HSP-002: Validator Support Program

[Meta_Pool]

In collaboration, Meta Pool, Linear, Hot, and Gauntlet are sharing two draft proposals—HSP002 and HSP003—for open discussion. This post serves as a Request for Comment (RFC) to gather insights and feedback from validators, token holders, and the broader community. No voting will take place at this stage. The aim is to collect constructive input and refine the proposals before submitting them to the House of Stake for formal consideration.

Active community participation is essential to ensure these proposals align with the principles of decentralization and contribute to a resilient, transparent, and healthy ecosystem. Your perspectives help shape decisions that strengthen the long-term sustainability of the network.

Frontmatter

hsp: 002
title: Validator Support Program
description: Quarterly support payments to maintain validator
decentralization post-inflation reduction
author: Meta Pool, LiNEAR, HOT
contributor: Gauntlet
status: Draft
type: Decision
category: Economic Governance
created: 2025-10-10

Abstract

This proposal establishes an initial one-quarter validator support program to maintain network decentralization following the planned NEAR protocol inflation reduction from 5% to 2.5%. The program provides 150 NEAR per quarter to the 100 smallest validators who maintain 97% uptime. This proposal covers only Q4 2025; continuation beyond the first quarter will require a subsequent proposal. The proposal depends on the inflation reduction being implemented but does not itself implement that change.

Situation

NEAR Protocol will undergo an inflation reduction from 5% to 2.5%, decreasing validator rewards by approximately 50%. This change is being implemented at the protocol level outside of the House of Stake proposal process. However, the economic implications for validators require a governance response to maintain network decentralization.

While larger professional validators can likely absorb this reduction, smaller and independent validators may find it challenging to maintain economically viable operations at the lower reward levels.

Research conducted by Meta Pool indicates that typical NEAR validator hardware costs under USD $700 per year. At the reduced inflation rate, some smaller validators may find their operations unprofitable, potentially leading to validator consolidation and reduced network decentralization.

Network decentralization is essential for NEAR’s security, resilience, and credibility. A diverse validator set protects against single points of failure, geographic concentration, and governance capture. If smaller validators exit due to economic constraints, the network risks becoming more centralized around a few large, professional operators.

This proposal addresses this risk by providing targeted support to smaller validators during the transition to the new economic model, ensuring they can continue contributing to network security and decentralization.

Mission

Objectives:

• Maintain or increase validator decentralization during the first quarter following inflation reduction

• Ensure smaller validators can continue economically viable operations during the transition period

• Support network security through a diverse validator set

• Gather data on program effectiveness to inform potential continuation proposals

• Cover operational costs for qualifying validators

Outcomes (First Quarter Only):

• 100 smallest validators receive adequate support to maintain operations in Q4

• No significant reduction in validator count or geographic diversity during transition period

• Stable network security metrics (uptime, participation rates)

• Data collection and evaluation to inform follow-on proposals

• Demonstration that inflation reduction can coexist with strong decentralization

Note: This proposal covers only the initial quarter following inflation reduction. Any continuation of the validator support program beyond Q4 will require a new proposal based on the outcomes and learnings from this pilot period.

Approach

The validator support program operates for one quarter (Q4 2025) with retrospective payment based on performance. This structure incentivizes consistent uptime while providing immediate support during the critical transition period following inflation reduction.

Q4 Program Structure (This Proposal)

One-Time Payment: 150 NEAR per qualifying validator, distributed at the end of Q4 2025.

Eligibility Criteria:

1. Stake Size: Bottom 100 validators by staked amount at the start of Q4

2. Performance: Maintain average 97% uptime throughout the 3-month period

3. Exclusions: Validators receiving incentives from other NEAR Foundation, Linear Protocol, or Meta Pool programs are ineligible to avoid double-subsidization

Assessment Process:

1. Snapshot taken at start of Q4 to identify the 100 smallest validators by stake

2. Uptime monitored continuously throughout the quarter

3. Final evaluation at end of Q4 determines which validators met 97% uptime threshold

4. Payments distributed to qualifying validators within 14 days of quarter end

Future Quarters (For Reference Only)

The sections below outline how a continued program might operate to provide context for long-term planning. However, quarters beyond Q4 are NOT included in this proposal and will require separate governance approval.

