HSP-007: Establish a Sustainable MPC Node Infrastructure Financing Program Funded via Protocol Emissions

Front Matter

hsp: HSP-007 
title: Establish a Sustainable MPC Node Infrastructure Financing Program Funded via Protocol Emissions
description: Establishes a sustainable incentive program to fund MPC nodes supporting NEAR Intents using protocol emissions.  
author: Sal Ternullo, Kendall Cole  
discussions-to: https://github.com/houseofstake/proposals/blob/main/HSPs/hsp-007.md  
status: Voting 
track: Decision  
type: Simple Majority  
category: Economic Governance   
stakeholders: MPC node operators, NEAR Intents developers, Chain Signatures users, NEAR token holders  
created: 2026-01-29 
requires: HSP-001

Abstract

This proposal establishes a MPC Node Infrastructure Incentive Program funded via protocol emissions accrued to create infrastructure incentives and is governed by House of Stake. The program provides performance-based monthly compensation to up to 21 MPC node operators supporting NEAR Intents and Chain Signatures. Compensation is NEAR-anchored at a fixed rate per node, with payments executed on-chain from House of Stake wallets following off-chain SLA validation and calculations.

The program transitions MPC infrastructure funding from discretionary grants to a transparent, governance-controlled mechanism aligned with NEAR’s emissions mandate. Payments are binary and SLA-gated, ensuring emissions-backed funding is issued only for delivered performance.

Context

NEAR Intents and Chain Signatures rely on MPC nodes to provide secure, distributed cryptographic signing across chains. These nodes are core production infrastructure that underpin NEAR’s intent-based execution model and multi-chain strategy.

Today, MPC node operations have been supported primarily through off-chain grants. While grants enabled early adoption, grant-based funding is discretionary and time-limited, which is structurally misaligned with permanent protocol infrastructure. As House of Stake assumes governance responsibility for protocol emissions allocation, MPC infrastructure should transition to a transparent, rule-based program governed by token holders. This proposal establishes that transition without modifying protocol parameters, smart contract logic, or emissions rates.

The MPC nodes powering Chain Signature are critical infrastructure enabling NEAR Intents which have proven exceptional product market fit with over $10B in volume processed to date. The system leveraging MPC nodes is also extensible to other use cases including privacy which are on the roadmap for NEAR Protocol in 2026. This proposal represents a significant and important milestone in establishing a sustainable funding mechanism from protocol emissions for core infrastructure.

Problem

MPC nodes that secure NEAR Intents and Chain Signatures lack a stable, governance-approved funding mechanism appropriate for mission-critical protocol infrastructure. Reliance on discretionary grants creates operator uncertainty, inhibits scaling to the target operating state, and misaligns long-term infrastructure incentives with emissions governance.

Without an emissions-backed, SLA-gated program, the protocol risks degraded reliability, slower scaling of the MPC set, and reduced resilience and decentralization of signing infrastructure.

Approach

The MPC Node Infrastructure Support Program operates with retrospective monthly payment based on adherence with performance requirements. This structure ensures protocol emissions are only distributed for delivered service, incentivizes continuous SLA compliance, and provides predictable economics for scaling MPC infrastructure as NEAR Intents and Chain Signatures mature.

Maximum Monthly Payment: 4,600 NEAR per qualifying MPC node, distributed monthly in arrears for each month of the program term (using a trailing 180-day average NEAR/USD price, where $1.50 represents the floor economic scenario, corresponding to approximately $6,900 per node per month: $5,750 infrastructure, monitoring, and maintenance costs plus a 20% margin). This scenario represents the floor price and economics for MPC nodes. It should be clearly noted that the prior discussions in the forum have run to ground the pure hardware costs on a monthly basis (in the lowest cost available provider) arriving at a minimum of $4,500 USD to operate 3 nodes (production mainnet, back-up mainnet, and testnet) required per provider without contemplating software costs or human resource costs. This program will be revisited annually in context of changing cost structures across the hardware landscape and integration support for Chain Signatures.

Cap on Program Incentives: Similarly, this proposal provides a structure which caps the USD equivalent upside at $3 as NEAR prices rise materially to protect the protocol from overpaying for MPC nodes. In this scenario, MPC nodes provide a profitable economic model with a margin of up to ~$8,000 USD per month relative to infrastructure, monitoring and maintenance costs of $5,750 USD. The examples of calculations for a Floor, Actual and Cap scenario are enumerated in Exhibit 1. Conversely, this proposal introduces a floor mechanic at a price of $1.50 USD per NEAR token to ensure that the MPC node operators are not operating at a loss.

Compared to alternatives:

  • Continue grant funding: simple short-term, but discretionary and mismatched to permanent infrastructure.
  • Purely market-based/operator self-funding: risks underinvestment in reliability and slower scaling.
  • Fully automated on-chain distribution: reduces human involvement but increases execution surface and governance change risk; this proposal keeps execution explicit while retaining on-chain transparency.

