NEAR Governance Discussion: Reducing Issuance to 1.6%, and the Path to a Fixed Supply

I am conscious that the change to emissions could impact small nodes adversely and we are thinking about mechanics to propose in phase 2 to maintain a strong Nakamoto coefficient. I believe that the second phase of this journey, assuming we are able to pass the proposal for emissions, will have a lively discussion on the appropriate node set composition, size, geographic distribution etc. to maintain a highly decentralized system.

To reinforce the point of view for SVRN, if we did not fundamentally believe that this proposal will result in value appreciation of NEAR on a relative basis to USD, BTC etc. we would not be making it given we will forgo nearly 1M native NEAR rewards a year from staking revenue.

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I think this a very valid question and ultimately the market should determine this with the Foundation and alternative incentive structures being designed to ensure the system remains sufficiently decentralized and resistant to attacks. My hope is that we can work through this together as a community based on research and data, to conclude on this in Phase 2

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House of Stake represents 0.3% of the NEAR total supply and 0.7% of the NEAR in staking. This looks unhealthy. Imo we need to create a system in which every holder, or at the very least, every staker, has the right to vote.

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Forum posts and votes generally self-select for those who believe HoS has legitimacy. The low engagement may suggest that the majority of holders and developers find little or no value in it. If the majority believes that HoS is a rigged system, the premise of “Democracy” is merely a fig leaf.

The proposal to cut emissions makes a good narrative for the speculative press.

MPC nodes should similarly be paid from on-chain activity fees, rather than politically. The number of seats should be dynamic. Currently there’s no price competition. MPC nodes are politically selected and funded.

There’s a bit of slight of hand here. The politically managed intents revenue is growing, while validators are squeezed on emissions and developers are squeezed on the dust from gas rebates.

How much of the ecosystem will the HoS vote itself?

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Thanks, Sal, for bringing these proposals forward. I appreciate the effort and the thinking behind taking a longer-term view rather than optimizing for shorter time horizons. I agree that NEAR needs to think in terms of a multi-year horizon, and I think these discussions are important for the long-term sustainability of the protocol.

That said, I have mixed feelings about another inflation reduction, especially given that the previous reduction was not that long ago and was already a difficult adjustment for some parts of the ecosystem. I’d like to highlight a few considerations from the perspective of validators, community infrastructure, and the current City Nodes experiment.

First, delegated validators should be part of the consideration.

After the previous inflation reduction, delegated validators have already seen their economics become significantly more difficult. This is particularly relevant for validators operating with delegated stake, including those participating through mechanisms such as Meta Pool. If validator economics are already relatively thin, another reduction could further weaken the incentive for independent operators to maintain infrastructure and contribute to network security.

For Arguement sake, it might be good to have 200 quality sets of Validators.

Second, there is an important timing issue with the City Nodes experiment.

I am currently a candidate for a City Node beneficiary, so I recognize that I have a direct perspective on this. However, I don’t think that should be the primary reason for the argument. My concern is broader: City Nodes are still extremely early in their lifecycle, with 4 Citynoded running and 2 on the pipeline.

The current inflation level provides an opportunity to bootstrap these experiments while they are still trying to establish partnerships, prove their value, and develop a path toward self-sustainability. Reducing the available economic support again before the model has had enough time to demonstrate whether it works could make the experiment harder to evaluate fairly.

In other words, I think we should distinguish between whether City Nodes are economically sustainable in the long term and whether we have given the experiment enough time to demonstrate that sustainability.

Third, I think the timing of the reduction matters as much as the reduction itself.

A lot of previous community initiatives have implicitly become discussions about budgets and operational funding—essentially treating community contribution more like a professional job. I think the current City Node experiment gives us an opportunity to test a different model: can we create local contributors and organizations that develop genuine ownership, relationships, and sustainable activity around NEAR rather than simply operating because there is a budget attached to it?

The experimental phase is therefore valuable precisely because it can help us measure what happens when contributors are given enough room to build, validate, and eventually move toward self-sustainability.

For that reason, my current position would be to postpone another inflation reduction for roughly one year.

That would not mean rejecting the long-term objective of lower inflation. Rather, it would give us a defined period to validate the current initiatives, particularly City Nodes, and establish clearer evidence around:

  • whether City Nodes can generate measurable ecosystem value;

  • how quickly they can move toward partnerships and self-sustainability;

  • what level of funding is actually required;

  • whether community contribution can become less dependent on direct operational budgets; and

I think that would make the eventual decision much more evidence-based.

I’m generally supportive of thinking several years ahead.

So my preference would be: keep the long-term inflation-reduction objective, but postpone the next reduction and use the next year as a validation period for the current ecosystem experiments.

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I think this is needed to move toward a more robust Web3 and AI network, as the chain has found its market fit (read: market share) and more stakeholders join the ecosystem as validators or delegates.

This would provide dynamic stakeholder collaboration, which is needed for the next phase.

As for now, I think it’s common knowledge there is no single HSP-XXX that has been proposed “from the community”

Even Bitwise, as one of our biggest validators which has launch their ETF product recently.

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HOS presents the opportunity for every tokenholder to participate, without compromising protocol yield with supported LSTs. I agree that it is disappointing to see the current scale of participation in the system, but I am hopeful that as increasingly important decisions on economic policy are brought forward, we will have stronger engagement. This proposal will require a super majority in HOS and then a validator uptake of 80+% in an upgrade. Holders that are delegating can either contribute in HOS or engage the validator they are delegating with express their views and lobby for their position.