Potential Ongoing Structure:

• Quarterly payment cycles with same eligibility criteria

• Regular reassessment of payment amounts, validator counts, and thresholds

• Adaptations based on changing network conditions and NEAR price

Potential Annual Budget: Approximately 100,000 NEAR if program continues for full year with similar parameters (see Budget section for detailed breakdown).

Rationale

150 NEAR per quarter (600 NEAR annually) provides ~$1,800 USD per year at current prices, substantially covering the hardware costs identified by Meta Pool research. This amount ensures validators remain profitable even with 50% reduced staking rewards.

Bottom 100 validators targets those most at risk from reduced rewards while maintaining manageable program size and cost.

97% uptime requirement ensures the program supports reliable validators who contribute meaningfully to network security, not just those running minimal infrastructure.

Quarterly assessment allows the program to adapt to changing conditions without requiring new governance proposals for minor adjustments.

Risks and Limitations

Sybil Risk: Large validators could theoretically split their stake into multiple small validators to game the program. However, the 97% uptime requirement and operational overhead make this less attractive than legitimate operation. The program will monitor for suspicious patterns.

Validator Dependence: Validators may become dependent on the subsidy rather than building sustainable business models. The Q4 pilot with required follow-on proposal provides a natural decision point to assess whether continued support is necessary or whether the ecosystem has adapted to the new reward structure.

Geographic Diversity Not Addressed: This program focuses on stake size, not geographic distribution. Future proposals may address geographic decentralization specifically.

Market Price Volatility: The 150 NEAR payment may become insufficient or excessive as NEAR price changes. The Q4 pilot provides data to inform appropriate payment levels for any continuation proposal.

Technical Specification

Payment Calculation

For each quarter:

1. Identify bottom 100 validators by stake at quarter start (snapshot at first epoch of quarter)

2. Monitor uptime for each validator throughout 3-month period

3. Calculate average uptime as: (epochs validated / total epochs in quarter)

4. Validators with ≥97% average uptime qualify for payment

5. Distribute 150 NEAR to each qualifying validator within 14 days of quarter end

Exclusion List Management

Validators excluded due to participation in other incentive programs:

• NEAR Foundation incentive recipients

• Linear Protocol subsidy recipients

• Meta Pool support program participants

The exclusion list will be maintained publicly and updated at the start of each quarter. Validators may appeal exclusion decisions through a simple process to be defined by program administrators.

Uptime Monitoring

Uptime will be calculated using on-chain data from NEAR’s existing validator monitoring infrastructure. No new monitoring systems are required. Uptime percentage = (number of epochs with produced blocks / total epochs in period).

Implementation Timeline

This proposal covers Q4 2025 only. The timeline assumes the inflation reduction has been implemented or will be implemented concurrent with this program launch.

• Q4 2025 Start: Program launches, eligibility snapshot taken

• Q4 2025 End: Final evaluation, payments distributed

• Post-Q4: Comprehensive evaluation report published

• Before Q4 End: Follow-on proposal should be submitted if continuation is desired

Any continuation beyond Q4 requires a new House of Stake proposal.

Backwards Compatibility

This proposal introduces a new off-chain payment program and does not modify NEAR protocol itself. It has no backwards compatibility implications for the network.

Critical Dependency: This proposal depends on NEAR’s inflation reduction from 5% to 2.5% being implemented at the protocol level. The inflation reduction is happening outside of the House of Stake governance process, but this validator support program is only economically necessary and justified if that reduction occurs. If the inflation reduction is not implemented, this proposal becomes unnecessary as validators will continue receiving current reward levels.

Timing: This proposal should be approved and implemented concurrent with or immediately following the inflation reduction to provide uninterrupted support during the transition period.

Milestones

Milestone	Target Date	Deliverable	Success Criteria
Program Launch	Q4 2025 Start	Eligibility list published, monitoring active	100 validators identified
Mid-Quarter Check	Q4 2025 Mid	Informal progress assessment	Tracking systems operational
Q4 Evaluation	Q4 2025 End	Final uptime calculations	Qualifying validators determined
Q4 Payment	Within 14 days of Q4 end	Payments distributed	All qualifying validators receive 150 NEAR
Program Report	Within 30 days of Q4 end	Comprehensive evaluation	Data and recommendations published
Follow-on Proposal	Before Q4 end (if continuation desired)	Q2+ proposal submitted	Community discussion initiated

---

Budget & Resources

Q4 Budget (This Proposal)

Item	Amount (NEAR)	Notes
Q4 Validator Payments	15,000	100 validators × 150 NEAR (assumes all qualify)
Administration & Monitoring	2,500	Data systems, evaluation, reporting
Contingency	2,500	Buffer for unforeseen circumstances
TOTAL REQUESTED	20,000	Q4 2025 only

Funding Source: NEAR House of Stake Foundation Treasury

Cost Notes:

• Actual Q4 costs may be lower if fewer than 100 validators meet the 97% uptime requirement.