Benefits

  • Establishes predictable, governance-controlled funding for critical MPC infrastructure.
  • Ensures emissions are distributed only for delivered, SLA-verified performance.
  • Aligns MPC operator incentives with protocol reliability and decentralization goals.
  • Protects the protocol from overpayment during periods of significant NEAR price appreciation.

Limitations

  • Requires monthly operational verification and reporting overhead.
  • NEAR-denominated payments expose operators to price variability below the cap.
  • Changes to compensation parameters require formal House of Stake tokenholder vote and cannot be adjusted dynamically.

End-to-end Value Hypothesis

This proposal delivers complete, standalone value by ensuring that MPC nodes supporting NEAR Intents and Chain Signatures are funded through a transparent, governance-approved mechanism aligned with protocol emissions policy.

By defining eligibility, compensation, enforcement, and administration within a single proposal, the program removes reliance on undefined follow-up actions or discretionary decision-making. All components necessary to realize the intended value, funding source, payment logic, performance gating, and governance authority, are explicitly specified.

Objective

  • Allocate a maximum 4,600 NEAR per MPC node per month (at a floor price of $NEAR = $1.50) to cover infrastructure, monitoring and maintenance costs with a 20% incentive margin.
  • Transition MPC node funding from discretionary grants to House of Stake–governed protocol emissions.
  • Provide positive expected profit for MPC node operators to incentivize long-term participation.
  • Enforce service requirements to realize gated payments so emissions are paid only for delivered performance.
  • Support scaling to the target state of 21 MPC nodes without changing per-node economics.

Outcome

  • Up to 21 MPC nodes are funded and operational, within a maximum allocation, with funding sourced from protocol emissions held in treasury.near.
  • Monthly payments executed in arrears.
  • Monthly public reporting by proposal authors via House of Stake proposal updates.
  • Emissions slashed for nodes failing to meet SLA requirements in any month (see Exhibit 2).
  • Governance-ready data to reassess node count, margins, and pricing assumptions.

Dependencies

  • Existing MPC node infrastructure supporting Chain Signatures and Intents (currently live; 9 nodes noted in current state).
  • Existing monitoring + performance evaluation process (“NEAR One” monitoring process referenced).
  • Service Level Requirements framework (Exhibit 2) establishing 99.0% and 95.0% Monthly Uptime thresholds and forfeiture mechanics.
  • Treasury execution capability from House of Stake to perform on-chain transfers.
  • Governance forum challenge process allowing participating MPC providers to contest SLA failures (Exhibit 2 procedure) in the Governance forum.

Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)

  1. SLA Compliance Rate (Monthly): % of eligible MPC nodes achieving Monthly Uptime requirements (Exhibit 2).
  2. Active MPC Node Count (Monthly): number of nodes funded (≤21) and number of nodes live.
  3. Payment Integrity: % of months where payments match the approved payment formula and SLA outcomes.
  4. Challenge/Dispute Incidence: number of governance-forum challenges filed and resolved per month.

Technical Specification

Compensation Formula

To protect the protocol from overpaying for MPC infrastructure during periods of material NEAR price appreciation, monthly compensation is subject to a USD-equivalent cap based on a $3.00 per NEAR reference price. See Exhibit 1 for example calculations.

Price reference: The NEAR/USD price used for monthly payment calculations shall be determined using a trailing 180-day arithmetic average calculated from a single, publicly verifiable price source being Coinmarketcap NEAR/USD as of 0:00 UTC. The averaging window (180 days), data source, and calculation methodology are fixed and shall be published as part of the Program Charter at launch. While the resulting average price updates monthly by design, no discretionary adjustments to the averaging window, data source, or calculation methodology are permitted during the program term. Any modification requires a new House of Stake governance proposal.

Eligibility

  • Node must be an MPC node supporting Chain Signatures on NEAR mainnet.
  • Maximum eligible nodes: 21
  • Node Requirements: Hardware and software specifications are documented in NEAR’s MPC Github.

Performance Requirements

  • Must meet Monthly Uptime Percentage (Exhibit 2).
  • Failure: 50% of monthly rewards forfeited for uptime < 99.0%; 100% of monthly rewards forfeited for uptime <95.0%
  • Challenge process: another participating MPC provider may submit a challenge on the governance forum with dates/times; claims may be rejected if incomplete/unsupported.

Payment Execution

  • Program administrator validates SLA compliance and the applied cap logic (if triggered).
  • On-chain transfers executed from House of Stake within 14 days after month-end
  • Payments are not automated; each month’s transfer batch is explicitly authorized and executed.

Backwards Compatibility

No conflicts with existing protocol rules, contracts, or consensus mechanisms are introduced. The proposal establishes a new treasury distribution program and associated governance reporting. It is compatible with current operations and does not require protocol upgrades.

