I think the bright proposal by @cloudmex-alan is a step the right direction.
Chunk only producers are critical for a true decentralized NEAR and so its survival and short term profitability is really necessary, otherwise under the current market conditions they will quickly fade out .
Please see my attached post Economic analysis of Chunk only producers analyzing current Chunk only producers economics which further demonstrates the need for such a proposal.
I agree here that allowing big validators to split it’s pools may have undesirable consequences for the network.
In fact having a network of 300 nodes is still an small network. I think in the future the # of validators have to be open and unlimited.
Still on that way, what we can do is assign UBI only to those who have <10% fee, in order to prevent abuse.
If the large pool splits in two - this would increase their compute costs (as they would have to basically run 2 nodes).
So as long as the UBI is just below the cost of running the node, they would not really benefit from splitting.
An interesting proposal, but the way NEAR operates to date so far is based on “quality” and “sustainability” not decentralization, so if we want something like this to work, then we’ll have to pay proper homage.
So, both the UBI and the Centralization Tax must have the requirement to have the validator fee set at exactly 10% – no more, no less – to be eligible to receive both. This will prevent the ongoing race to the bottom in validator fees, especially with the new Chunk Producers, that benefits no one except the existing Validator kleptocracy. It also aligns with the requirement for the Liquid Staking Pools to delegate.
Using the Namakoto Coefficient is a superior metric to base the UBI/Centralization Tax upon vs some kind of stake-based weighting. But it also needs to be dynamic (percentage-based) so the market value of NEAR doesn’t render it overexpensive or underexpensive in the future and requiring revisiting the issue.
TL;DR Requiring or encouraging Validators to set higher minimum fees but Chunk Producers lower minimum fees is patently stupid from a quality, sustainability and decentralization standpoint. Decentralization at all costs is what the failed & validator-egalitarian Harmony blockchain looks like – a race to the bottom in fees, a lack of validator differentiation, trashy low cost validators en masse, temporary foundation delegations not based on quality, as much ongoing employee turnover as NEAR/NF has and… no traction. Let’s not repeat the mistakes of others.
Also, please get real, people! Chunk Producers are not going to take away any meaningful amount of market-share delegation from the Validator kleptocracy, regardless of fees. Delegators care about security and that is conveyed through simplistic jingoism, appearances, sizzle and incentives all helped tremendously by having a huge marketing and customer support warchest enabled by humungous NF delegations and 100% fees.
Great post @JoeSixpack ! Thanks for supporting
Can you detail more? I got a bit lost here.
This isn’t a centralized database? That we should avoid… 
AWS Managed Blockchain is there for the people who is looking for this.
If the large pool splits in two - this would increase their compute costs (as they would have to basically run 2 nodes).
So as long as the UBI is just below the cost of running the node, they would not really benefit from splitting.
Not really, you can run two (or more nodes) in the same server by having different public IPs on the same server and running multiple instances of neard in the same server. Need some tweaks and additional space for each instance but it can be done.
So it would be just the opposite.
It will really decrease node costs.
UBI for validators?
This is a complex subject and in my view hasn’t been properly addressed by the most of the blockchains. How do you propose UBI is sponsored? How is it different to NEAR Foundation incentives with delegations?
Lets put delegators into 5 groups:
Now let’s review who can actually provide UBI? In my view it’s just group 1. You can’t force group 2,3,5 to stake in certain pools. And you can’t force them to share their rewards to contribute to UBI.
According to NEAR Whitepaper the 1% of inflation/rewards is going towards NEAR treasury, this can be used as source for UBI, but in reality, how is it different to Group 1 simply re-index their contributions based on NEAR price.
Look how other chains for example doing that, Solana, for instance: its foundation program, stake into participants from stake pool, which is automated in runs every epoch, so no delay, efficient, of course, when bot is working 
It also incentify testnet by paying for the server with locked tokens.
As we can’t in any way make group 2,3,5 select when’re to stake, and group 4 is very small to make a difference, I think we have only one option short term: Is to improve NF delegation process by automating it, efficiently adjusting to market conditions, and introducing locked incentives for running testnet.
No matter how we call it UBI or simply NF delegations it is still the same.
Thought?
My concern about this comments is the thinking that the benefits should come from a central entity like NF, in order to a UBI model to work it should be permisionless and without middle man.
Putting clear rules as follow, and based on the conversation as far:
10% of the rewards generated by the protocol every epoch will be given as UBI to small validators. All the NEAR validators that are in the active set would receive UBI if they met the following criteria:
This rewards should be given directly at the end of every epoch from the protocol to validators.
How do you propose to achieve it?
Can’t disagree more. That is a HUGE difference. Is not just the money, it’s where it comes from
Aren’t we talking about decentralization and permissionless blockchains after all ? @cloudmex-alan set the point quite clearly.
Agree on decentralisation, but the reality is - there is a little decentralisation in POS networks, give me even one example where network is fully decentralised? Even ETH2 is mostly owned by liquid pool providers such as Lido or others
NEAR is in fact making an effort to become more decentralised that other with NDC initiative, and social aspects. So in the future NF role in delegating to node will be replaced by DAO or other governance body which can make decisions on how and who to stake with, and moving that role to MetaPool, Everstake and Linear is a start I think, next step would be to automate the process and make it efficient.
But the suggested approach will require near-core economics revamp, NEPs, a lot of research and a lot of effort from near-core team. This may take years.
