Updated polls based on feedback include 2 new polls at the end, as well as a verbal correction: ‘Governing body’ has been changed to ‘voting body’ indicative of a future ‘house of stake’ style community voting body.
For a high level overview of the different governing bodies and relevant assumptions, please see here: NDC Governance Framework V1.3 - Google Docs
On Transparency Commission Accountability:
- (A) Yes
- (B) No
- (A) No, the TC is qualified and capable of determining for themselves who is fit to serve.
- (B) Yes, if the TC wishes to remove someone from a position of power, they should need the governing body to approve their decision in order for the member to actually be removed.
- (A) Yes, and the treasury should finance the quarterly job in order to ensure effective budget allocation and oversight.
- (B) No, the Transparency Commission and any interested community member can track proposals on-chain to verify conflicts of interest and effectiveness.
- (A) A member can motion to remove a member of any house, if that motion receives X% of governing body vote in Y time period, then the member is removed.
- (B) No, governing body members should not be able to motion to remove elected members of NDC.
New Topic Added In:
- Yes, this is needed in order to ensure balance of powers.
- No, the TC can self-regulate themselves sufficiently and investigate themselves if need be.
New Topic Added In:
- Yes, this is needed for further accountability and to avoid conflict of interest.
- No, the TC’s work will be visible to other governing bodies and the voting bodies, and as such will be auditable by the community.
On the House of Merit:
- (a) All allocation proposals should break up funding into milestones, such that the treasury is allocation is not allocated all at once, but over time.
- (b) All allocation proposals should be deployed in a single lump sum.
- (c) Only allocation proposals of certain amounts should be deployed as lump sums, with larger amounts allocated in tranches for specific milestones.
- (A) voting body approval is required for all 1, 2 and 3.
- (B) voting body can motion and vote on the removal of members.
- (C) voting body can motion to nullify the setup package and reset the budget at any time.
- (D) voting body can veto recurring and big ticket budget decisions by HoM at any time.
- (E) all of the above.
On the Voting Power and Involvement of the Larger Voting Body
- (A) Yes, but only if a significantly high % of the governing body votes for it.
- (B) No, because there are elections every X years anyway.
- (A) Yes, assuming X% of the governing body approves it.
- (B) No, the sole capacity to allocate budget should be vested in the HoM.
- (A) Yes, this ensures proper overall checks on the TC power.
- (B) No, the TC can self-regulate sufficiently to avoid this need.