Security Considerations

This proposal does not introduce changes to protocol-level logic, consensus mechanisms, or validator operations. Risks are limited to correct application of the approved compensation formula, SLA validation, and treasury execution. These risks are mitigated through:

  • A deterministic trailing 180-day price averaging mechanism and an explicit USD-equivalent compensation cap at $3.00 per NEAR
  • Binary SLA-gated payments with full forfeiture on failure
  • On-chain execution of transfers from House of Stake wallets
  • Monthly public reporting of performance, calculations, and payments

No additional security risks have been identified.

Stakeholders

Implementation Plan

Definition of Done includes:

  • Publication of eligible MPC node list (up to 21 nodes)
  • Confirmation of applicable SLA standards
  • Activation of monthly payment and verification process
  • On-chain payment execution from treasury.near and House of Stake wallets
  • Monthly public reporting of performance and payments

Implementation steps:

  1. Publish Program Charter: confirm node cap (21), average calculation logic to include floor and cap, and publish the monthly price reference methodology.

  2. Publish Eligible Node Registry: list eligible MPC node addresses (up to 21).

  3. Confirm SLA Reference: publish the authoritative SLA/service requirements (Exhibit 2) as the governing standard.

  4. Establish Monthly Operating Cycle: payment deadline, SLA validation timeline, challenge window, and payment execution window.

  5. Monthly Reporting: post monthly updates as HoS proposal comments including (i) eligible nodes, (ii) SLA pass/fail, (iii) payments made, (iv) cap triggered or not, (v) challenges and resolutions.

  6. Annual Evaluation: The program will include an annual evaluation, starting at the end of Month 3, to address community feedback and ensure ongoing alignment with protocol needs. The evaluation will be led by Near One and reported publicly.
    Each evaluation will review:

  • Cost assumptions and operational efficiency

  • MPC node operators expectations and sustainability

  • Program performance metrics and transparency to token holders

Based on the findings, there may be recommended program adjustments. Any program changes require a separate governance proposal. The program will not automatically sunset as part of this process, ensuring predictability for operators.

Milestones

Budget & Resources

Category Assumption Amount
Maximum Per-Node Monthly Payment 4,600 NEAR per qualifying node 4,600 NEAR
Maximum Funded Nodes 21 MPC nodes -
Maximum Monthly Allocation 21 × 4,600 NEAR 96,600 NEAR
Maximum Annual Allocation 96,600 × 12 1,159,200 NEAR

This proposal is not requesting an upfront transfer of tokens to House of Stake. Calculated rewards will be remitted from Protocol Treasury to House of Stake Treasury on a monthly basis and then distributed to MPC node operators.

Cost Notes

  • NEAR Price Assumption: NEAR-denominated payment amounts are calculated monthly using a trailing 180-day arithmetic average NEAR/USD price. The $1.50 reference represents the floor economic scenario used to illustrate baseline per-node economics. Actual monthly payments vary in NEAR terms as the trailing average updates, subject to the approved USD-equivalent cap at $3.00 per NEAR. The 180-day averaging window, price data source, and calculation methodology are fixed and may only be modified through a new House of Stake governance proposal. On a monthly basis, the calculated rewards will be distributed from the protocol treasury to House of Stake for distribution to MPC node providers.

  • Maximum Per-Node Economics: The 4,600 NEAR monthly payment per node corresponds to approximately $6,900 USD per month, representing:

  • ~$5,750 USD in average infrastructure, monitoring and maintenance costs, plus

  • a 20% incentive margin to ensure positive expected maintenance costs are fully covered for MPC node operators.

  • Hard Caps, Not Targets: The amounts listed above represent maximum allocations, not guaranteed spend. Actual monthly and annual emissions distributed may be lower.

  • Any expansion or modification of funding levels requires a new House of Stake proposal.If no proposal changing these economic parameters is adopted, this mechanism will continuously renew.

Team & Accountability

Responsible: MPC node operators are responsible for operating, maintaining, and securing their respective MPC nodes in accordance with the required service-level requirements. Operators are responsible for meeting all uptime, availability, and performance requirements necessary to qualify for monthly payments under this program.

Program Administration: House of Stake, or a formally delegated operator acting on its behalf, is responsible for administering the program and authorizing off-chain payments in accordance with the approved pricing formula.

Accountable To: House of Stake governance and, ultimately, NEAR token holders. Program administration and outcomes are subject to public scrutiny through governance records, monthly reporting, and publicly disclosed payment outcomes.

Governance of Continuation

Unless modified or terminated by a subsequent House of Stake governance proposal, the program will continue operating under the same parameters in successive terms. House of Stake retains full authority to amend or discontinue the program at any time through governance or where such action is required for legal, operational, or risk-management reasons.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors of this proposal are involved in NEAR infrastructure development. Sal Ternullo serves as the CEO of SVRN which is a NEAR-focused treasury company while Kendall Cole serves as the Founder of Proximity Labs, which has previously provided grant funding to MPC node operators within the ecosystem. The proposed transition of MPC node incentives from Proximity-funded grants to protocol-level funding could reduce or eliminate the need for such grant funding going forward. SVRN has a clear and expressed intention to become an MPC node provider in the system."

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0 1.0.

Exhibit 1- Scenario Calculation: Actual December close, Floor and Cap

Exhibit 2

Service Level Requirements
SERVICE AVAILABILITY COMMITMENT.

  1. Monthly Uptime Percentage. The MPC node provider will use commercially reasonable efforts to maintain a Monthly Uptime Percentage with respect to the MPC node provider infrastructure supporting the Node infrastructure. MPC node provider’s uptime support activities include:
    ( a ) 24/7 network-wide system monitoring;
    ( b ) 24/7 technical support for Critical Priority tickets; and ( c ) response to platform-level issues and upgrades.

  2. Monthly Uptime Percentage Calculation.
    2.1. “Monthly Uptime Percentage” means the percentage of total minutes in a calendar month during which the [production environment of the Services] is operational and available, as measured and determined solely by Provider using its monitoring tools and logs.

The Monthly Uptime Percentage is calculated as:

Monthly Uptime Percentage =
[(Total Minutes in Month – Unexcused Downtime) / (Total Minutes in Month)] × 100

Where:
“Unexcused Downtime” means the number of minutes during the month when the Services were unavailable, excluding Excused Downtime.
“Excused Downtime” means time when the Services were unavailable due to ( a ) scheduled maintenance, ( b ) emergency maintenance, or ( c ) an Exclusion.

2.2. MPC node provider will use reasonable efforts to notify Client of scheduled and emergency maintenance and schedule maintenance during off-peak hours.

  1. Foregone Rewards. If MPC node provider fails to meet the Monthly Uptime Percentage commitment in a given calendar month, and such failure is not the result of an Exclusion, as described in Section 5, the Protocol will be eligible to forgo payment of rewards as set forth in the following table, subject to requesting such Service Credit in accordance with Section 4. All Forgone Rewards will be calculated based on the actual Fees payable for the impacted month.

  2. Forgone Rewards Procedure. In the event there is an uptime and service issue, another participating MPC node provider in the network can submit a challenge citing the specific dates and times of the alleged outages to the House of Stake governance forum. MPC node provider reserves the right to reject incomplete or unsupported claims in its reasonable discretion.

Monthly Uptime Percentage Forgone Rewards
95% < (X) < 99.0% 50% of monthly rewards
<95.0% 100% of monthly rewards
  1. Performance Exclusions. MPC node provider shall not be responsible for system downtime, degraded performance or other failure that is the result of resulting from:
    ( a ) Protocol software, or network configuration;
    ( b ) any third-party system or technology not within MPC node provider’s direct control;
    ( c ) a Force Majeure Event; or
    ( d ) suspension or restriction of Services due to Client non-payment, compliance violations, or misconduct under the Agreement (each, an “Exclusion”), and MPC node provider will have no obligation to issue Service Credits to the extent that a failure to meet the monthly uptime percentage is the result of an Exclusion.

Exhibit 3- MPC Node Hardware Requirements

The following hardware specifications and cloud provider recommendations apply to all MPC node operators participating in the network following the upcoming upgrade to the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) MPC architecture.

Hardware Requirements

* At least one DIMM must be installed in slot 0 of each memory channel. All memory channels must be symmetrically populated.

Networking

  • Firewall: allow inbound traffic on port 80 (MPC) and port 8080 (web interface)

  • IP address: a public static IP is required

Cloud Providers

The following cloud providers have been verified to offer hardware configurations compatible with TEE deployment. Other providers may also be capable of meeting these requirements. We recommend confirming TDX support with your existing provider before migrating to a new one.

Alternative Hosting Option

Server colocation remains a viable option at any data center that offers colocation services, provided that the hardware meets the requirements listed above.

Additional Information
Refer to the Intel Hardware Selection page for additional information.

12 Likes

I’m in support of this proposal. Just a few follow up questions:

The proposal states that the mechanism “continuously renews” unless modified by a new governance proposal. Would the authors consider a fixed authorization term (e.g., 12 months) with an explicit renewal vote to preserve periodic governance consent and cumulative performance review?

The proposal caps the program at 21 MPC nodes. What observable metrics (latency, geographic distribution, fault tolerance, volume throughput) would justify proposing an increase or decrease in this cap in future governance cycles? I know you mentioned the math and modeling checked out when we were on the HoS governance call but I feel that understanding how these metrics affect the network would help the community better assess the monthly reports.

4 Likes

I welcome this proposal. I do however have some small questions:

- Is the current NEAR MCP architecture capped to 21 nodes? What happens if we were to onboard more than 21, would eligibility for rewards be FCFS or will it be based on performance?

- There’s many stakeholders within HoS. Who within HoS do you think should be the program administrator?

- Will there be a public dashboard for community members to have a look?

4 Likes

Thank you for the note Othman, glad to hear that you are supporting.

We debated framing this on a defined term basis but ultimately given the criticality of the infrastructure we concluded that it was best to make this proposal continuous. Please keep in mind that a future HoS vote can modify the economic terms or eliminate the program altogether.

The current cap of 21 nodes is based on comparables for distributed signing systems with a bar that exceeds the most distributed today in the market. This was also designed in context of the total cost that the protocol should pay for the infrastructure to prevent a scenario where the spend exceeds.

In Exhibit 1 there is an example of the economic calculations for three scenarios, while in Exhibit 2 there are defined SLA requirements with related observable metrics.

5 Likes

Thank you for the feedback and support. Please find responses below to the questions you raised all of which are good.

1.) The system itself can scale beyond 21 MPC nodes but there becomes a question regarding the point of diminishing returns from a security / resiliency perspective relative to economic cost to ensure a viable mechanic for the providers.
2.) On the program administration point, there are a number of key stakeholders playing different functions in administering the program which are outlined in the RACI chart

3.) In the early days, we will be providing posts on the governance forum that provide reporting but are certainly open to building tools and dashboards in the future.

4 Likes

Strong support for this proposal

This is exactly the kind of proposal that House of Stake was built for.

Transitioning critical protocol infrastructure from discretionary grants to a transparent, governance-controlled funding mechanism is precisely what emissions governance should be doing.

5 Likes
  1. As an infrastructure provider, we’d like to know more details about $6000 per month infrastructure cost. That seems extremely expensive even with failover nodes and separate monitoring nodes. To support this proposal, we need a clear breakdown from the current operators to justify the costs.

  2. The payment should be calculated in USD. The 180 trailing price doesn’t make sense. We have intents to convert the monthly payment into USDC or another stablecoin. Node operators should receive the infra cost in USD, while rewards can stay in NEAR if they chose so.

3 Likes

Thanks for the comment and feedback. In contemplating the run-rate USD cost of the infrastructure, monitoring and management we’ve scope out the following components which compose the $6k run-rate average cost:

Hardware & Infrastructure

- Procurement of dedicated confidential-compute (TDX) enabled servers

- Enterprise network security infrastructure (firewalls, etc)

- Redundant deployment across physically separate environments

Software, Security & Licensing

- Network firewall and security licensing

- Monitoring and alerting

- Endpoint and OS-level protection

Deployment & Configuration

- Secure physical rack installation and cabling

- Virtual environment setup and hardening

- MPC software installation, validation, and testing

Ongoing Operations & Support

- Continuous monitoring and incident response readiness

- OS and security patching

- Health checks, maintenance, and uptime management

The actual timeline of USD cash requirements depends on whether hardware is purchased or rented.

On point 2, I do appreciate your perspective with regards to the USD / USDC payment for cost coverage with rewards in NEAR but the proposal is directed towards the utilization of emissions which are in the form of NEAR.

Happy to discuss either or points further.

2 Likes

Assuming 3M of total emission that goes to treasury.near based on the current inflation rate. The proposal is looking to allocate 1.2M towards MPC operations. That’s a huge allocation and requires extensive research for a proper decision making

In order to justify not only the cost, but the proper distribution the operation and selection of MPC nodes has to be public for stakeholders to decide whether it’s fair.

The proposal in the current state is looking to be other way around. First secure the money, then decide on who (node operators) and how (undefined or private) the funds or used.

Currently we (the NEAR stakeholders) don’t know who are the MPC node operators. We also don’t know what are the requirements to operate an MPC node, e.g. hardware/security/software.

So there are question:

  • Can anyone become an MPC operator to earn funding? If so how does the security enforced? Since TEE has limitation on security based on the physical access.
  • Where is the documentation for MPC operators to justify the costs?
  • Who are the current MPC operators and how they were selected and compensated before?
  • Why do we transition to 21 nodes with this proposal instead of just covering the cost of existing 9?
2 Likes

Hi Sal, thank you for putting this proposal forward. It was helpful to meet you during the governance call yesterday and get an early preview of this proposal.

Undoubtedly, this is an important and exciting proposal for House of Stake, as it begins to answer the question of what HoS will be governing in practice. As the first proposal of its kind, it is inherently precedent-setting. For that reason, it is important that the proposal includes well-defined processes and positions HoS for success.

It is also critical that the benefits and tradeoffs of this program are clearly articulated for all stakeholders, including tokenholders, NEAR builders, and validators — who may be impacted by this proposal. I will elaborate on these considerations in more detail below.

Before this proposal proceeds to a vote, it’s imperative to address the following material considerations:

Per-node cost assumptions

The proposal states that funding corresponds to approximately $7,200 per node per month. However, based on the emissions outlined in Exhibit 1 and a NEAR price of roughly $3, the effective monthly amount appears closer to ~$14.5k per node.

Please clarify the pricing assumptions used.

Source of emissions

The proposal does not clearly specify whether MPC node funding would come from:

  • newly issued emissions, or

  • a reallocation of existing validator rewards.

Please clarify the source of emissions so delegates and the community can understand the potential impact to tokenholders and validators.

Tokenholder dilution

If this program is funded via new emissions, then the cost is borne by tokenholders through dilution. Given that this would be an ongoing program, this tradeoff should be made explicit so delegates can properly assess the long-term implications.

MPC node requirements and operator expectations

The proposal states that “Node Requirements: Hardware and software specifications are documented in NEAR’s MPC GitHub.” However, after reviewing the referenced repository, I was unable to find clearly documented hardware and software requirements for MPC node operators.

While I see that you have outlined the requirements in bullet form in your response to fastnear, these requirements should be documented in a repository or other canonical source of truth so that delegates can properly assess cost assumptions.


HoS as program administrator

The proposal designates HoS as the program administrator responsible for maintaining the MPC node registry and executing ongoing payments. This represents a significant operational responsibility.

However, there is currently no proposed process, operating model, resourcing plan, or set of next steps from the HoS side. As written, this places ownership on HoS for an ambiguous and complex process that would be defined and scoped after approval rather than prior to it. Given the precedent-setting nature of this program, it is important to define governance structure and operational readiness before moving forward.


Overall, this is a very important proposal for HoS and will likely set precedent for how HoS manages similar mission critical infrastructure programs in the future. For this reason, the cost assumptions, emissions source, and administrative/operational framework should be clearly defined.

Looking forward to your responses and working together to keep iterating on this proposal.

Tagging community members who have not yet provided feedback, and whose perspectives on this proposal would be valuable. @KlausBrave @vinibarbosa @coffee-crusher @cloudmex-alan @charleslavon @jlwaugh @Cameron @Tane @Gus @Yuen

5 Likes

Thanks for the follow up and hoping that my response here helps to shed more color and light on the thought process as well as answering some of the questions you’ve raised.

There are currently 9 MPC node operators:

  • NEAR One

  • HOT

  • Aurora

  • Everstake

  • Node.monster

  • Staking4All

  • Luganodes

  • Stakin

  • Black Sand

Historically, these node operators were recruited to help bootstrap the system using grants and thus far they have been performant despite having no established incentive for doing so. The goal of this proposal is to establish the basis for an incentive structure that can be used to recruit proven infrastructure partners into the system.

Please keep in mind that the proposal is simply for budget allocation and the actual utilization of funds is on a ‘look-back’ basis for actual performance. If the system does not scale to 21 MPC nodes, the full budget will not used. The ‘slashing’ logic for nodes who do not adhere to performance requirements are described in Exhibit 2.

In regards to the hardware and software requirements, these are documented in the section below explicitly.

The current state of the proposal is defined to define a budget allocation, rather than explicit funding in order form an incentive structure that would attract MPC node providers to engage.

  1. The goal of establishing a budget allocation is to form as the basis of a recruitment process for nodes to join and run them. In the current form, the MPC nodes are distributed across geography and physical footprint security models in different data centers

  2. See the detailed documentation below which covers the hardware requirements with variable costs based on the provider. The software costs and resource costs for the other line items in the response above are variable based on tooling selection and specific resources.

  3. Previous compensation: NEAR One, HOT, and Aurora haven’t been compensated at all; the other 6 received grants which covered infra costs only without considering overhead

  4. The rationale for transition to 21 MPC nodes is to scale the system to increase both decentralization and resiliency of the MPC node which will become increasingly important as Intents continue to grow and institutional flows begin to come online.

I hope this is helpful in addressing the points above and also happy to answer any questions.

MPC Node Hardware Requirements

The following hardware specifications and cloud provider recommendations apply to all MPC node operators participating in the network following the upcoming upgrade to the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) MPC architecture.

Hardware Requirements

* At least one DIMM must be installed in slot 0 of each memory channel. All memory channels must be symmetrically populated.

Networking

  • Firewall: allow inbound traffic on port 80 (MPC) and port 8080 (web interface)

  • IP address: a public static IP is required

Cloud Providers

The following cloud providers have been verified to offer hardware configurations compatible with TEE deployment. Other providers may also be capable of meeting these requirements. We recommend confirming TDX support with your existing provider before migrating to a new one.

Alternative Hosting Option

Server colocation remains a viable option at any data center that offers colocation services, provided that the hardware meets the requirements listed above.

Additional Information
Refer to the Intel Hardware Selection page for additional information.

6 Likes

Hi Axia,

Thank you for your thoughtful note and comments. I’m hopeful the responses below are helpful to share comments and can serve as the basis for iteration to a final refined proposal following the comment period.