• If all 100 validators qualify, direct payments total 15,000 NEAR.

• The remaining 5,000 NEAR covers administrative overhead and contingency.

---

Projected Annual Budget (For Reference Only)

(Not part of this proposal)

Item	Amount (NEAR)	Notes
Q1 Validator Payments	15,000	Covered by this proposal
Q2 Validator Payments	15,000	Would require new proposal
Q3 Validator Payments	15,000	Would require new proposal
Q4 Validator Payments	15,000	Would require new proposal
Administration (Annual)	10,000	Data analysis, reporting, community management
Contingency (Annual)	30,000	Buffer for adjustments across full year
Projected Annual Total	100,000	Illustrative only

Any support beyond Q4 requires a new governance proposal with updated targets, budgets, and mechanisms based on Q4 results.

Reporting

End of Q4 Report (within 30 days of quarter end):

• Number of eligible validators at Q4 start

• Number of qualifying validators (met 97% uptime)

• Total payments distributed

• Validator count and decentralization metrics

• Geographic distribution analysis

• Program effectiveness evaluation

• Recommendations for potential continuation

• Cost-benefit analysis

This comprehensive report will inform any follow-on proposals for Q2 and beyond.

Team & Accountability

Responsible:

• NEAR House of Stake Foundation: Program administration, payment distribution, reporting, oversight and approval of program adjustments

Accountable to:

• House of Stake governance

• NEAR validator community

Program Administration:

• Validator eligibility determination for Q4

• Uptime monitoring and calculation throughout Q4

• Payment processing at end of Q4

• End-of-quarter comprehensive reporting

• Community communication about program status and results

Governance of Continuation:

• This Q4 pilot runs as approved; no mid-quarter adjustments without emergency proposal

• At end of Q4, program automatically concludes unless new proposal is approved

• Follow-on proposals for Q2+ should be submitted before end of Q4 to allow discussion time

• Any continuation proposal should incorporate learnings from Q4 pilot

Security Considerations

Economic Security

Program Sustainability: The 20,000 NEAR Q4 budget represents approximately 0.002% of NEAR’s total supply, a negligible impact on token economics. At current prices, this is roughly $60,000 for the quarter to support network decentralization during a critical transition period.

If the program continues for a full year at similar scale (illustrative 100,000 NEAR annually), it would represent approximately $300,000 annually to support decentralization—still a minimal cost relative to the value of maintaining a diverse validator set.

Validator Economics: By covering operational costs for smaller validators, the program reduces the risk that validator consolidation could compromise network security. The 97% uptime requirement ensures supported validators actively contribute to network operation.

Budget Risk: If NEAR price increases significantly, the program may become more expensive in USD terms. Conversely, if price decreases, 150 NEAR may become insufficient. Quarterly reviews allow adjustments.

Gaming and Abuse

Sybil Attacks: The program’s design makes it economically unattractive for large validators to split their stake, as:

• Each “fake” validator requires separate infrastructure and maintenance

• 97% uptime across multiple small validators is operationally challenging

• The program pays the same 150 NEAR regardless of stake size

• Administrative overhead and monitoring will flag suspicious patterns

Uptime Gaming: Validators cannot easily game the 97% uptime requirement as it’s calculated from on-chain block production data over 3 months. Short-term uptime manipulation would be evident and could result in disqualification.

Exclusion List Gaming: Clear criteria for other incentive programs will be maintained to prevent validators from appearing to exit other programs to qualify for this one.

Decentralization Impact

Positive: The program directly supports network decentralization by enabling smaller validators to remain operational despite reduced rewards.

Monitoring Required: The program should track whether it actually maintains validator diversity or creates perverse incentives. Annual evaluation will assess real decentralization impact.

