HSP-003 Incentive Effectiveness & Rewards Program Close
TL/DR
- The HoS veNEAR rewards program (HSP-003) went live on December 19, 2025 and since then, provides participation incentives for governance-locked NEAR.
- Roughly 83% of total locked NEAR in this program originates from just 15 large locking events, nearly all occurring during active proposal periods.
- Average daily locking is materially higher when proposals are active, regardless of whether incentives are live.
- Incentive only periods (no active proposals) do not show higher locking intensity than comparable non-incentive periods.
- Structural product constraints (conversion friction and fragmented staking integrations) limit the addressable supply of NEAR that can seamlessly enter House of Stake, reducing the potential impact of incentives.
- Recommendation: In the absence of empirical evidence that HSP-003 independently increases locked NEAR, incentives should be suspended in their current form and only reconsidered if redesigned to directly reinforce governance driven locking.
Background & Context
House of Stake (HoS) went live on October 13, 2025, introducing a new on-chain governance and delegation framework for veNEAR holders. The HoS veNEAR rewards program (HSP-003) went live on December 19, 2025 and since then, offers governance participation rewards on locked NEAR.
Prior analyses by Gauntlet identified governance proposals as a primary driver of increases in locked NEAR. In periods without active proposals, incentives alone did not appear to meaningfully increase the amount of NEAR locked in House of Stake.
Since launch, the system has moved through four distinct operating regimes defined by the presence or absence of incentives and active governance proposals:
- No proposals active, no incentives active
- No proposals active, incentives active
- Proposals active, no incentives active
- Proposals active, incentives active
The existence of these regimes creates a natural framework to evaluate the marginal impact of incentives while controlling for proposal activity. With sufficient time now elapsed in each state, a structured comparison across regimes is now feasible.
The purpose of this document is to determine the effect of HSP-003 incentives on changes in locked NEAR, distinguish that effect from proposal-driven locking behavior, and assess whether continuation of the incentive program is justified based on observed outcomes.
Proposal Activity as A Driver of NEAR Locked
For this analysis, an active proposal period is defined as the time between when a proposal is first posted to the forum and when voting concludes.
HoS participants must have their NEAR locked before voting begins in order to be eligible. However, users can lock NEAR either in anticipation of an upcoming vote or in response to a proposal once it has been introduced. As a result, changes in locked balances during proposal windows may reflect deliberate strategic positioning around governance activity rather than routine participation.
There are currently 5.29M NEAR locked in HoS. Of this total, more than 4.3M NEAR, representing roughly 81 percent of all locked supply, originates from just 15 large locking events. All but one of these events occurred during an active proposal period.
The concentration and timing of these large locking events indicate that growth in locked NEAR within HoS is not gradual or continuous. Instead, major increases in locked NEAR are closely associated with live governance periods, suggesting that proposal activity plays a central role in driving large scale participation.
| Date | Active Proposal | Locking Account | NEAR Locked |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2/2/2026 | Yes | cc96f55848f0ac487f1a185e72df91d33ec13b608fc8eb90d15dbd1bf363c807 | 499,997 |
| 2/3/2026 | Yes | 4783b54876253b1f79e3241c11d683223d186ad217178927fcbd2fff2f646172 | 499,028 |
| 12/14/2025 | Yes | 21a075b68b8fb9ff01942c1f052c2dec984d8a833191f29db700d7a298f5f624 | 439,019 |
| 12/14/2025 | Yes | 717e23c9f60bbbdda4b1b9118a1a7e095320940219645d7fdd55b801af8a7f82 | 439,019 |
| 12/14/2025 | Yes | ffef0feba237d91dd78c61c41e692456afc757ce55eb04e6ba374494ccd14505 | 439,017 |
| 10/29/2025 | Yes | spareuni818.near | 291,520 |
| 10/20/2025 | Yes | 0df78d0bbb77808cc8bb7afba092e184dd0cf8caf3e89af2295ac62d95ee9d63 | 220,005 |
| 10/20/2025 | Yes | 76c32ebe82e58f283f1dc9ff456c57d4489ea23b0cb6a89d4de602b5ca54c14c | 219,980 |
| 10/30/2025 | Yes | linear-gov.sputnik-dao.near | 205,671 |
| 10/19/2025 | Yes | a268c8c425fc6e2574a07301ca6c10db196aa559b3d3cbbc02e6370c61d33f38 | 200,099 |
| 10/19/2025 | Yes | 26945c364a2551a9521ca19b010205aee183a8c864503d8debd3ce3bfeb58416 | 200,002 |
| 10/20/2025 | Yes | 2c494a5c5ca9fd8c442b9260b79f77644222e30efd475ca5bdc3d4ac9b009cc4 | 200,000 |
| 10/17/2025 | Yes | bcc328f40ca071af1b91a6a82a238358f9eeedf2aac0bbf954d01a0bfc8f58f5 | 144,946 |
| 2/23/2026 | No | aurora_hos.near | 120,002 |
| 10/30/2025 | Yes | mrsergey.near | 102,835 |
The table below summarizes the number of observations in each regime, along with the total and average daily change in NEAR locked. The average daily change provides a normalized measure of locking intensity across regimes with different durations.
