The purpose of this blog is to provide an alternative and uncensored stream of information around the House of Stake governance process — until the House of Stake becomes truly independent from the NF identity and influence.
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Hello everyone,
This past week has been unexpectedly eventful—yet, for reasons unknown, much of it remained unreported or unaddressed.
Few months ago, Ilia reported that a representative from House of Stake would be presented in the NEAR Foundation’s Council (NF Board).
During the week, Near Community launched a poll —a temperature check aimed at identifying preferred candidates for this seat.
The poll attracted strong participation, with three primary candidates emerging:
Among them, James received the highest number of votes. James brings over five years of active experience in NEAR governance and community-building, having played critical roles in several DAOs and past Community experiments.
That same week, Bianca, a member of the NEAR Foundation Legal Team, joined the House of Stake chat and affirmed that the long-term intention is for the community to govern and manage proposal flows. This encouraging development reminds us that the funds in the House of Stake treasury genuinely belong to the Community.
Another notable event was the AMA with @lane. While roadmap talks and vague language often dominate these sessions, one significant point stood out: the community is now invited to start submitting proposals via the governance forum. Though the final form is not yet approved, a working draft was shared by Agora team. This form may definitely evolve.
The chat also saw heated discussions around reducing inflation in the NEAR ecosystem. While final figures remain unclear, a majority appear to support a reduction. Some dissenters expressed caution. Ultimately, this issue lies within the authority of Near validators.
Near Maxi (c)
Aside from James—who continues active contribution in the Governance Squad working group—we saw little public activity from other delegates this week. James is currently working on automating governance voting and introducing more transparent, bot-supported vote progression models.
Calls to reorganize the Screening Committee have resurfaced. Community members feel it either failed in its duty during the delegate selection process or no longer serves a significant role—such as pre-screening proposals, identifying spam, or security concerns—which could instead be handled by delegates and veNEAR holders themselves.
Its full composition remains opaque, though it is said to include Lane, a member from NearOne, one from Gauntlet, and two unnamed individuals linked to the NEAR Foundation. So far, the NEAR Foundation has chosen not to disclose their identities.
@Uhthred_B, a dedicated contributor to House of Stake, has made significant progress on the Conflict of Interest Policy. I encourage everyone to review and comment:
Conflict of Interest Policy Draft
Let’s be clear: these policies and processes are not the exclusive domain of the Foundation. The House of Stake treasury is community-owned, and it is the community that must shape and enforce governance norms.
Recently, Lane introduced several new roles under his direction, supported by the NEAR Foundation:
While some of these roles make structural sense—Head of Product, for instance, can help coordinate contractors—others raise serious concerns. The Community Lead role should not be appointed by the Foundation. Instead, it should emerge from within the House of Stake, potentially elected or rotated among delegates.
A proposal has also been made to create a Social Media Team under House of Stake management. The NEAR Foundation’s Legal Team is expecting a draft version by mid-next week.
It is essential to clarify that House of Stake is not a traditional “community”. What it truly needs is structured, independent marketing and communication infrastructure, not a return to legacy-style Foundation-managed “community management.”
Let’s also remember that Ilia previously disbanded the NEAR Community Team for valid reasons. Reinstating that model would represent a step backward.
All responsibilities mentioned by Lane—such as AMAs, communication, social media, and announcements— must be handled by a dedicated House of Stake media team, directly accountable to House of Stake governance. That is the only structure that ensures independence, neutrality, and transparency.
Community communication must remain autonomous from the Foundation.
There have also been questions and concerns surrounding university-led governance research initiatives funded by the NEAR Foundation. Community strongly encourage the Foundation to ensure open competitions for research grants, so that universities worldwide can participate transparently and fairly.
In addition to the proposed House of Stake Media Team (intended to replace the need for a centralized Community/Comms Lead role within NF), several other initiatives have emerged—many of them led by NEAR’s founding contributors and long-term stakeholders.
As Ilia previously explained, following the dismissal of the NEAR Community Team, the moderator team was also disbanded, and—in a second step—the responsibility for managing NEAR’s broader social media presence (excluding X/Twitter) was transferred to the community via Service DAO.
However, for unclear reasons, a NEAR Foundation staff member later reversed Ilia’s decision, reclaiming control over these channels back under NF authority.
So, the proposal will focused on saving the team, but transition Near Squad team to the House of Stake.
Another major initiative underway is the revival of community-driven marketing, in various experimental forms. One such example is the FAST Marketing proposal, which aims to support ecosystem influencers and grassroots visibility campaigns across NEAR.
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It was revealed today that Klaus Brave @KlausBrave, an contractor hired by @lane (without competition) to assist with governance, received a staggering $15,600 USDC in just one month — with no public report provided to justify the payment?
This feels deeply inconsistent with Lane’s own statement here:
“There should be an accountability <…> for every dollar that gets spent.”
Where is that accountability now?
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Thanks for the update. Dacha.
House of Stake — Weekly Recap (week 27)Here’s a detailed recap of this week’s House of Stake unfiltered updates.
This week, the House of Stake–endorsed delegates held their kick-off offsite in Cannes. However, there is still no concrete update on when the House of Stake will launch its operations. You can listen to the latest AMA here: AMA Recording
Key points: the open roles for HoS are still under discussion. Also, @KlausBrave highlighted the importance of pioneering AI governance — NEAR has a chance to lead in this area. I’m personally glad to be involved and to see some progress here.
It also seems that @bearmans was hired as another contractor, but his role and remuneration is still unclear.
Picture generated by chatGPT
One of NEAR’s founding fathers and top validators, Vadim, publicly asked for this information — “Looks like a great event! Where can I see a transparent report of the expenses for this governance offsite in Cannes?” — but no answer has been provided so far.
This question was directed at @lane . There is still no published, transparent report providing a breakdown of expenses for this governance offsite in Cannes.
We are expecting the same level of transparency from @KlausBrave regarding the payment.
In the House of Stake chat, Prakharr is developing a Telegram bot that can automatically generate chat summaries and other features. Anyone who wants to contribute to this practical tool is welcome to join the discussion here: Join the work
The Treasury Management Working Group has launched a short survey to gather community input on treasury priorities, funding strategy, and risk management. Your input will help shape how funds are allocated, converted, and managed. If you have 10–15 minutes, please complete it this weekend or early next week: HoS Treasury Survey
The NEAR Foundation agreed to transfer responsibility for managing NEAR’s social media channels (excluding X/Twitter) to the Community and the House of Stake. This actually happened in Q2 2024 when the NF Community and moderators team were disbanded, and the Community was empowered to manage these channels. The Community also supported this move — see the poll results in the screenshot.
The NEAR Community Squad leadership is now expected to:
Community chats are the primary touchpoint that users interact with daily, so it’s essential for a leading blockchain to have effective AI agents in place for moderation and real-time support.
The great target deadline for delivering this by July 31st. If the current team is unable or prefers not to take this on, I’m happy to help find someone suitable or support anyone who would like to lead this effort.
Since one of the team members I respect in the Squad asked me not to publish this as a formal proposal on the forum yet, I’ll keep it as a draft for now.
Everyone is encouraged to review the working draft and share ideas here: Working Document
The House of Stake — Social Media & Governance Operations Charter has now been published, replacing the idea to hire Comm/Media lead at NF initially proposed by @lane.
This Charter outlines the mission, team structure, roles, and responsibilities for managing NEAR’s core community channels under the House of Stake. It defines clear workflows for content creation, moderation, design, KPIs, budget, and reporting lines to ensure operations are transparent and community-led.
Key roles include:
Everyone is encouraged to read it, leave comments, suggest improvements — and if you’d like to take on any of these roles, please don’t hesitate to post your CV or a short intro directly under the forum thread: Submit your interest here
According to the framework, the role of the Screening Committee is to initiate delegate selection processes, pre-screen grant proposals, and ensure continuous evaluation of governance efficacy.
There have been ongoing discussions about the practical scope of this committee, including concerns about potential conflicts of interest within the SC. As a result, the idea to establish a Due Diligence Team (DDT) under the House of Stake Security Council was proposed.
The DDT would strengthen this framework by conducting independent reviews — including conflict-of-interest checks — verifying proposals and payments in detail, and providing clear reports to the Security Council.
Poll: What is the main goal of the Screening Committee (SC)?
Results (ordered by support, high to low):
Takeaway:
Most voters trust delegates and veNEAR holders to handle proposal filtering on their own and see the SC as unnecessary or bureaucratic once the initial setup is done. Only a small share see it as vital for removing delegates.
The current plan is to build a proper Council structure to handle conflict-of-interest checks and other reviews.
This document has already been sent to the NEAR Foundation and @lane to integrate into the HoS framework, which is not yet finalized according to the latest AMA session.
Similar due diligence teams exist in other ecosystems — so creating one here is both logical and necessary.
Please review the doc and share your input: Proposal — Creation of a Due Diligence Team (DDT)
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PS: Speaking of news filtering and why truly independent media is so important — just look at how the NF is actively promoting the proposal about lowering inflation across all social media channels, yet not once has there been any information shared about this proposal: https://vote.intea.rs. Personally, I also support the first proposal, but such important proposals should never be subject to censorship.