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

Disclaimer

Gauntlet is currently partnered with the Near Foundation to provide mechanism design and economic analyses. Our scope pertains to incentive design and infrastructure optimization, while other authors of this document drive the other scopes of work.

[luzmargaritas]

In these times of change, it is essential that the community support those responsible for network decentralization and security. Proposals from experts and those familiar with the economic aspects of node management are needed, so the community welcomes comments and suggestions that will enhance the proposal

[slimedrgn]

There’s no “planned NEAR protocol inflation reduction from 5% to 2.5%”, Linear & Hot have already made a proposal (with questionable legitimacy) and it got rejected by voters. If we assume they resubmit the same proposal and it gets passed, I don’t like selecting a number of “smallest” validators. In this proposal sybil risk seems like an afterthought, while it’s the most important one, one can easily launch 30 validators to get $54,000 per year and spend less than $500 on hardware, and it will be impossible to identify them given the “sybil risk” mitigations provided.

Maintaining 97% uptime is too easy, that gives you more than 2 days of being fully offline every quarter. Even with 100% uptime (as calculated in this proposal), NEAR allows for 2-3 hours of downtime per epoch without losing validator seat or rewards, so it’s insanely easy to get 100% uptime. The “operational overhead” of spending 5 minutes to update the node once every 1-2 months (or with metapool’s node studio, it’s literally 1 button click: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YXdAhuEwmSE) is just negligible. And of course, if you can operate one validator, operating multiple of them is much easier since you have to only learn the tech once, and then use it many times.

Also, I think 150 NEAR per quarter is way too much, metapool themselves are recommending a $14/month hosting for node studio.

[NEAR_MAXi]

I want to be clear upfront:
I’m not writing this to debate whether staking emissions should be 5%, 4%, or 3.25%.

At this point, I’m not even concerned about the emissions rate itself.

What concerns me — and what should concern anyone who values NEAR’s long-term credibility — is how this emissions reduction is being pushed:
Not through open debate.
Not through explicit, standalone consensus.
But by quietly bundling it into a Nearcore upgrade and then presenting it as a done deal.

⸻

Governance isn’t just about outcomes — it’s about process

This is not how serious decentralized protocols make economic decisions.
• The emissions change was not voted on directly by the community in a clear, binding proposal.
• It was embedded in a protocol upgrade, with no clean opt-out path for validators who disagree.
• A large portion of the stake abstained, citing legal and compliance concerns — and that abstention is now being spun as silent approval.

If this is what passes for “governance” now, the word has lost its meaning.

⸻

We shouldn’t normalize this

Even if some think the emissions reduction is economically justified, the way it’s being handled sets a dangerous precedent:
• That protocol-level monetary policy can be changed without clear consent
• That abstention = consent
• That validator silence or exit is as good as approval
• That post-hoc proposals (like HSP002/003) can retroactively justify something already being slipped through

This is not decentralization. This is narrative control wrapped in protocol commits.

⸻

And no, it hasn’t happened yet — which is why this matters

Let’s be clear: this isn’t about complaining after the fact.
The upgrade hasn’t been finalized. It can still be opposed.
This is exactly the time to speak up — because once this gets normalized, you won’t be able to unring this bell.

⸻

What needs to happen now
• Unbundle monetary policy from protocol upgrades — permanently
• Require explicit votes for core tokenomics changes, with quorum and clarity
• Treat abstentions as abstentions, not consent
• Respect validator independence — not just in words, but in how changes are presented and voted

If emissions cuts are the right decision, make the case. Run the vote. Accept the result.
But don’t sneak it in under the hood and call that governance.

⸻

This isn’t about emissions anymore.
It’s about protecting the integrity of how NEAR makes decisions.

That still matters — and if we care about decentralization, it has to matter more than ever right now.

[Bowen]

I think there are some misunderstandings here. The release which contains a standalone change to the protocol inflation is the process through which voting happens. Even if there is some other voting process, eventually validators need to adopt some release so that the change takes effect on the protocol level. Since the mainnet launch, the protocol has a built-in mechanism to decide whether a new protocol version gets adopted or not through voting by validators. More importantly, the protocol requires 80% of the stake to adopt the release for it to take effect, which is a very high bar. That has been the case for all releases historically and nothing changes there.

[NEAR_MAXi]

Thanks Bowen. Just to clarify — what happens to validators who don’t upgrade to the new version? Are they still able to stay in consensus and continue producing blocks?