How else @mariozito do you propose to make it happen? Are you happy to start NEP discussion and take an active role in it?
@cloudmex-alan am I right saying your approach will require near-core redesign?
Significant changes to the NEAR Protocol’s economic design may be risky and take time to implement correctly, as well as requiring careful research and analysis. It is important to consider short-term solutions that can be quickly implemented and adjusted over time, instead of drastic changes to the protocol’s economy.
The hypothesis that I raise is a similar approach to Bitfinex’s 2016 hack, more details of this episode here. Briefly, Bitfinex created a “BFX” token for users who suffered losses, designed in a way that the company could buy it back from the users later.
The creation of a second token to reward the costs of Chunk-only producers may be a viable solution to the financial losses in this sector.
Following this hypothesis, we could create a second token that would present the advantages of trading and repurchasing them when the market condition improves. Let’s say that in this hypothesis the buyer is NF, this option may be interesting for two main reasons: 1) No need to get rid of amounts in $NEAR in a low market. 2) No need to analyze a near core redesign.
I understand the comments about centralization concerns of decision-making, whether the idea of UBI or second token, but the issuer of the tokens does not need to be the same buyer, in this hypothesis NF. The issuer of the token can be a DAO that has the technical and legal ability to issue these tokens, is autonomous and independent from NF and has sufficient neutrality to execute the best repurchase agreement possible.
If this hypothesis is acceptable, I have some suggestions for candidates who can play an active role in it and initiate these discussions.
Recently, we also had the case of $USN where there were significant losses for NEAR, perhaps this instrument that I am suggesting could also be an alternative to address other challenges.
The creation of a second token can have an impact on users’ trust in the NEAR Protocol, depending on how it is implemented and communicated. If carried out in a clear and transparent manner, it can increase users’ confidence in NEAR Protocol’s ability to deal with challenges and protect the interests of its participants.
I think that we must seek BOTH long term solutions for this problem and short term solutions:
Long term solutions will improve the “technical” and trustless decentralization of NEAR. A goal in which (I guess) we all agree.
Short term solutions (within next six months) will allow Chunk-only producers to survive this bear market and set a stable platform for it’s long term survival, without changing the protocol.
I mostly agree with this in the sense that it may require a NEP and a change to the protocol.
BUT not necessarily it needs to take years. Maybe 18 months is a reasonable guess. That will depend on two factors:
If it is considered key it may be implemented fast. Pagoda has a great team
Of course I am, I am just doing it now. Why do you think I am taking the time to setup an Economics analysis and participate in this discussion ? Cant’t you see it ?
This is a total misconception, the NDC initiative may or may not imply more “decentralization”. It is quite a different scope and environment . To what I have seen up to the moment, it may just mean centralization under some selected “projects” and “friends”.
Just look at this post Introducing the Ecosystem Influencer Roundtable - #10 by Niall and how “influencers” have been proposed and selected 
In my view (and I have more than 10 years of cooperative experience to atest so) this is not the way to build “collective” consensus at all.
Also, when I decided to start contributing to the NDC I see that contributors participation is now closed. This is simply unacceptable. When trying to do collective work and in the spirit of full participation, contributions must always be opened, at least for a reasonable time period (this is not the case, the NDC call was not more than six months ago) to allow all members of the community to have a voice.
BUT this is another topic for another post.
It may require some creativity for the Community members to find an acceptable solution that considers:
The NEAR Foundation. As you mentioned before, I agree that the NF must be involved in some way in a short term solution. At least until the NDC takes a useful, valid, transparent and democratic governance struct (and this may really take years !).
The Liquid pools are a valuable and critical component of the validators ecosystem, so their interest and participation must be considered. BUT it is incorrect to delegate to them the responsibilty of a full solution to this problem. As I have shown there may be conflicts of interest at play.
The Chunk-only validators which have quite different conditions and staring point than Block validators. I am refering here strictly to the Stake Wars III winners ( (some 100 winners over more than 1000 participants), who have been battle tested in a quite challenging, aggresive and disorganized shardnet and have demonstrated the technical and organizational hability to survive it.
The Block validators which are also a critical component of the ecosystem, but have have quite different conditions and staring point than Chunk-only validators.
Up to the moment, two proposals have arised and am sure more will come as this is a relevant topic:
@ruziev-dev
Proposal: Increase validator stake decentralization by reordering locked tokens to another validators
I am currently working on a short term proposal too, which will post in next days.
Hi Mario,
Hope all is well. Could you clarify what you mean by this statement? Just to better understand how I can contribute towards greater collective consensus
Hi @Niall .
Glad you mentioned it. Sorry for the delay in the response, but this is a complex issue that can not be explained in just a few words. So I am writing a detailed post about it, but that will take some more time.
As a VERY brief resume:
About the “influencers” roundtable (I will repost this in the corresponding thread) but is important to answer your question here:
As you see there are a lot of points to be considered and each one deserves a better explanation.
Indeed. Some very good points. I totally agree around the exclusion of communities. I think there is more benefit in investing in the grassroots level, especially now in such a market. It is these communities who are creating a core group of advocates of the project in regions around the world. Big influencers come and go with the market
Currently there is a working group looking at creating a DAO that would specifically look at how to create and support regional guilds. Are you aware of it?
Can you share more information about this?
Hey people, any news abouth this? Almost half a year has passed since the delegation and there is no news, what does the foundation expect? that we all migrate to other chains? Validators are only losing money to keep the chain decentralized