Amazing. Numbers speak louder than words.
Imagine if these funds were directed towards builders releasing active NEAR dapps (with real users) instead of insiders.
For what ?
Building a Community ?
Where they can build? help each other ? Govern the chain ?
No need, we have AI !
Woah.
I think you’re getting ahead of yourself here. There’s no need to actually use AI for the things you mentioned. Instead I suggest that we eat funds to talk about maybe using AI in the future for these things.
Besides, what’s another 463 days and 522K ?
We can always pivot to something else later.
Nearly 16 months after NEAR co-founder Illia Polosukhin tasked the NEAR Foundation with building a new governance framework, the flagship initiative known as House of Stake (HoS) remains offline. More than $500,000 has reportedly been spent so far — not including Gauntlet’s paychecks, traveling, events like the recent presentation in Cannes, and internal coordination efforts. Yet the governance platform is still only available in testnet alpha, with no confirmed date for mainnet launch.
The prolonged delay is drawing growing criticism from across the NEAR community. Calls are intensifying to prioritize delivery and elevate execution-oriented contributors. One independent developer shipped a working NEAR wallet in just three weeks*, prompting some to suggest recruiting builders like this into leadership — especially in light of the departure of former COO Chris Donovan from full time role.
Meanwhile, the NEAR Foundation’s commitment to transparency remains under scrutiny. Though it publicly pledged to release regular financial disclosures, no specific breakdown has been shared regarding costs associated with the Cannes trip or HoS-related contractor payments. This absence of detail has only deepened concerns around accountability — especially after reports surfaced that an advisor known as @KlausBrave received $15,600 for work on HoS before disappearing from all public channels without delivering visible output.
Despite these headwinds, development continues. James W, lead of the Governance Infrastructure & Process working group, confirmed that Agora’s frontend is actively being tested. A governance assistant is expected to be ready for testing within the week. AI summarization tools, including GovBot, are already functional across Discourse and X , with possible Discord integration in development. Additionally, a prototype “shade agent” capable of autonomously reviewing proposals is under exploration, potentially evolving into an AI delegate. Discussions are ongoing about deploying a global HoS voting contract and integrating governance tools with platforms like neartreasury.com and nearn.io. Still outstanding, however, are foundational governance documents such as a Code of Conduct, a Mission/Vision/Values statement, and a Conflict of Interest policy.
In parallel, Kent Fenwick and the Agora team have launched a public alpha version of the governance app. Users can test proposal flows and voting mechanics on testnet. Agora’s frontend code will soon be open-sourced, once placeholder code is cleaned. FastNEAR has resolved a known undelegation bug. The tentative roadmap includes updating smart contracts, enhancing delegate filtering, and coordinating with NF to finalize a mainnet launch date.
Broader governance questions also surfaced this week. Charles, one of the initial HoS delegates, proposed transitioning around ten NEAR Foundation departments to community control (Bianca NF HoS coordinator didn’t confirm it). Validator operations and founder support could fall under HoS oversight within 12–18 months, depending on execution capacity and agreements. He also mentioned that the initial six-month HoS budget will prioritize AI governance tools and liquidity incentives.
The announcement sparked mixed reactions. Some raised concerns about a potential conflict of interest, noting Charles’s ties to Benevo Labs, an AI and DeFi venture. Others see AI alignment as consistent with NEAR’s broader strategy.
Personally, I view this more optimistically — at the very least, we might finally get a dedicated AI agent managing NEAR’s social media. (Earlier, @Illia terminated NF’s moderation team with the idea of transitioning to AI agents managed social media.)
Still, there’s legitimate concern: @crypto_psalm flagged that the budget process lacks broader community input and doesn’t include other essential expense categories.
A mock poll conducted within the HoS community asked members to define the “HoS North Star”. A tongue-in-cheek result the winner was raising the price of $NEAR to $142.37 againts of used before (in NDC) benchmarks like: net new user growth, 30-day retention, active application count, and net inflows.
In related governance developments, the community began voting on which NF functions should be prioritized for migration under HoS. Surprisingly, DevHub led the polling.
I disagree with that. Overall, Vlad Frolov has been managing DevHub quite effectively, despite some open questions around marketing and community engagement. He’s not afraid to shut down unsuccessful projects like Race of Sloth and move forward. The new Near N project has real potential to become a leader — with the right marketing and community strategy. If anyone has ideas, feel free to share.
As for Nearweek, it’s worth considering what exactly is being offered on the market for the $35,000 that the NEAR Foundation is paying them. There may be alternatives. That said, the community reacted negatively to the idea of the HoS working directly with Nearweek at the time.
Elsewhere, Lane Rettig — NF’s Head of Governance and Research — launched a public GitHub repository for House of Stake development: https://github.com/houseofstake
Its intended use remains unspecified, but it could serve as a central coordination point for ongoing technical work.
(*) 3 months
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Where are these discussions taking place? The discussions in the Working groups concluded that it is a bad idea to dilute attention in the early days of HoS. Stop reporting BS as facts, because it helps your agenda!
Dacha stop the cap - you left your comments on the document - which you had to backtrack because that would have conflicted you out of the discussion.
She did confirm this - she confirmed that there are no plans to transfer any departments to HoS - false flag propaganda once again-
Who handles this account? Is this you? What legitimacy do you have to control this handle?
So you ONLY agree with the community when it suits your own opinion? Either all telegram polls are sacred or none are.
The community reacted positively to the work that NEARweek is doing at the time. The disagreement was with YOU dredging them on the HoS telegram group.
Now, on another note, why wouldn’t you report on your Arbitrum adventures?
Dear @UhthredB,
Thank you kindly for your thoughtful contributions to the independent media blog — your input is truly appreciated.
I’m genuinely glad to see more community members becoming actively engaged. Regarding @KlausBrave — yes, he has indeed gone quiet across all channels. This isn’t just a personal impression: I haven’t seen any recent participation from him in the public chats, nor any updated input on the Conflict of Interest (CoI) document.
You are warmly invited to join the working group Telegram chat to follow the full context of the discussion and view the related post.
Conflict typically arises when financial incentives are involved. In my case, I participate voluntarily, much like Eugene H., with no monetary interest at stake.
Yes, she did not confirm the transition as claimed. My original statement remains factually correct.
Respectfully, I encourage you to feel free to create your own blog or communication channel to express your perspective. Open discussion is always welcome.
That was part of a broader healthily discourse — intended to spark deeper engagement. I simply summarized the Community sentiment to bring attention to the larger conversation despite of my opinion.
With appreciation,
Watchfrog team 
It’s been a relatively quiet week in NEAR’s governance channels – perhaps a seasonal lull as many take summer holidays and as the community anticipates the imminent rollout of the House of Stake (HoS) platform. NEAR Foundation’s Lane Rettig, who leads the HoS initiative, returned from the EthCC conference and a short vacation noting he was “still deeply in message debt and catching up”. This lightened activity comes as HoS moves closer to launch; the Agora team confirmed that smart contract audits are scheduled and a tentative go-live date of August 7, 2025 has been set pending a successful audit. An updated HoS testnet frontend is already live for community testing. With these milestones in sight, many discussions have paused, creating a brief calm before HoS governance truly begins.
This week brought concrete progress reports from the HoS leadership. In a July 17 update, Lane summarized recent developments: the HoS team has established a bare-bones web landing page and is finalizing operational details like entity formation (e.g. setting up a Fireblocks vault for the HoS treasury). Perhaps most notably, Lane revealed that NEAR Foundation (NF) has partnered with “a lab at a major research university” to pursue governance research, with terms just finalized and a formal announcement expected soon. This direct funding of an academic initiative – done without any open request for proposals – has prompted some community concern about discretionary spending. In response, community members are “strongly encourag[ing] the Foundation to ensure open competitions for research grants, so that universities worldwide can participate transparently and fairly.”
On July 21, an update from Kent (of Agora) delivered welcome news on HoS technical progress. He confirmed that a bug fix to the HoS smart contracts has been completed and those contracts (v1.0.1) are now entering an external audit by Halborn slated for July 28–August 1. Barring any issues, August 7, 2025 is the target launch date for House of Stake’s initial version – roughly on schedule after months of development. Kent provided a new staging site URL for the HoS frontend and urged community members to keep testing and reporting bugs or feedback ahead of the production release. If all goes smoothly, NEAR token holders will soon be able to lock NEAR for veNEAR, delegate to endorsed delegates, and vote on proposals via the HoS platform.
Even as HoS’s technical launch nears, governance of the initiative’s human and financial resources remains under scrutiny. Lane noted that just last month NF introduced a new “compensation committee” to review and approve all roles and expenditures related to HoS. This committee was established to bring more oversight and rigor to how funds are spent – a response to earlier ad-hoc decisions that raised eyebrows. For example, a community watchdog blog revealed that a contractor hired to assist HoS governance (without any competitive process) was paid $15,600 in a single month with “no public report provided to justify the payment”, calling it “deeply inconsistent” with the principle that “there should be an accountability… for every dollar that gets spent.”. Such instances – along with questions about uncompetitive vendor selection – underscore why many see the compensation committee as critical for transparency in expenses, vendor selection, and accountability. The committee’s role will be to vet salaries, contracts, and budgets, ensuring that funds are allocated prudently and with clear justification. As one community member bluntly asked regarding opaque spending, “Where is that accountability now?”.