Or does non-adoption mean they fall out of sync with the chain?

Would help to understand how much actual optionality there is here.

[cuongdcdev]

“Or does non-adoption mean they fall out of sync with the chain?”

nothing happens, all validators operating as normal.

[cuongdcdev]

i think it’s better to let the smallest/ unprofitable validators move to MetaPool Node Studio, give them a free ticket for at least 1 quarter, in this way, we don’t have to spend 150 NEAR/quarter, and also could reduce the management time and support effort from MetaPool

[snoopfear]

I believe that in the near term, based on examples like Solana, reducing inflation should eventually lead to an increase in the token price. However, it’s equally important that we maintain strong engagement and interest in the NEAR ecosystem to make this effect sustainable. Regarding the specifics of the support conditions, in my opinion, slimedrgn has explained everything quite thoroughly.

[lane]

Hello,

This proposal was posted five days ago. After the seven day temperature check period, in about a day and a half, it’s eligible to become a canonical HSP proposal and to be put up for a vote.

As a next step, please submit it in markdown format as a PR to the proposals repository here: Sign in to GitHub · GitHub

Let me know if you have any other questions about the process.

Thanks!

Lane

[DDeAlmeida]

Depend of the level of upgrade. Green this is ok to stay.
But other (Yellow, red) will kick you.

Btw, in the next version (probably in 2-3 weeks), this modification will be onboarded in a Yellow release

[illia]

@NEAR_MAXi

Not through open debate.
Not through explicit, standalone consensus.

We have had open debate in August. I think every side expressed their opinion.

The vote that was run by Linear & HOT was a signaling vote with 90%+ of voted stake said YES.

So it’s time for real onchain upgrade vote. That is the current protocol upgrade process, that is the consensus (literally).

See: Upgradability - Guide to Nearcore Development

The feedback around small validators was heard - Metapool has was working on a few different options of the programs and proposed here a variant.

I think changing from bottom 100 validators to under X NEAR stake is a better approach.

For example for 100k NEAR, at lower 5% validator reward, these validators will be making less than 240N.

@NEAR_MAXi

• The emissions change was not voted on directly by the community in a clear, binding proposal.

What would this look like from your perspective?

Currently House of Stake has 180k NEAR - there is clear apathy to participate in the governance by the broader token holder base. House of Stake will need incentives and time to actually gain legitimacy. Adding incentives on top of existing staking rewards is just lighting up money on fire IMO.

Meanwhile, validators are currently representatives of the delegates of their stake. As we saw with signaling vote there were validators who were voting YES or NO based on the interests of the stake owners.

@NEAR_MAXi

• Unbundle monetary policy from protocol upgrades — permanently

We need a protocol upgrade for this and validators must adapt it But yes, that should be the plan as House of Stake actually gains large amount of stake and there is technical implementation for this.

@NEAR_MAXi

what happens to validators who don’t upgrade to the new version?

Please see the validator voting process / consensus (Upgradability - Guide to Nearcore Development). Effectively 80% of stake need to upgrade for protocol to change the version. When that happens, other validators must either upgrade or their client will stop running in the epoch with the new version.

[NEAR_MAXi]

Thanks for jumping in, Illia.

To be fair, I initially misunderstood — I thought the emissions cut was bundled with other protocol changes in a single release. But Bowen clarified (both here and elsewhere) that the only change in this release is the emissions reduction.

And if it doesn’t reach 80% validator adoption, emissions just stay the same.

That default outcome makes sense to me — no forced upgrade, just opt-in consensus. Appreciate the transparency.

[cuongdcdev]

if the majority accepted the inflation reduction version, then the proposal is implemented on mainnet with inflation reduced by half. The minority of validators will be forced to follow this to join the network; it’s the consensus.

[foxreymann]

Not apathy. HoS is not fit for purpose. I have over 18k NEAR in my validator. HoS UI doesn’t allow me to restake it into veNEAR. I was told there is an option from the cli where I could unstake my validator and through creating my own lock contract somehow stake it into veNEAR and then back to my validator. I’m not bothered, this is no apathy, this is too complicated.

[foxreymann]

@Meta_Pool

Milestone Target Date Deliverable Success Criteria Program Launch Q4 2025 Start Eligibility list published, monitoring active 100 validators identified

So where is the list? Does fox.pool.near qualify? I’m not sure. I’m validator no 292 out of 333. But I have 40k NEAR staked by MetaPool. Does it mean I receive MetaPool incentives or not?

[Yuen]

Current method to get your tokens redelegate back to your validator is through CLI. The Agora team will add in a direct feature to redelegate in future versions (no set date yet). I attached the picture below for how to redirect the stake to your validator.

[charleslavon]

I’m voting yes because I’m in favor of helping to maintain a diverse validator set if an inflation cut were adopted, but I don’t think ‘smallest validators’ is the right filter, and we’ll need stronger guardrails to avoid sybil abuse.

A short, one-quarter pilot with modest payments feels like a reasonable way to test this out. For a binding proposal, I’d want to see stricter uptime requirements and support amounts that better match actual validator costs.

[Griff]

I’ll be voting Abstain because I don’t feel 100% sure that I understand the full context for this proposal as someone relatively new to the ecosystem… but the proposal does not pass my smell test.

#1 I am skeptical of the approach of this proposal

We need to adjust the goals here. It seems like the goal is to just give extra rewards to small stakers that already exist, because we are about to cut the inflation rate and don’t want to lose them. This is not a winning strategy! To me it seems to be addressing a symptom and not solving a core issue.

IMO this program should be targeting the goal of attracting NEW, efficient and aligned validators to the network, such that our growth rate exceeds the drop off rate.

To do that we need an actual marketing budget attached to this. We need more competition in staking, there are people who would run these nodes if they had a good subsidy to get started…. but to find those people someone needs to be DMing on TG in other communities who run nodes, (not just posting on Twitter which they should do as well). Reach out to the DappNode and similar communities, and make it easy for people to get started.

We also probably need to have a big pot of Near that can be staked behind new nodes… maybe make it like a NEAR staking matching fund… where any NEAR that is staked by a new node will get 3 months of matching stake for every NEAR staked on their node… or some solution like that, so people can get new nodes up and get enough NEAR delegated so the validating can start.

I really don’t like the current approach of rewarding the people that have the least stake because…

#2 The incentives are backwards

The smaller you stake, the more you get (relatively). Everyone gets 150 NEAR regardless of stake size, so you’re literally incentivizing people to stake the MINIMUM. That makes no sense. You want competition. You want the best, most efficient setups. You want people with proper infrastructure who are bullish on Near and staking to their own node!

If we stick with this rewards system, instead of a flat payment, I would suggest a quadratic formula or something where it’s easy to align incentives. Maybe larger stakes get proportionally more, or base it on efficiency/performance. This proposal is telling people “stake less to get better rewards” and that’s the opposite of what you want. Imagine you are a Staker and have 150 people below you… there is currently an incentive to shed some delegation (maybe sell the NEAR you hold) so you can get down to be in the bottom 100. That’s dangerous.

We have a real opportunity here. This is a great chance to bring NEW validators to the network. Let’s go for big plays, not just subsidizing what we already have. Let’s use this budget to actually grow the validator set and make NEAR more decentralized.

#3 Uptime seems like the wrong metric?

@slimedrgn

Maintaining 97% uptime is too easy, that gives you more than 2 days of being fully offline every quarter. Even with 100% uptime (as calculated in this proposal), NEAR allows for 2-3 hours of downtime per epoch without losing validator seat or rewards, so it’s insanely easy to get 100% uptime.

Maybe instead of using the Uptime metric maybe we can use Endorsements % instead, that seems like a more competitive metric, which encapsulates Uptime alongside other metrics.

#4 But maybe I don’t know what I’m talking about

It is probably easier to keep our current nodes happy and here, than to attract new ones… and I appreciate that. We can design a solution to reward nodes via this program while we avoid incentivizing them to compete to be in the bottom 100. My first thoughts on how to do this might be a bit complex mathematically, but I’m sure we can create a simpler solution that is easy to communicate with a little more thought.

[JoeSixpack]

Can’t attract new validators when there is too little incentive. 5% was barely profitable, 2.5% is now for charitable purposes. But what do the Top 100 Block Producers care if all the “little people validators” are forced to shut down? Its just more Benjamins to them. A core problem here is NF thinks that running a validator should be a Staking as a Service business, not promoting decentralization. NF could do well to learn from Solana Foundation’s hugely successful delegation program instead of continuing to centralize/cartelize the Block Producers.