Per node cost assumptions

The structure is designed to place a floor $1.50 NEAR for $7,200 USD per node per month with a cap based on a NEAR price of $3. Given that the proposed incentive is in native NEAR, when NEAR’s price is higher the rewards should be capped to prevent overpending on the MPC Nodes relative to their loaded operating cost.

Source of emissions

The source of emissions are from the 10 basis points of the total 2.5% protocol emissions that are accruing but are currently utilized to treasury.near. This is NOT a reallocation of existing validator rewards.

Tokenholder dilution

The program is not funded from new emissions so there is no impact to the dilution of tokenholders.

MPC node requirements and operator expectations

Thank you for reviewing the prior post. I just responded to the Fast NEAR comment and pulled through very clearly defined hardware and hosting requirements for everyone.

HoS as program administrator

There are multiple ongoing workstreams to explicitly define the processes required to administer the program with multiple stakeholders from House of Stake engaged in the process. Based on the progress made to date, the requisite processes and procedures for program administration will be prepared well in advance of March which is the proposed inception date for operational mechanics. It is also important to note that several different stakeholders have responsibilities for the execution model to deliver the program.

I hope the explanation above is helpful and happy to address further questions or comments that you may have.

7 Likes

Thanks for your responses, Sal.

Correct, which means that if NEAR’s price increases to $3, operators will be paid a ceiling amount of ~$14.5k/month.

Thanks for clarifying.

Good to know. However, since the vote is expected to close on February 12, it is important that these operational mechanics are clearly outlined prior to that date so delegates can make an informed voting decision about HoS’s operational readiness to act as the program administrator.

3 Likes

Of course! I look forward to continuing to collaborate to address feedback and I fully agree with regards to the operational mechanics to ensure seamless execution and administration.

4 Likes

Thank you to the @SVRN for the preview in yesterday’s governance call and for this detailed and thoughtful proposal that is very balanced and fair.

This proposal is a significant step forward in positioning NEAR as an enterprise-grade protocol, which is important for the future growth of NEAR products. I specifically support the inclusion of the Floor and Cap price as a sensible fiscal management that protects both the DAO and the node operators.

To ensure this program meets the high standards for the HoS, I have a couple of comments and questions:

  • I want to echo @Axia comments (tk u for the ping! :slightly_smiling_face:) regarding the operational responsibility placed on the HoS. Defining the operating model and resourcing plan is critical before the vote.

To address the ‘ambiguous and complex process’ Axia mentioned above, I recommend that the author considers moving towards an automated transparency rather than manual forum-post reporting as suggested in the proposal, especially since we’re talking about a 1M+ yearly program.

This could be created with a live dashboard similar to Meta Pool’s StakeVote UI or a public Dune Analytics report. This provides a real-time ‘Health Dashboard’ that reduces the administrative burden on HoS, it makes the ‘Challenge Process’ objective and trustless, and allows delegates to verify SLA compliance before the executing of payments by the HoS.

  • The proposed 180-day window seems quite slow to be able to react to market shifts. A 90-day average would be closer to a ‘Goldilocks’ zone that provides the stability node operators need for planning while ensuring the DAO isn’t using ‘stale’ pricing that detaches from NEAR’s current value:

Ques: Does the author see any blockers to moving to a quarterly lookback?

  • Regarding defining the scaling and a fair selection process to grow from 10 (including the author) MPC operators to 21 Nodes:

Ques: Is there a staged rollout plan (i.e. something like adding 3 nodes per quarter) to monitor network stability and budget impact as we scale?

Ques: How will the selection process for these new nodes be made transparent? Given that the authors are managing the GTM plan, will there be an open ‘Call for Operators’ with a public scoring rubric to ensure a competitive and decentralized selection or is there already a pre-selected target list from the NEAR team or HoG? And can you provide some more details of the strategy and tactics regarding the implication of the Go-to-Market plan to attract these additional 11 operators?

  • Governance Integrity: Regarding the noted Conflicts of Interest by the author (thank you for that transparency), to ensure this program carries a clean mandate from the community, I suggest the author commit to an abstain vote in the Tally vote as well as providing a brief public statement of their reasoning.
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Thank you for your comments and feedback Coffee Crusher. I agree with your point of view with regards to automated reporting rather than manual posting and we will work on automation of this reporting create a dashboard should the proposal be approved. This has always been the intention but with the first priority goal being to operationalize the program, manual reporting in the short seems a sensible first step.

In regards to the program management, I want to make sure the collective group is consistent in understanding the requirements in the proposal that actually fall on House of Stake which are narrow in scope to including: 1.) AML / KYB of node providers and 2.) execution of on-chain payment pursuant to monthly receipt of calculated rewards. While not trivial in any manner, the resource and time requirements to execute these functions are manageable in-scope and do not represent material overhead.

We initially began with a 90 day average calculation and after consideration of the dramatic and volatile swings that we’ve seen over the trailing 24 months and elected 180 as the period that would smooth this volatility in the most meaningful way on both the upside and downside. We can revisit this and discuss further, but I do feel confident that we landed in the right approach.