Meanwhile, within the budding House of Stake council itself, debates continue over how (and whether) the 11 endorsed delegates should be compensated. Some delegates have proposed receiving stipends or rewards for their work even before HoS is live – a point of contention for many in the NEAR community. Critics argue that compensation should be earned through meaningful contributions and only with approval from the token holders the delegates represent. In fact, the original HoS proposal suggested any delegate reward pool must be “voted on and approved by the community” in a transparent manner. Community sentiment echoes that delegate rewards ought to depend on demonstrable work and merit, not entitlement. As one community member noted in a forum discussion, it’s fortunate that NEAR holders can always choose to vote directly because “so far, not a single delegate has earned that merit.” The implication is clear: to deserve pay, delegates must first prove their value.
Transparency – a recurring theme in NEAR’s governance discussions – remains a point of tension, especially regarding who is making decisions behind the scenes and how funds are used. One focal point is the HoS Screening Committee, the small group tasked with selecting the initial delegates and fast-tracking certain proposals. Back in March, Lane outlined the committee’s composition in broad terms (three NF representatives, one NEAR One core dev, and one Gauntlet member). However, the actual identities of some members – particularly the NF-appointed individuals – were never officially disclosed. Now, more than six months since delegate selection began, community members are pressing for clarity. They feel the Screening Committee has either outlived its usefulness or failed to be sufficiently open about its makeup and mandate. “Its full composition remains opaque,” one forum blog noted, saying it’s “said to include Lane, a member from NearOne, one from Gauntlet, and two unnamed individuals linked to the NEAR Foundation.” Moreover, “so far, the NEAR Foundation has chosen not to disclose their identities.” Such opacity has fueled calls to either reveal the committee members or even reform the process, folding any necessary duties into the delegates’ and community’s hands. In response, there’s talk of establishing a dedicated Due Diligence Team under the HoS Security Council to independently vet proposals and check conflicts of interest, adding another layer of accountability.
The community is also demanding transparency in how NF-sponsored events and initiatives are budgeted. The first in-person HoS kickoff event in Cannes (held alongside EthCC) is a case in point. By all accounts the July gathering was productive – “a big success… a great first opportunity to get to know one another, build trust, share updates”, according to Lane’s recap. However, questions have been raised about the costs and funding of that event. Only Lane has provided a public summary of what transpired. There has been no detailed expense report released to the community yet, despite this being an NF-funded offsite to kickstart a “community-owned” governance project. On social media, a prominent NEAR validator openly asked, “Where can I see a transparent report of the expenses for this governance offsite in Cannes?”. So far, there has been no public answer. Community members expect that delegate attendance and NF-funded activities be justified openly – some have even suggested that any NF-funded delegate who fails to secure at least 10,000 veNEAR in community delegation should return the funds allocated to them for such events or roles. The rationale is that delegates need a minimum level of token-holder support to validate the investment in them. (Notably, of all delegates, Lane himself was the only one to promptly publish a detailed Cannes trip report on the forum.) The silence from others on their takeaways or spending has only amplified calls for full disclosure. The Cannes case underscores why many in the community insist that House of Stake’s finances be treated with DAO-like openness going forward – every event, grant, or expenditure should be logged and reported.
As NEAR’s grand governance experiment prepares to launch, the community’s message is that transparency and accountability are not optional – they are prerequisites for legitimacy. There is even a growing sentiment that NEAR’s founders should intervene to ensure the experiment stays on course. Some community members are urging Illia Polosukhin, NEAR’s co-founder, to take a more active oversight role: specifically, to impose a hard cap on compensation within the House of Stake (for example, setting strict limits on delegate stipends, committee budgets, and other payouts) and to institute a clearly defined trial period for this new governance model. The idea would be to treat HoS’s first months as a pilot – with capped costs and continuous evaluation – rather than an open-ended entitlement. By setting these guardrails, Illia could signal that while the Foundation supports decentralizing governance, it will not allow runaway spending or unchecked authority in the name of “community” without proven results. “The House of Stake treasury is community-owned, and it is the community that must shape and enforce governance norms,” as one forum post put it. Many believe a mandate from the top to limit pay and periodically review HoS’s performance would reinforce that principle and protect the experiment’s integrity.
PS:
Wonderful to see more volunteers from the community stepping up to strengthen the new $NEAR governance experiment! Join the event or host your own!
Meanwhile, Klaus and Lane have launched a dedicated DAO — hos-bounties.sputnik-dao.near — to fund bounties related to HoS for the Community contributors, with an initial budget of $5,000.
Interested in joining the Compensation Committee?
Hit like under Rika Golberg’s post to express interest.
Time Passed Since the NEAR Foundation announced New Governance but not yet launched: 477 days, 17 hours, 43 minutes, 29 seconds, 121 ms
Approximate Money Already Burned: $552,555.48 USD (not including Cannes trips, flights, Gauntlet invoices)
In a recent AMA session with NEAR Foundation’s legal team, Bianca highlighted a major overhaul of the House of Stake (HoS) – NEAR’s emerging community governance and treasury entity. The HoS is moving from an initial trust-based setup to a more flexible foundation structure registered in the Cayman Islands . Under this model, the House of Stake Foundation has no shareholders or beneficiaries, and it controls a subsidiary company in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) to facilitate operations . This two-layer structure is designed to streamline payments (for example, paying contractors in fiat currency, which was challenging under the old trust) .
Key details of the new structure include:
Cayman Foundation: The HoS Foundation is incorporated in the Cayman Islands, offering simplicity and flexibility (unlike a rigid trust). It holds the community’s treasury funds and is not owned by any shareholders .
BVI Subsidiary: A limited liability company in the BVI, fully owned by the HoS Foundation, will execute contracts and payments (solving prior issues in paying out funds).
Independent Directors & Accountants: The foundation’s board is minimal – currently a single corporate director provided by a third-party service (unaffiliated with NEAR Foundation) . In addition, a UK accounting firm (Harris & Trotter) specializing in crypto finance has been engaged to manage accounts . This ensures professional oversight of the books.
Bianca noted that treasury management may involve creating sub-accounts or “sub-treasuries” with quarterly budgets to buffer against crypto market volatility . Importantly, she stressed that all HoS funds ultimately belong to the community, not the NEAR Foundation . The new legal structure is meant to enshrine that principle, while providing a clear framework to operate independently yet in coordination with NEAR Foundation on broad ecosystem goals .
The House of Stake is envisioned as a community-driven governance body with checks and balances, taking lessons from NEAR’s previous experiment, the “NEAR Digital Collective” (NDC). It comprises three main groups with distinct roles:
Screening Committee: A small committee that initially vetted delegate applications and is supposed to pre-screen funding proposals. This group holds significant power as a gatekeeper for what gets to a vote and probably, even has budget execution authority (similar to the NDC’s former trustees) . However, its membership has not been fully disclosed.
Endorsed Delegates: An initial cohort of 11 delegates was announced in March. These individuals and organizations – ranging from NEAR contributors to outside ecosystems – will debate and vote on proposals. The delegate system is meant to make on-chain governance more efficient for everyday token holders , though any NEAR holder with “veNEAR” voting tokens can still vote directly on proposals without delegating, if they wish .
Security Council: A watchdog body (akin to an “enforcer”) that can veto proposals or take emergency action on security matters. This council is still being formed, but Bianca indicated it could serve as an additional check – for example, intervening if the Screening Committee or delegates approved something malicious or against the community’s interest . It’s comparable to similar oversight councils in other DAO frameworks (and in the previous NDC model). So, the community proposed a Due Diligence (DD) commission under the Security Council, but the proposal has not yet been reviewed (link). Additionally, not a single document has been shared with the community.
According to Bianca, the community will have ultimate control over these structures. In the AMA, she emphasized that the NEAR community has the power to appoint or remove directors, change the Screening Committee, replace accountants, and otherwise modify governance as needed . The intent is that HoS should not be a static, Foundation-imposed system, but an adaptable framework that the community can shape over time . All critical governance documents – such as the foundation’s bylaws and memorandum of association – are to be published openly so the community can review how everything is set up . Bianca assured that these legal documents would be shared imminently, underscoring that nothing is “secret” about the rules by which HoS will operate.
How a proposal will flow: Bianca described a process where a funding or governance proposal is first reviewed by the Screening Committee, then opened to community discussion and a token vote, and finally requires sign-off by the HoS Foundation’s director to release funds . This multi-step flow is meant to ensure due diligence (via the committee), broad stakeholder input (via token voting), and legal compliance (via the director’s formal approval). To make funding more efficient, she suggested the use of multi-signature wallets or sub-accounts under HoS control, so that approved budgets can be distributed without bottlenecks . This is a conscious move away from the previous NDC model, which saw operational delays in payments – something the Foundation is keen to avoid repeating .
