Thanks, Hack Humanity, for the update and for taking the Screening Committee’s feedback on board.
I’d like to add a bit more context on why this decision was made.
Opening the Constitutional Vote – and Why We’re Using a Simple Majority
Over the past months, the House of Stake Constitutional Documents have gone through extensive drafting, public discussion, and formal review.
The Screening Committee has now completed its review and made one important recommendation:
Given the current concentration of voting power at HoS, the ratification vote should use a simple majority, not a supermajority as originally planned. Here’s why.
The Current Reality of Voting Power at HoS
Today, voting power at House of Stake remains highly concentrated.
- The 3 largest delegates collectively hold approximately 34.6% of voting power
- Several combinations among the 5 largest delegates exceed 33.33%
- see HoS Voting Power Dashboard
Under a ⅔ supermajority threshold, just three large voters can block ratification, no matter what the other 400 delegates believe is right.
Why a Supermajority Is Risky in the Current Distribution
Supermajorities are meant to protect foundational rules and require broad support. But when voting power is concentrated, they also amplify veto power.
In simple terms:
- Under supermajority, large holders cannot easily push something through alone if everyone else disagrees.
- But they can block it if they vote no
- Supermajority under these conditions does not measure broad consensus, it measures whether the largest holders choose not to block.
That imbalance creates risk, especially for something as foundational as constitutional ratification.
If you’re interested in the formal mechanics, see the technical appendix below.
What the Simple Majority Decision Protects
- Democratic legitimacy under current conditions. Simple majority ensures the outcome reflects the wider delegate base, not whale veto. This will be even more the case if the Documents are passed with a large majority.
- Governance continuity. The Interim Constitution expires end of May 2026. With the Citizens House vote passed, HoS will soon have an active treasury. If ratification is blocked, we risk governance uncertainty, stalled proposals, and unnecessary deadlock, right when momentum is building.
- Community co-creation. These documents are the product of extensive public discussion since October 2025, structured community feedback, co-creation cycles, and legal alignment with the HoS Foundation.
- House of Stake Exercising its Mandate. Under Article 5.1 of the PVP, the Foundation could establish these documents without any vote. It chose to seek tokenholder consent.
Why Not Remove Supermajority Altogether?
Supermajority remains the defined threshold for constitutional amendments. We are not removing it. Instead, we are making a pragmatic adjustment for this specific ratification vote due to current voting power concentration.
We still think, supermajority for constitutional amendments is the right approach going forward, because
- It encourages broad ecosystem alignment on foundational decisions
- Pushes us aim for a healthier voting power distribution
As voting power becomes more distributed, supermajority becomes safer and more appropriate. Using a simple majority for this ratification is not lowering standards, it is protecting progress under present conditions.
A Governance Step Forward
This decision reflects the principle we’ve consistently upheld:
Avoid governance debt.
Acknowledge reality.
Design mechanisms that work in practice.
This vote matters. And now more than ever, your participation matters.
The vote opens in the coming days.
Whether you hold a lot of voting power or a little: your vote counts.
Let’s ratify the foundations and keep building.
Appendix A
Example case: Three voters with very unequal weights in a ⅔ supermajority vote.
-
A = 60
-
B = 25
-
C = 15
-
Total = 100
Compute Winning Coalitions:
| Coalition | Weight | Wins? | Critical players |
|---|---|---|---|
| {A} | 60 |  |
— |
| {B} | 25 | |
— |
| {C} | 15 | |
— |
| {A,B} | 85 |  |
A and B are both critical |
| {A,C} | 75 | |
A and C are both critical |
| {B,C} | 40 | |
— |
| {A,B,C} | 100 | |
A is critical |
Interpretation:
- Supermajority reduces A from total control.
- But A becomes a veto player: every winning coalition includes A (because B+C=40 can never reach 67)
- B and C gain some power, but only by being “the extra votes” that push A over the threshold in 2-person coalitions
- If you are interested to learn more about measuring veto power, check out the Banzhaf Power index.
Appendix B: Structural Safeguards Against Precedent
Supermajority stays in place for amendments.
The ratified documents still require a ⅔ supermajority to change the constitutional framework after it’s approved. The current voting mechanism applies only to this specific vote, it does not set a precedent for future constitutional changes.
The classification is based on verifiable facts.
Voting power concentration data is public. Future Screening Committees will assess proposals based on the conditions at that time. If voting power becomes less concentrated, the argument for using a simple majority no longer applies.