Periods with active proposals exhibit substantially higher average daily increases in locked NEAR than periods without proposals. When no proposals are active, daily locking is modest, and the presence of incentives does not correspond to higher average increases. In fact, the average daily change is lower during incentive-active periods than during periods without incentives.
This pattern reinforces the view that proposal activity, rather than incentives alone, is the primary driver of meaningful increases in locked NEAR.
| Regime | Number of Observations | Δ NEAR Locked | Δ NEAR Locked / Number of Observations |
|---|---|---|---|
| No proposals active, no incentives active | 11 | 201,021 | 18,275 |
| No proposals active, incentives active | 39 | 212,853 | 5,458 |
| Proposals active, no incentives active | 56 | 3,476,218 | 62,075 |
| Proposals active, incentives active | 29 | 1,037,516 | 35,776 |
While the table summarizes average differences across regimes, the time series visualization provides additional context. Visually, all material step increases in total NEAR locked occur during active proposal periods. Periods without proposals show comparatively limited movement, reinforcing the conclusion that governance activity coincides with the largest increases in locked balances.
Recommendation
Taken together, the event level concentration, regime level averages, and time series evidence point to a consistent conclusion: increases in locked NEAR are overwhelmingly concentrated in periods with active governance proposals. The largest step changes in locked balances occur during proposal windows, and average daily locking intensity is materially higher when proposals are active.
Importantly, this does not imply that incentives can never influence locking behavior. However, within the observed sample, there is no empirical evidence that HSP-003 incentives generate a measurable incremental increase in locked NEAR on their own. Periods with incentives but no active proposals show comparatively modest changes, and incentive active periods do not exhibit higher average daily locking than comparable non-incentive periods.
In addition to the lack of measurable impact, there are structural and product level constraints that likely limit incremental locking irrespective of incentives:
- User flow complexity within the House of Stake application may reduce conversion efficiency. The pathway between staking, acquiring LSTs, and locking for veNEAR introduces multiple onchain actions and steps that can increase friction.
- Fragmented staking integrations constrain addressable supply. Users who have staked NEAR into contracts that do not issue transferable tokens cannot directly route their position into House of Stake. They must first unstake (subject to time delays), then restake or lock within House of Stake. This creates additional operational and financial friction likely suppressing marginal participation.
These structural constraints suggest that even a well calibrated incentive may struggle to produce measurable incremental locking if the conversion pathway is operationally complex or inaccessible to a significant portion of staked NEAR.
In the absence of empirical evidence that standalone incentives drive incremental locked NEAR and given the presence of identifiable product level frictions, incentives should be suspended in their current form. Governance proposals appear to be the primary driver of governance participation growth within House of Stake, and continuing incentives without measurable incremental impact risks deploying rewards without measurable governance impact.
Before reconsidering incentives, priority should be given to addressing structural constraints: simplifying the locking pathway, improving UX clarity, and expanding integrations so that staked NEAR across major contracts can be seamlessly routed into House of Stake without requiring full unstake cycles.
Future incentive programs could then be redesigned to directly reinforce governance participation, align incentives dynamically with proposal activity, or target specific participation behaviors. However, based on the evidence to date, locked NEAR growth appears proposal driven rather than incentive-driven, and incentive programs should remain paused until both structural frictions are resolved and clear incremental impact can be demonstrated.
Following this analysis, Gauntlet won’t propose continuing the veNEAR rewards program in its current form. The program will conclude as originally scheduled on March 19, 2026, marking the end of its three-month testing phase.
After March 19, 2026, no new locking rewards will be available for collection.
Participants who locked NEAR for governance participation may claim any outstanding programme rewards until June 17, 2026.
veNEAR Rewards Funding plan vs. actual rewards paid
| Total Rewards requested as part of HSP 3 proposal | 280,682 NEAR |
| Total Rewards Claimable by the Users (estimate until March 19) | 81,814 NEAR* |
| Rewards claimed so far | 15,557 NEAR* |
Note: These figures reflect governance participation rewards, not financial returns
Resources:
Rewards Contract: rewards.hos-dao.near