Timeline: The initial launch of House of Stake governance is targeted for early August (with reports suggesting a go-live around August 7). At that point, the first set of proposals and votes can commence. In fact, NEAR ecosystem head Lane Rettig recently indicated in an AMA that the community is now invited to start submitting proposals on the forum, even before the final interface is live .
Despite the positive strides, the rollout of House of Stake has not been without controversy. Community members are demanding greater transparency and voicing concerns about whether HoS will truly break from the past. A focal point of criticism is the Screening Committee. To date, the full composition of this committee remains opaque – an issue Bianca acknowledged. The community was told only that it consists of five individuals (reportedly including Lane Rettig, one member from NEAR One, one from Gauntlet, and two people affiliated with NEAR Foundation) . The Foundation has pointedly refused to disclose the identities of the latter two, which has raised eyebrows . This lack of transparency, coupled with the committee’s outsized role in both selecting delegates and filtering proposals, has led some to question its legitimacy. Calls to reorganize or even disband the Screening Committee have surfaced in the community, with arguments that its duties could instead be handled in the open by the delegates and token holders themselves . In other words, why have an unelected, behind-the-scenes committee at all, if HoS is meant to be community-driven?
Furthermore, while the initial delegate selection was framed as a careful vetting of candidates’ reputation and alignment , skeptics point out apparent conflicts of interest in the outcome. On NEAR’s governance forum, some outspoken community members criticized the list of endorsed delegates as being filled with insiders and NF favorites. One forum participant went so far as to label the selection “illegitimate”, noting that 3 out of 5 screening committee members were NEAR Foundation representatives, inherently biased toward picking their own . The same commenter alleged that several chosen delegates either work for the Foundation or rely on its funding, calling into question their independence .
Another point of contention is the actual engagement (or lack thereof) from some of the new delegates. Delegates representing organizations like Areta, Tane Labs, etc., have seldom posted updates or interacted with community proposals so far. This has fueled questions about whether some delegates are truly committed to NEAR governance or merely lent their names.
Together with Near Ai assistant and ChatGPT we have jumped deeper to analyze their work and commitments at Arbitrum Governance based on the data:
Voting Record: Areta consistently voted on all formal proposals during the evaluated period. In both Snapshot (off-chain) and Tally (on-chain) votes, Areta maintained a 100% voting rate . This indicates reliability in casting votes to meet quorum. However, mere voting presence is only the baseline of delegate activity.
Proposal Authorship: The report shows no record of Areta authoring or sponsoring any governance proposals. There is no indication that Areta took initiative to draft or lead proposals on the forum or Snapshot. The absence of authored proposals suggests a lack of proactive leadership in governance, with Areta primarily acting as a voter rather than a proposer.
Feedback Activity: Areta’s engagement in discussions has been minimal. The DIP feedback metrics show that Areta earned only about 10 out of 40 possible points for delegate feedback in the April reporting period . This low score implies that Areta contributed little in the way of forum comments or substantive feedback on proposals during that month. In fact, Areta did not even meet the threshold for the smallest “presence in discussion” multiplier, indicating fewer than the minimum 2–3 comments required in the relevant discussions. In an earlier month, Areta had provided at most one or two high-quality comments (scoring ~24.9 points for feedback) but still fell short of a sustained engagement level (no multiplier for frequency) . Overall, Areta’s participation in deliberative discussions appears sporadic and limited to brief input rather than ongoing dialogue.
Commentary and Qualitative Notes: The feedback report does not highlight any notable commentary from Areta aside from the quantified scores. The data suggests Areta’s contributions beyond voting were confined to isolated remarks rather than continuous involvement. This pattern – voting on every proposal but rarely voicing opinions or initiating ideas – is a hallmark of passive participation. It signals that Areta has been largely inactive in qualitative governance roles, content to vote but not to drive debate or shape proposals.
In summary, Areta demonstrates passive delegate behavior. They fulfill basic voting duties but show little initiative: no proposals authored and very few comments given. This low-activity profile suggests that Areta is not an active contributor to Arbirum DAO’s governance beyond the bare minimum.
Voting Record: Gauntlet has an impeccable voting record on Arbitrum governance proposals. The DIP report confirms Gauntlet voted in 100% of Snapshot polls and on-chain Tally votes during the measured periods . High voting turnout implies Gauntlet is reliably present for formal decisions, which is positive in terms of meeting quorum and representing delegators on paper.
Proposal Authorship: There is no evidence in the report of Gauntlet authoring any governance proposals. Gauntlet is a well-known organization in the ecosystem, but within Arbitrum DAO’s context, they did not spearhead or submit proposals for consideration (aside from contributing to external initiatives). The lack of authored proposals indicates Gauntlet has not taken a leading role in introducing changes or new initiatives in Arbitrum DAO’s governance; their involvement is mostly reactive (voting on others’ proposals) rather than proactive.
Feedback Activity: Gauntlet’s engagement in forum discussions and delegate feedback has been quite limited for much of the program. In the March feedback report, Gauntlet scored only 12.6 out of 40 points on the Delegate Feedback metric – a low score reflecting minimal commentary or insights shared. During that month Gauntlet did not attain any discussion multiplier, meaning they posted fewer than the required 3 comments in governance threads. By April, Gauntlet’s qualitative participation improved somewhat (feedback score ~23.2/40) , but this boost was largely due to a single initiative: Gauntlet received a one-time 10-point bonus for contributing a “Statement of Support” (SOS) submission . In other words, Gauntlet’s primary qualitative contribution was confined to that one-off activity. Outside of that, the data suggests Gauntlet rarely engages in debates or gives detailed feedback on proposals. They generally did the minimum to satisfy DIP requirements – and in fact were in the lowest reward tier (Tier 3) in earlier months due to low engagement , despite their full voting record.
Commentary and Qualitative Notes: The report does not quote Gauntlet providing extensive commentary on proposals. The pattern that emerges is a delegate with substantial voting power who participates in votes but seldom voices opinions publicly. Gauntlet’s rise to Tier 1 in April was driven by bonus points and slightly more feedback, but it’s noteworthy that this came after prior criticism of the DIP and likely to ensure eligibility; it does not erase the prior inactivity in discussions. In essence, Gauntlet has acted more as a silent voter than an interactive community member. This low-engagement approach is underscored by the fact that even with perfect voting, Gauntlet initially only achieved ~74% total participation score (barely missing the cutoff) because their contributions to discussion were so scant .
Gauntlet’s governance role exhibits limited active participation. While always present in votes, they have provided little in the way of discourse or leadership. The need to rely on bonus points to reach a top-tier score highlights that Gauntlet’s normal level of engagement was not sufficient to be considered a fully active delegate . Not initiating proposals and contributing few comments are clear signs of a predominantly passive governance role, despite the outward appearance of activity through voting.
Voting Record: Klaus Brave’s voting record is technically complete for the proposals tracked – the data shows 100% participation in both Snapshot and Tally votes in recent months . However, it must be noted that Klaus’s delegated voting power was very low, and merely casting votes did not translate into meaningful influence or robust participation under DIP criteria.
Proposal Authorship: Klaus Brave did not author any proposals in the Arbitrum governance forum or on Snapshot during the evaluated period. There is no indication of Klaus taking a sponsor role for governance initiatives. This lack of authored content suggests no active initiative-taking on Klaus’s part within Arbitrum DAO’s governance – he did not propose changes, funding actions, or new policies.
Feedback Activity: Klaus Brave’s participation in discussions and feedback was virtually nonexistent. According to the feedback report, Klaus earned only around 12 out of 40 points for Delegate Feedback – indicating perhaps a single modest comment or a couple of very brief remarks at best. This level of engagement is insufficient to register any significant impact. He also accrued minimal bonus points (e.g. ~1 point from perhaps attending a call) . The result of such low activity is that Klaus failed to meet the minimum participation threshold for the DIP program. In both March and April, Klaus Brave’s total participation score hovered around 60–61%, below the 65% needed for the lowest incentive tier . In other words, despite voting on everything, Klaus’s lack of substantive contribution led to disqualification from rewards – a clear marker of inactivity. The report explicitly lists him with 0% reward (Tier X) due to not qualifying .
Commentary and Qualitative Notes: The feedback report offers little commentary on Klaus Brave aside from the numbers, likely because there was not much to comment on. The consistently low participation scores speak for themselves: Klaus has been present in name only. He did what requires minimal effort (pressing “yes/no” in votes) but did not engage with the community or proposals in any meaningful way. This passive stance is underscored by the fact that Klaus Brave’s profile had to be marked as not qualified for the delegate program, signaling a level of engagement falling short of the program’s basic expectations . Essentially, Klaus’s role in Arbitrum DAO governance has been inactive: no initiatives led, no influence on discussions, and barely any footprint beyond casting votes.
Klaus Brave is a prime example of an inactive delegate. He maintained nominal participation (voting attendance) but contributed no value-added input. The DIP report data shows two consecutive months of failing to reach even minimal performance cutoffs . This persistent low engagement marks Klaus as a largely dormant participant in governance – a delegate in title who is not effectively performing the role’s responsibilities.
Voting Record: Tané voted on all tracked proposals (100% participation in both Snapshot and on-chain votes) during the period, according to the DIP report . This indicates Tané was reliably present for every decision, similar to the other delegates examined. Voting diligence ensured that Tané met the baseline responsibility of a delegate in Arbitrum DAO’s governance.
Proposal Authorship: The report and forum records show no proposals authored by Tané. Tané did not emerge as a proposer or lead sponsor for any initiatives in the Arbitrum governance process. This suggests that, like the others, Tané has not taken a proactive role in setting the agenda or championing specific changes within the DAO.
Feedback Activity: Among the four delegates in this review, Tané showed relatively more discussion activity early on, but still at a moderate level. In March, Tané earned a substantial Delegate Feedback score (~32.8/40) by contributing to multiple discussions – enough to help achieve a Tier 2 reward at that time. This indicates Tané did provide some meaningful feedback or commentary (likely a handful of constructive posts on proposals) in that month. However, this engagement appears to have waned by April. The April report shows Tané’s feedback score dropped to 21.0/40 , and his overall participation fell to ~71.7%, just barely making Tier 3. Tané also did not secure any discussion multiplier in April (implying fewer than 3 comments that month), similar to Areta. The decreasing feedback contribution suggests that Tané’s initial burst of participation was not sustained. Moreover, Tané’s reliance on the program’s leniency for small delegates is evident: with a low voting power (under 100k ARB), Tané’s contributions needed to be qualitatively significant to count, yet in April he only achieved a borderline score . Tané did gain a couple of bonus points (likely from attending governance calls) but nothing beyond routine involvement.
Commentary and Qualitative Notes: The report does not cite any specific commentary from Tané by content, focusing instead on the numerical scores. From those, we infer that Tané has been somewhat active in providing feedback (more so than the other three delegates) but not to an exceptional degree. It engaged in discussions enough to be recognized, but did not emerge as a leading voice. Notably, Tané’s contributions, while present, did not drive major proposal edits or initiatives as far as the record shows. Its participation, though genuine, stayed within the scope of reacting to proposals rather than initiating them. The decline in his engagement metrics could indicate either burnout or a shift of focus away from Arbitrum governance over time.
While Tané is not completely inactive – it did participate in dialogues to a degree – there are still signs of diminishing and limited engagement. The lack of any authored proposals points to a non-leadership role. The drop from a higher feedback score to just barely above the threshold suggests that Tané’s activity level is inconsistent and possibly trending downward. In April, Tané contributed only what was necessary to remain eligible for incentives, with no extra involvement beyond that . This pattern implies that Tané, like the others, is not fully active in Arbitrum DAO’s governance in a broader sense; he participates, but does not go much beyond the minimum expected input.
This data raises significant concerns about the adequacy of the due diligence conducted in selecting these delegates.
As the House of Stake enters its launch phase, NEAR is at a crossroads in decentralizing its ecosystem governance. On the one hand, the pieces are in place for a groundbreaking experiment: a legally independent community foundation, a hybrid model of expert delegates and open tokenholder voting, and the promise of agile funding for grassroots projects. The changes were driven in part by hard lessons from the NDC’s struggles, and there is real hope that this iteration will succeed in empowering the NEAR community to drive the protocol’s evolution.
On the other hand, trust and transparency will be the make-or-break factors. In the coming weeks, the community will be looking for the NEAR Foundation to follow through on releasing all governance documents and for the HoS committees to conduct business openly. If the Screening Committee continues to operate in the shadows, or if delegates remain uncommunicative, skepticism will only grow. Success for HoS will likely require a cultural shift: the NEAR Foundation must let the community lead (even if that means sometimes relinquishing control or accepting criticism), and the community members in power must rise to the occasion with professionalism and openness.
Bianca’s AMA ended on an optimistic note: she promised more frequent updates and dialogue as HoS ramps up . The community, for its part, is not short on passion or ideas – as evidenced by lively debates on everything from inflation tweaks to social media strategy for NEAR . The stage is set for NEAR’s House of Stake to become a model of decentralized governance, if the talk of community control is earnestly implemented. The coming quarter will be crucial. As funds start to be disbursed and proposals acted upon, NEAR’s wider community will finally be able to judge: Is the House of Stake truly their house, or just another façade?
One thing is clear – all sides agree that transparency and accountability will determine the outcome. As one community blog put it, the HoS treasury “is community-owned, and it is the community that must shape and enforce governance norms” . Achieving that ideal will require continued pressure, good faith on both sides, and likely a few course-corrections along the way. All eyes in the NEAR ecosystem will be watching as this ambitious governance experiment unfolds.
Meanwhile in the Aurora ecosystem – a Near Department of Effectively – the community is rallying behind a proposed update to the AURORA token economy. Aurora Labs CEO Alex Shevchenko revealed in a recent livestream that the “Aurora Token Economy 3.0” proposal has received an enthusiastic reception from community members. The plan outlines several changes to Aurora’s tokenomics and governance, including new revenue-sharing mechanisms and streamlined community treasury funding. According to Alex S., answer regarding plans for the next 6 monts on the last regular weekly updates stream on these ideas has been overwhelmingly positive, and a formal proposal is expected to be submitted to the Aurora DAO for an official vote in the near future.
Alex S. and his team have been notably open to community dialogue, actively discussing proposed changes and incorporating feedback. It’s a great example of how engaging the community early and often can lead to smoother implementation of significant governance reforms across blockchain projects.
If you wish to share concerns anonymously, feel free to use this inbox:
hostip@proton.me
Disclaimer:
Some or all of the content in this document/message/publication was generated using AI language models, including Near AI agent and ChatGPT. While we aim for accuracy and objectivity, the information may contain errors and should not be considered expert or professional advice. The author assumes no responsibility for any outcomes resulting from the use of this information.
After 16 months of planning, NEAR’s long-awaited House of Stake (HoS) governance system is finally on track to debut on August 7, 2025. HoS is a new permissionless, stake-weighted voting framework designed to replace the one-person-one-vote model of the old Near Digital Collective (NDC). In HoS, NEAR tokenholders lock up NEAR (or liquid staking tokens like stNEAR/liNEAR) into a vote-escrow contract to mint veNEAR. The longer NEAR is locked, the more veNEAR (voting power) it generates. This aligns influence with long-term stake and is intended to boost participation and ecosystem growth. By Q1 2025 NEAR had even announced the first 11 “Endorsed Delegates” to represent holders in governance, and partnered with Agora to build the voting front end.
On August 4th, the HoS core team publicly confirmed that “we’re planning to go live in a week, on August 7.” This soft launch is intended as a system check: most on-chain flows will be live (token locking, delegate profiles, proposal creation, screening-committee review, security-council vetoes, etc.), but initially no proposals will actually be executed. In other words, the first phase is a dry-run of the full governance cycle. A public “Final HoS Launch Tasks” dashboard was also published, and the team says once all checklist items are complete, “we have a green light to launch”. In practice, delegates and tokenholders can lock NEAR for veNEAR, register delegate profiles and statements, and experiment with submitting and voting on proposals – but a switch (e.g. once sufficient veNEAR is locked) will be flipped later to enable real on-chain votes.
Key Soft-Launch Features:
Token Locking & veNEAR: Holders can lock NEAR (and stNEAR/liNEAR) into the new escrow contract to receive veNEAR. veNEAR voting power grows with lock duration.
Delegation & Profiles: veNEAR holders assign their voting power to one of the Endorsed Delegates. All delegates have published “statements” outlining their positions.
Proposal & Voting Flows: Any veNEAR-holder can submit grant, governance or budget proposals. Delegates can vote on them. During the soft launch these votes will not yet bind, serving instead to test the on-chain mechanisms.
Oversight Bodies: The Screening Committee (initially composed of NEAR Foundation, Near One and Gauntlet seats) will fast-track or reject proposals, and a Security Council retains an emergency veto power, as designed in the HoS framework.
At release time, vote tallies won’t trigger payouts or changes. This simulated phase is meant to stress-test the system and give time to fill any remaining gaps (finalizing policies, documentation, UI tutorials, etc.) before live governance fully commences. The Hos Core team emphasizes transparency: core members will be doing weekly “office hours” and updates on progress.
Many in the NEAR community are excited that HoS is finally launching, but some have urged caution. Critics point out that some governance components are still unfinished or unclear, specifically citing missing documents such as workflow templates, policy guides, and a clear roadmap. Observers note that detailed guides on how to file proposals, vote, and complete KYC/KYB steps (for grant proposals) are still being finalized. Others have highlighted gaps in stakeholder outreach and marketing readiness, suggesting that public education and PR plans should accompany the launch. (A few community members even recommended delaying HoS’s public rollout into September/October to finalize these pieces, though the team decided to proceed with the early August soft launch.)
Despite these concerns, many see the soft-launch approach as prudent. It gives delegates and tokenholders a sandbox to learn the new system before real stakes are on the line. In practice, once the system is tested, the plan is to “flip the switch” and enable real voting.
A hot topic has been how delegates are compensated. By design, HoS allocates an inflationary token budget (0.5% annual NEAR inflation) to fund delegate rewards and grants. One of proposal envisions giving delegates a $1,000 - $3,000 salary (adjusted for local living costs) , performance-based NEAR token bonuses and some benefits like medical insurance, traveling. The draft framework suggests that delegates’ NEAR rewards would vest and be contingent on peer-reviewed performance scores and the incentive pool (roughly 3,000 NEAR per delegate per month) would be distributed proportionally by each delegate’s median peer score (out of 100 across categories like leadership, community engagement, etc.), with a bonus multiplier for top performers. About 70% of each monthly reward would be liquid, with 30% locked and vesting over a year (so it can be staked again). In theory, this model links compensation to real contributions and locked stake.
However, delegates’ pay has sparked debate. Some argue for even stricter performance criteria or caps. For instance, observers pointed out other DAO experiments (e.g. on Arbitrum) where delegates earned rewards despite low participation. They suggest clauses such as delaying any delegate payments until Q1 2026 to first measure outcomes, or capping pay (e.g. $1,000/month) for delegates without sufficient voting engagement. The idea is to ensure that delegates earn their compensation by actively participating in governance. Others counter that even a guarantee of some compensation is needed to enable delegates to focus on the project and live “a healthy, productive life,” as one recent comment put it. In any case, the final compensation plan is still being refined; the HoS Compensation Committee will make binding decisions on pay levels and any adjustments.
As August 7 approaches, NEAR’s community is in a holding pattern of eager anticipation. The soft launch of House of Stake will be the first time NEAR’s new governance model is active on mainnet. By most accounts it will include the core features that Gauntlet and the NEAR Foundation have been developing for over a year. After this trial period, the team intends to enable full voting power – likely when enough veNEAR has been minted and entrusted. In the meantime, the community will continue refining policies, building documentation (an FAQ and proposal guide are already being drafted), and recruiting additional expertise for governance roles and support teams.
In sum, HoS represents NEAR’s big bet on a stake-weighted, delegated democracy, aiming to deliver “equitable and sustainable growth” for the protocol. The coming weeks will show whether the system works as intended. If all goes smoothly, the House of Stake could become a showcase of accountable, community-driven governance – or at least a valuable learning exercise on that journey.
Q&A: Understanding the Legal Structure of the House of Stake . This detailed FAQ outlines how HoS functions as a legally registered foundation in the Cayman Islands, and explains the roles of Directors, the Security Council, Screening Committee, and endorsed Delegates. It also clarifies community powers, voting mechanisms, and how legal safeguards ensure decentralization with real-world enforceability.–
If you wish to share concerns anonymously, feel free to use this inbox:
hostip@proton.me
Disclaimer:
Some or all of the content in this document/message/publication was generated using AI language models, including Near AI assistant and ChatGPT. While we aim for accuracy and objectivity, the information may contain errors and should not be considered expert or professional advice. The author assumes no responsibility for any outcomes resulting from the use of this information.
The NEAR Protocol’s new on-chain governance portal House of Stake (HoS) is now online in alpha/beta form. The HoS site (accessible at gov.houseofstake.org) allows any NEAR stakeholder to create governance proposals (“Create Proposal”) for review by the Screening Committee. As HoS Lead @lane Rettig reminded the community, participation is permissionless: any token-holder can lock NEAR (into “veNEAR”) and vote, even without formally joining a delegate. (The delegate structure simply streamlines voting for busy users.) The HoS launch has been staggered: an alpha version went live on August 7th and the core team is targeting a full mainnet launch in August 14th.
How it works: Users can now submit proposals to HoS. Each proposal is pre-screened, then put to a vote of delegates and veNear token holders.
Behind the scenes and lack of accountability: Unfortunately, all screening decisions so far still behind closed doors. No public timeline or feedback, except: “No specific deadline. You can see the prioritization of my tasks on the kanban. Reviewing proposals is important but it’s less time sensitive.” - The @lane NF HoS core team member said.
Let’s tale a look on proposals - the Five major HoS-related proposals have already been posted to the NEAR governance forum, indicating the topics delegates and community members are discussing:
Social Media & Ops Charter: to establish a “Social Media Team” and formal communications/operations framework for HoS.
Suspend Delegate Fees: to temporarily set the endorsed-delegate remuneration fee to zero (and strip benefits) through end of 2025. The goal is to lower barriers for delegate participation until the compensation model can be refined.
Due Diligence Team: to create a three-person Due Diligence Team (DDT) under the upcoming HoS Security Council. The DDT would independently audit potential conflicts-of-interest in proposals or budgets and advise the council.
Transparency & Accountability: to urge the Screening Committee to publish its delegate-selection criteria, apply strict COI rules, and require HoS/NF core staff to issue regular public reports. It also calls for more on-chain voting of key decisions.
More Decentralization: A community proposal by @Psalmy recommends phasing out the “endorsed delegate” model after an initial period. It suggests quarterly token-holder snapshots so that the top 10 veNEAR recipients (by stake) become new “verified” delegates representing the community.
Each of these proposals has sparked discussion. However, all review is still by the private screening committee, and no outcomes or schedule have been announced.
Several prominent NEAR community members now serve as HoS delegates, carrying the largest veNEAR voting power. Key figures include:
Evgeny (aka Maestro) Kuzyakov (vote.mob.near): A founding father of NEAR and core developer (FASTNEAR). Maestro helped build NEAR’s protocol tools, making him a trusted technical voice in governance.
Alan (alan777.near): A leading contributor from Meta Pool (the flagship NEAR staking pool). Community endorsements describe Alan as a “key member of the Meta Pool team” with years of NEAR governance experience. He co-founded NEAR education programs and was one of the NEAR Foundation’s initially endorsed delegates.
Vadim Zavodil (zavodil.near): A founding father. Vadim has been active in NEAR’s ecosystem growth since the first days and now represents the entire community.
Illia Polosukhin (root.near): CEO and Co-founder of NEAR and one of the original architects of the protocol. Illia’s foundational role in NEAR’s development (he “initially inspired the House of Stake approach”) gives his delegate status high prestige.
Mister X (grmsn.near): whale who joined near in at the early days 
Slime — the ORIGINAL NEAR developer, active member of the Shitzu community, and founder of the INTEAR wallet. Some community members note that he may be the only original developer still actively working within the NEAR ecosystem.
As well as originally endorsed delegates such as NEARWEEK, the NEAR Foundation’s media outlet, along with 404DAO and Tane Labs.
Not all NF-endorsed delegates have yet joined to the HoS voting portal.
Community members have raised concerns about transparency and readiness. The HoS Core Team has openly acknowledged delays in delivering promised documents and tools. In a late-July update, Lane Rettig reported that the team is “heads down focusing on the launch,” but admitted they’ve been “inconsistent” in providing mission/vision values, proposal templates, and other deliverables. A public dashboard of final tasks was shared, tracking items like a code-of-conduct and user docs that are still in progress.
Key points:
Screening Committee: So far its deliberations remain private. No public criteria or minutes have been released. But if you want to nominate yourself - this is thread of you. Two people already nominated themselves.
Security Council: A five-member HoS Security Council structure (with veto power) is being formed. (According to GitHub issue logs, three of its five seats are already fulfilled ).
NF → HoS Transition: The NEAR Foundation is drafting an NF→HoS transition plan (per GitHub issue #27) outlining how budget and responsibilities will shift over 1–3 years. For example, proposals have suggested forming sub-committees (e.g. infrastructure, local events, investment) each with budgets and accountability metrics. Details are still being worked out.
Hiring: NEAR recently opened a “Head of Governance” position to lead HoS long-term. The role will oversee the constitution, delegate processes, and even integration of AI-tools. This underscores that HoS is intended as a “flagship experiment” in on-chain governance for the entire ecosystem.
With August underway, HoS’s alpha phase is concluding. The Core Team has signaled that everything on their pre-launch task list must be completed to “green-light” the official launch. Assuming final checks go smoothly, NEAR stakeholders can expect the full House of Stake governance system to open by mid-August. At that point, any staker with veNEAR tokens will be able to vote on approved proposals, and the transition of budgetary control from the NEAR Foundation to the community-led HoS will accelerate.
Looking ahead: The coming week should reveal the first screening-committee decisions and delegate votes. Community members will be watching whether HoS launches “out of beta” cleanly and whether key roadmap items (like mission statements and user docs) finally go live. Meanwhile, discussions continue on the forum about governance models and oversight, reflecting that the HoS rollout is as much a political experiment as a technical one.
–
If you wish to share concerns anonymously, feel free to use this inbox:
hostip@proton.me
Disclaimer:
Some or all of the content in this document/message/publication was generated using AI language models, including Near AI assistant and ChatGPT. While we aim for accuracy and objectivity, the information may contain errors and should not be considered expert or professional advice. The author assumes no responsibility for any outcomes resulting from the use of this information.
The NEAR Protocol’s House of Stake (HoS) governance framework was introduced with the ambitious goal of placing decision-making power in the hands of the community. It brings forward innovations such as stake-weighted voting through locked veNEAR tokens, with future plans to integrate AI into governance processes.
At the same time, the initial rollout has raised questions about how closely practice aligns with the vision of decentralization. A number of key positions remain in the hands of NEAR Foundation (NF) representatives, which has led some community members and ecosystem participants to call for greater clarity and accountability. As HoS moves forward, the community is watching carefully to see whether authority will gradually expand to a broader set of stakeholders, ensuring that the framework lives up to its promise of inclusive governance.
