justified within those proposals directly.

Our principle: governance should breathe

These changes reflect a simple principle:

  • We don’t build infrastructure that isn’t needed.

  • We create systems that can grow and shrink with demand.

  • We introduce mechanisms because they serve the ecosystem, not because governance frameworks are expected to have them.

  • We keep costs low while remaining ready to scale when activity returns.

That said, thank you to all who made good thoughtful comments to the budget proposals so far. We hope it is clear that community feedback has directly shaped these changes, and we welcome further discussion!

Let’s prove that flexibility, speed, and collective decision-making can reinforce each other rather than compete with each other.
Onwards!

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