I am not opposed to the idea of a quarterly look-back but it could place a cash flow burden for the ongoing operating costs to the MPC node providers.

In regards to your recommendation on abstaining from the voting process, I do appreciate your perspective here and want to air on the side of full transparency. The foundation of conflict management is rooted in disclosure, which we have done from the onset of this process. In the House of Stake community call we clearly stated that we intend to vote with 500k veNEAR which we believe is the right approach, but for the benefit of those who could not participate I want to state this plainly here in the forum. This places us as a significant delegate with the other large delegates in the system having greater voting power than us, but it is balanced and does not utilize our balance sheet to governance attack the system.

SVRN is the largest NEAR token holder outside of the Foundation with public disclosure of 50M+ NEAR on our balance sheet. We are long term incentive aligned to the success of NEAR and believe that expressing our vote, both in the context of this proposal, as well as through active participation in future governance proposals within House of Stake is our responsibility.

I hope the thoughts above are helpful in reacting to your comments, all of which are thoughtful and constructive.

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Thank you so much for your response to my comments and questions, and your continued engagement with the community.

If you can move towards an automated reporting process that is open and transparent for all community members, not just to the the HoG, this allows for the delegates and token holders to have full viability and information.

Thank you for more details regarding the R&R’s for the HoS (i.e. HoG) regarding admin responsibilities. If this proposal passes, it would optim if @AK_HoG could provide more details to the community on actual admin time spent per month, to understand the resource allocations and requirements.

I totally understand your decision about the 180 day period due to the past volatility of the market recently. Since any changes to this proposal (if it passes) will require a follow-up proposal, I suggest that after six months that we could revisit and review if the 180 days is working correctly to mitigate larger pricing swings or it needs to be adjusted with a follow-up proposal.

Regarding my abstain voting comment, I actually intended that I’m in support of SVRN voting on Agora for this proposal, but requesting that if you do vote, to vote “abstain” or registering your vote after the minimum quorum requirement has already been reached. While still providing a voting rational either path on the Forum for full transparency.

Also, I’m not sure if you saw my questions the selection process for the 11 additional operators and about the implementation of the GTM plan that I mentioned above?

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Of course, I want to make sure that we are good stewards of the process and set a strong example in leading by engaging with the community given this is the first material economic design related proposal going through HoS.

We are committed to work towards automation and can share a timeline once we have scoped the effort and begin delivering on it. It should not be too difficult to execute against and I think feasible to have live for the first payout period.

I agree with your logic on the approach and six months into this process we can evaluate opportunities for optimizations and then carry forward a new proposal and voting process.

I had misinterpreted your logic previously on this point. We will evaluate your thoughts as a team and ultimately take the decision that we think is in the best interest of the community. There are pros and cons on every approach but I very much appreciate your perspective.

I apologize for missing these questions here are some quick responses:

-There are currently 9 nodes live today that would be migrated to the program and then the objective would be to scale this to the 21 target throughout the year.

-There is no pre-selected target list to date, and we can work on sharing the evaluation criteria which largely center on capability and controls around the infrastructure to ensure the highest likelihood of compliance with SLA requirements. These are generally measured through ongoing third party attestations over technology controls expressed through SOC (service organization control) reporting where third party auditors validate that technology controls are designed and operating effectively to ensure availability and performance, amongst other control objectives. The plan is to leverage the successful approval of a budget and defined incentive system to recruit mature infrastructure businesses and regulated financial institutions to participate in the system.

I hope this is helpful and apologize for missing these questions previously.

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Thank you so much for your thorough and quick responses to comments, and I truly appreciate your demonstrated intentions of strong community engagement.

I also appreciate the commitment to work towards report automation, and especially in time for the first payout period.

The six month evaluation to allow for optimization (and resolving any refinements needed) will increase the strength of this proposal and it’s success.

No worries regarding misinterpretation of my comments about abstaining, thank you for taking this into consideration to have a transparent and fair voting cycle.

Thank you also for the further details about the selection process for these additional 11 operators, and I’m looking forward to reading when available, the evaluation criteria.

I do have a question about your Go-to-Market plan and specifically your tactics on how you will identify (once you have the evaluation criteria) and engage with these potential operator prospects to have them become a part of the MPC program?

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Could you please clarify whether Richard Muirhead is currently a member of the SVRN Board?

Additionally, was any internal NEAR Foundation resource involved in promoting or advancing this proposal?

I would also like to note that Richard Muirhead serves as a Council member of the NEAR Foundation Board and as Chair of the Compensation Committee.

In this context, if Richard Muirhead is indeed a member of the SVRN Board, then submitting this proposal for a vote — as well as any subsequent voting on it by individuals affiliated with the NEAR Foundation, including contractors — could constitute a conflict of interest

I would appreciate your clarification on this matter.

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