Despite the goal of community-led governance, roughly 75% of HoS’s initial governance seats are held by Near Foundation staff, contractors, or close affiliates. This includes members of the Screening Committee, the Endorsed Delegates, and the Security Council – the three core bodies of HoS governance. Critics argue this supermajority influence undermines the spirit of decentralization. Below is a breakdown of these bodies and their composition:
Screening Committee (4 seats) – An interim committee was appointed by NF to pre-screen proposals and select delegates. All four initial members have NF ties: Bianca Guimaraes-Chadwick (NEAR Foundation legal counsel), Lane Rettig (NF’s Head of Research and HoS project lead), Bowen Wang(NEAR Foundation board member, NEAR One team), and Gauntlet (an NF contractor).
Endorsed Delegates (11 seats) – These are the community delegates who vote on proposals, initially chosen by the Screening Committee. Six out of the 11 inaugural delegates have direct connections to NF. For example, Cameron Dennis works on NEAR’s AI initiative (funded by NF), Yuen works in the Near Community Squad team (moderating NF chats and governance forum), NEARWEEK is essentially an NF-funded media outlet, Slime is a developer who received NF grants (creator of Intear wallet), Aurora Labs is a major NF contractor, and Charles (Garrett) has been a recipient of NF grants last month. This NF-heavy lineup has raised concerns of conflicts of interest, given that NF’s own team selected the delegates.
Security Council (5 seats) – A special council with veto power over proposals (meant to act in emergencies or protect the network) is being formed. All five known members are prominent NEAR insiders often described as part of co-founder Illia Polosukhin’s close circle. They include Bowen Wang(NEAR core contributor and NF board member), Alex Shevchenko (CEO of Aurora Labs, longtime NF partner), Evgeny Kuzyakov (early NEAR core developer, a.k.a. “Maestro” from FastNEAR), Kendall Cole(lead at Proximity Labs, an NF-funded DeFi arm), and Lane Rettig (NF’s HoS lead). In other words, the exact same figures already deeply involved in NEAR’s ecosystem governance are now also in HoS’s top oversight body.
Together, these appointments mean 15 of the 20 total governance seats in HoS (75%) are effectively controlled or strongly influenced by the Foundation and its affiliates, giving NF a supermajority voice. On the NEAR governance forum, some community members have openly criticized this outcome, calling it “just an example of nepotism” and claiming that NF’s leadership “appears to fear independent candidates” The original intent of HoS was to “eliminate favoritism” and dilute the Foundation’s influence, but in practice “the complete opposite has happened”, one long-time NEAR contributor lamented.
Additionally, Lane, the NF lead for House of Stake, holds seats in both the Screening Committee and the Security Council. Likewise, Aurora Labs is represented in two areas as well—among the endorsed delegates and within the Security Council.
To its credit, the Near Foundation has acknowledged that the current setup is interim. HoS was always meant to transition to more community control after launch. NF has stated that the interim Screening Committee will be replaced via on-chain elections in the near future. According to HoS lead Lane Rettig, a Screening Committee Charter proposal was expected by mid-August (probably by September) to define how elections work, committee size, member terms, etc., enabling the community to elect a new committee. Once that charter is passed, the interim NF-appointed committee would step aside for an elected team of screeners. In anticipation, Lane opened a nomination thread for community members interested in serving on the Screening Committee.
The community’s hope is that this election will bring genuinely independent voices into the governance process, reducing NF’s outsized influence. However, skepticism remains high. Given the track record so far, many in the community worry that the “new” committee might end up populated by the same insiders under a different name. The **“no surprises”**outcome that cynics predict is that NF’s close associates will continue to dominate.
Another early concern is the lack of transparency and speed in the HoS process so far. With HoS’s alpha platform online, community members and delegates have indeed begun drafting and posting proposals. At least five major proposals were published on the NEAR governance forum in August – covering topics from creating a social media team, to temporarily suspending delegate compensation, to forming a due-diligence audit team, to transparency reforms, and a call for further decentralization of delegate selection. These garnered discussion and represent exactly the sort of community input HoS was meant to empower.
Yet as of mid-August, none of these proposals has been acted on by the Screening Committee. More than 12 days have passed with no official review decisions or votes initiated. By design, proposals cannot advance to a token-holder vote until the Screening Committee labels them “Pre-Approved” or not – a step that has been a bottleneck. According to a community-run HoS watch blog, “all review is still by the private screening committee, and no outcomes or schedule have been announced” . In other words, the initial proposals appear stuck in limbo.
This delay has drawn frustration because HoS was supposed to be an improvement in efficiency over the previous governance system (the NEAR Digital Collective, or NDC). Under NDC, funding decisions often lagged for weeks; HoS was intended to streamline that. Now community members are openly questioning how HoS will be better if it takes over two weeks just for a committee to even acknowledge proposals. There are also practical worries: HoS is supposed to manage ecosystem funding on a rolling basis, yet if the process drags on, it’s unclear how budget timelines (e.g. monthly funding cycles) will be met.
Part of the problem is opaque decision-making. The interim Screening Committee has operated entirely behind closed doors so far. It has not published any criteria for how it selects delegates or evaluates proposals, nor does it provide meeting minutes or rationales for its pending decisions. This contrasts with the transparency many hoped for.
To better understand what to expect, the House of Stake Proposal Process Charter (v1 draft) lays out a structured lifecycle for governance decisions. Although still being finalized, the draft process is as follows:
Stage 1: Forum Discussion – Any NEAR token holder (with veNEAR) can submit a rough proposal idea on the NEAR Governance forum. This is a preliminary discussion phase, usually lasting about 7 days, where the community can provide feedback and gauge sentiment. The goal is to refine ideas publicly before they become formal proposals.
Stage 2: Formal Proposal (NIP) – After sufficient discussion, the proposer writes up a formal proposal (a NEAR Improvement Proposal or similar) following a required template. This proposal is then submitted to the official HoS platform (Agora) for an official decision process.
Stage 3: Screening Committee Review – Once a formal proposal is submitted on-chain, the Screening Committee reviews it during a limited window (by draft rules, 3 days, extendable up to 10 days maximum). The committee evaluates the proposal on criteria such as technical feasibility, NEAR ecosystem alignment, legal compliance, risk, and financials. It then labels the proposal either “Pre-Approved” or “Not Pre-Approved.” This label does not stop the proposal from proceeding, but it influences the next stage: if Pre-Approved by the committee, the proposal will face a lower threshold to pass in the token-holder vote (simple majority). If not approved by the committee, the proposal can still go to vote but requires a higher supermajority to pass. The Screening Committee is supposed to publish its decision and rationale on the forum for transparency (though as noted, this hasn’t been happening yet).
Stage 4: Proposal Activation – Following committee review, the Screening Committee (typically the chair) formally opens the proposal for voting on the on-chain governance platform (e.g. activating it in the Agora voting interface). A snapshot of veNEAR holdings is taken at this point to determine voting power for the upcoming vote.
Stage 5: Token Holder Voting – The proposal is then subject to a 7-day on-chain vote where all veNEAR holders can participate (either directly or via their chosen delegates). Voting is stake-weighted: each user’s influence is proportional to their veNEAR (i.e. how much NEAR they locked and for how long). Quorum: at least 30% of all delegated veNEAR must vote (yes/no/abstain) for the vote to be valid. Passing threshold: If the proposal was Pre-Approved by the Screening Committee, it needs a simple majority >50% “Yes” to pass. If the Screening Committee did not approve it, then it requires a supermajority >75% “Yes” to pass. This two-tier system is meant to give extra weight to the committee’s expertise without giving it an absolute veto over ideas. It also incentivizes proposers to incorporate feedback to earn committee endorsement.
Stage 6: Security Council Review – After a successful vote (i.e. the community approves a proposal), there is a short safety window (e.g. 48 hours) during which the HoS Security Council can intervene onlyif the proposal poses a critical security threat or could fundamentally harm the network. The Security Council’s mandate is to veto malicious or dangerously flawed decisions (for example, a proposal that has a bug or would violate the protocol’s integrity). In normal circumstances, the council would not override the token-holders’ will, and this veto power is expected to be used rarely, only as an emergency brake.
Stage 7: Execution of Decisions – Finally, once a proposal is approved by voters (and not vetoed), it moves to implementation. In HoS 1.0, the Near Foundation directors still handle execution of on-chain decisions. In other words, the Foundation will carry out the approved changes – whether that’s disbursing a grant, enacting a protocol upgrade, or implementing a policy – as long as it doesn’t conflict with any legal or fiduciary obligations. (The Foundation has reserved a right to reject proposals that are illegal or could incur liability, though this is expected to be extremely rare.) Over time, future phases of HoS intend to automate more of the execution and transfer those powers directly on-chain or to the community. For now, as an interim “safety net,” NF serves as the executor to ensure compliance and continuity. Notably, the draft charter calls for the NF team to publish an Implementation Plan within 3 days of a proposal passing – outlining steps, timeline, and roles – to keep the community informed.
Roles & responsibilities in this system are also clearly defined. Endorsed Delegates are expected to vote on every proposal (with >80% participation) and act in the best interest of the ecosystem. They can be removed by token-holder vote if they fail to perform or violate the code of conduct. Token holders themselves can always choose to vote directly or delegate their vote to any endorsed delegate. The Screening Committeeplays a crucial quality-control role but is not meant to be a final decision-maker. And the Security Council and Foundation act as guardians to ensure nothing catastrophically bad or illegal slips through. All of these structures are new to NEAR, and the exact parameters (quorums, thresholds, terms) may be adjusted as the community learns what works. The Proposal Process Charter is still in draft (as of mid-August 2025), and will likely be one of the first documents the community ratifies via HoS.
One of the most novel aspects of NEAR’s House of Stake is its plan to integrate artificial intelligence into on-chain governance. This is not just about simple automation or sentiment analysis – HoS envisions AI eventually taking on active roles in decision-making, under human oversight. Jack Laing, HoS’s AI Product Lead, recently published a roadmap outlining a three-phase progression for AI’s role in governance (a concept sometimes dubbed the move toward a “self-driving DAO”):
Phase 1: The AI Assistant (Support) – In the initial phase, AI acts as a copilot for human participants. The goal is to reduce the cognitive burden of governance and increase participation. For example, an AI assistant can provide a conversational interface where community members ask questions about proposals and get summaries or clarifications. Other planned tools include a Proposal Quality Agent that automatically reviews draft proposals for completeness or flags potential issues, a Sentiment Agent that gauges community feedback from forums/social media, a Feasibility Agent that checks the technical viability of proposals, and a Simulation Agent that models scenarios (e.g. what happens if a certain protocol parameter is changed) before a vote. By Q3 2025 (the next few months), NEAR aims to roll out the first governance copilots and quality-checking bots in this category.
Phase 2: The AI Delegate (Represent) – In this more advanced phase, AI could take on a representative role, effectively becoming delegates in governance. The idea is to ensure decisions reflect broad stakeholder preferences, without each individual having to vote on every issue. Planned initiatives include “Broad Listening” algorithms that analyze and cluster the diverse viewpoints of token holders, identifying major sentiment groups or policy preferences. Based on these, the HoS team envisions creating AI Delegates – autonomous agents aligned with those specific clusters of opinion. For instance, one AI delegate might consistently vote in line with the preferences of risk-averse stakers, while another might represent developers’ viewpoints. A Delegate Selection Agent could even help match human token holders to the AI delegate best reflecting their values. The roadmap also mentions Digital Twins – personal AI agents for users that learn an individual’s preferences (potentially via private data stores) and could vote on their behalf within a limited scope. There’s a concept of Modular Delegation, where a token holder could delegate their vote on technical upgrades to one AI (or human) expert, but maybe delegate their vote on financial budgets to a different expert, dividing representation by topic. Another concept is Memory Governance, essentially an evolving, stake-weighted knowledge base that these AI agents draw from to inform decisions. Phase 2 is expected to roll out through late 2025 into early 2026, with early versions of AI delegates and preference-matching tools targeted by Q4 2025.
Phase 3: The AI CEO (Manage) – The final and most experimental phase pushes the envelope by granting discretionary decision authority to AI agents in order to scale governance beyond human limits. This might involve forming hybrid councils of humans and AIs (where AI agents sit alongside elected humans to make decisions collectively), and eventually even full AI councils for certain domains of decisions. To keep such power in check, a suite of oversight tools is envisioned: an Accountability Agentto audit decisions, a Conflict of Interest Agent to ensure agents aren’t biased or colluding, and a Transparency Agent to track all governance actions. Humans would retain oversight and ultimate control– for example, through the ability to audit AI decision logs, or veto rights if an agent goes rogue. Another innovation is role-gated memory, allowing an AI agent to be “trained” with confidential information relevant to its role (via private vector databases) which can be securely transferred or wiped when the agent is replaced, ensuring continuity without exposing sensitive data. This phase essentially asks: can we trust AI to manage parts of a blockchain ecosystem under our rules? Milestones for Phase 3 are farther out, toward 2026; by mid-to-late 2026 the roadmap hints at trials of “agentic consensus” (AIs reaching rough consensus on proposals among themselves, only escalating to humans if they hit an impasse) and by Q4 2026 possibly the first AI-only governance councils operating with defined scopes.
It’s important to note that these AI initiatives are exploratory – they will be developed gradually and with community input. The HoS team has stressed that AI is meant to augment and scale human governance, not replace it. In practice, that means starting with supportive tools that make it easier for people to engage (Phase 1), then automating routine decision-making in a way that still reflects human-defined preferences (Phase 2), and only then cautiously trialing more autonomous agents (Phase 3). NEAR’s approach is being watched in the wider crypto industry, as few other projects have outlined such an “AI-governance” vision. If successful, it could address long-standing issues like voter apathy and the bandwidth problem (few people can follow all governance discussions) by letting trustworthy agents shoulder some of the load. Still, many challenges remain – from technical feasibility to ethical considerations – before an “AI CEO” can be at the helm. For now, NEAR stakeholders seem cautiously intrigued by the possibilities, even as they debate the immediate governance issues at hand.
Originally, the House of Stake mainnet launch was slated for August 14, 2025 (following an alpha release on Aug 7). That date has come and gone, and HoS is still in a “beta” state, with official launch slightly delayed. The HoS core team indicated that a checklist of final tasks (like completing certain charters, documentation, and security audits) must be finished before giving the green light. As of August 18, those tasks were reportedly close to done but not fully completed, hence the brief holdup. This minor delay in launch, while not catastrophic, has added to community impatience – especially given the broader context of NEAR’s ecosystem eagerly awaiting a functional governance system after the winding down of the NDC experiment.
The critical question going forward is whether House of Stake will live up to its promise of a more open and effective governance model. In these early weeks, perceptions are mixed. On one hand, the mere fact that NEAR is attempting this innovative structure – with on-chain votes, elected delegates, and an evolving constitution – is a positive sign of commitment to decentralization. The inclusion of the community in discussions, the forthcoming committee elections, and the transparency of posting drafts (like the governance charter) for feedback all demonstrate some willingness to share power. Additionally, the NF → HoS transition plan (a roadmap for gradually shifting funding control from the Foundation to the community-elected bodies over 1–3 years) is in development, which shows that even the Foundation expects to step back as HoS matures.
On the other hand, old habits die hard. The dominance of NF-affiliated personnel in HoS’s initial phase has raised eyebrows and drawn criticism that “decentralization” so far is largely on paper. If the upcoming Screening Committee election simply reinforces the status quo (i.e. seats go to people from Illia’s inner circle or NF-funded entities), then HoS could lose credibility with the very community it needs to engage. Furthermore, if processes like proposal reviews and budget approvals don’t speed up, NEAR risks recreating the bureaucratic inertia that plagued prior efforts.
Some community members have suggested that Lane Rettig, despite being the face of HoS, may not be empowered to enact the deep changes needed to truly decentralize governance. As the NF’s Head of Research, Lane has championed community involvement and even frequently acknowledged past mistakes in NEAR’s governance approach. But skeptics feel that ultimate decisions – like who gets on crucial committees or which proposals move forward – are still being orchestrated “above” Lane, by NEAR Foundation leadership. In essence, they argue that Lane’s calls for openness are colliding with an entrenched top-down culture. “It’s clear Lane doesn’t really decide anything,” say detractors in community chats, pointing out that structural power (control of funds, veto ability, appointments) remains with NF for now. The Foundation’s true test will be whether it actually lets HoS committees and token holders start making big decisions in the coming months, even if those decisions sometimes go against NF’s preferences.
In the coming weeks, all eyes will be on a few key developments: the outcome of the Screening Committee Charter and election, the first set of on-chain votes (once proposals finally clear the screening stage), and how the Security Council wields its veto authority (if at all). The success of HoS will be measured in transparency and inclusivity: Will we see regular public reports and open criteria from the committees? Will independent, community-chosen delegates have a say equal to NF’s sponsored delegates? Will funding and protocol changes start reflecting the community’s voice? These are open questions that only real operation of HoS can answer.
For now, NEAR’s House of Stake remains an experiment in progress – one that is undoubtedly pushing the envelope with concepts like AI integration and stake-based democracy, but also facing skepticism about whether it can escape the gravitational pull of centralized influence. As a flagship governance project in the crypto space, HoS’s journey will be instructive. If it succeeds, it could set a new standard for decentralized decision-making at scale. If it falters due to internal politics or apathy, it will join the list of Web3 governance ideas that sounded better in theory than in practice. The coming months, as HoS 1.0 formally launches and enters its first active cycle, will be crucial in determining which way it goes. The NEAR community is watching – and, hopefully, voting – to ensure that this House of Stake truly becomes a house owned by the stakeholders.
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Some or all of the content in this document/message/publication was generated using AI language models, including Near AI assistant and ChatGPT. While we aim for accuracy and objectivity, the information may contain errors and should not be considered expert or professional advice. The author assumes no responsibility for any outcomes resulting from the use of this information.