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I think your point of view of self-selection could be turned to more positive skew which I explained in a previous response. If tokenholders have a strong view one way or another, they should participate in the system and express their views.

The counterproposal you provided would result in a significant negative event for the validator set with emissions immediately crashing to 10-20% of current levels contemplating buy-backs and transaction fee burns.

In regards to MPC nodes, I do believe the future state should incorporate revenue driving buy-backs into the protocol treasury and then funding the critical line items in the network’s op-ex model including MPC nodes.

The logic for driving a diligence process for MPC node selection was covered in the MPC proposal thread and thus fair has resulted in an operator set with nearly 100% uptime and ability to successfully manage the change management process across the TDX migration and many software changes. There is significant difference in my mind between political selection and doing technical, operational and compliance diligence of operators.

Thanks for your note Simon.

On your first point, I have been in active conversation with the LSTs on this proposal and generally speaking thus far we have found alignment to pursue a design that optimizes for value accrual to NEAR, even if the NEAR native token yield through their commission structures declines in the short term. The feedback, interestingly enough, is that a two year ramp is too slow to realize the benefit we aim to achieve on economic equilibrium.

I did research on the City Nodes experiment which is quite interesting and prior to this discussion thread was not top of mind, absent a few brief conversations on the topic. I reached out to the team managing the City Nodes program and they are conscious of potential impacts and are coordinating a management plan if this proposal passes to ensure the experiment has time to yield sufficient data to demonstrate sustainability or not.

My view on the timing is naturally different from yours, but I do appreciate your perspective and the color that you’ve shared is helpful in expanding my thinking on City Nodes and this is a topic I will do more research and learning on. My view is that if we can pursue the end-state supply side tokenomics with this proposal, and then research on Phase 2 over the next 12-18 months, we will positioned to solely focus on the demand economy and scaling buy-backs.

All of this said, thank you for your thoughtful post and I look forward to meeting and speaking further on City Nodes soon.

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In the short term, if implemented without a gradual tapering mechanism, yes. Of course the target from the sliding window could be approached by a Zeno step mechanism. The target itself could be determined by a symmetric rate to compensate for overages and deficits. The goal was to provide a simple explanation everyone could immediately grasp.

If you liked the response from the speculative press to this proposal, a deflationary proposal would be even stronger.

Finally, the emission rate itself doesn’t tell the full story. Second order effects are more important here. Stakers would be paid in a deflationary asset. The nominal rate isn’t inclusive of the realized gains.

The political concerns remain. I prefer trustless, programmatic mechanisms to political controls. For obvious reasons, many either feel apathetic about the HoS or are reluctant to legitimize it with further participation.

It is incumbent on the HoS to project legitimacy. If critics feel HoS lacks legitimacy or is rigged, they are not obligated to participate.

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Thank you for engaging on the mechanism rather than just the process, this is genuinely appreciated. A couple thoughts on these points.

On the point regarding second order effects, we are in agreement. A lower nominal yield paid in an asset with a smaller supply is the whole basis for Part 1, and it’s why we’ve said the yield reduction is not a cost to stakers in real terms if the design works.

On the counterproposal, I think this should be contemplated in the research process of the second phase and is a reasonable mechanic design to explore. Emissions bounded by net burns and buybacks over a rolling window, with a taper into the target, is consistent with the principles we’ve aligned to.

Gas burns are on-chain, programatic and measurable. Intents buy-backs are also measurable on-chain, but the explicit programmatic design could be enhanced and I agree with this.

Second, a symmetric correction means emissions can rise to make up a deficit. Our view is that emissions should only ratchet down.

Part 1 is a single parameter change that can be ratified now and starts producing data. The mechanism you’ve framed needs deeper analysis and . That’s the sequencing, not a preference for political control.

On the legitimacy point, I’ve agreed that I would like to see participation in HOS grow and my hope is that this proposal serves as a drawing force to encourage holders to participate. I would appreciate your leadership in doing so and given your depth on mechanic design I think you would find community members who would like to delegate to your voting pattern.

Choosing not to vote is totally your choice, but the proposal will still be decided through this process, and I’d rather the people who disagree be counted.

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Strongly support Part 1, and I’d encourage everyone to engage seriously with Part 2.

NEAR is in an unusual position. Intents is generating real revenue, and that revenue is already buying NEAR on the open market. That lets NEAR improve its token economics because the network is beginning to pay its own way, which very few L1s can claim.

A single-parameter change is the right first step. It is simple, verifiable, and phased in slowly enough for us to watch its effects. I take the point from cloudmex-alan and DDeAlmeida that validator growth after the 2025 halving owed a lot to Meta Pool’s delegation programmes, so it isn’t clean proof that the set can absorb another cut. To me that’s an argument for measuring closely through the 24-month ramp, not for standing still.

On cloudmex-alan’s’s question about what the token is for in the end state, my answer is the machine economy. AI agents will increasingly hold and settle value in whichever assets offer the most predictable rules. A network whose supply stops growing, and whose security is paid for by what it earns, is a strong candidate to be that asset.

That’s why Part 2 matters. The one condition I’d want built in from the start is that issuance only reaches zero once network revenue verifiably covers the security budget. Designed that way, a fixed supply would put NEAR in a category of its own.

Looking forward to the formal proposal.

A revised version of this proposal, formally submitted via House of Stake, has been posted on a separate thread. Please continue the discussion here: