# HSP-XXX: Establish a 24-Month Issuance Ramp to a 1.6% Target Rate Of NEAR Token Emissions

**URL:** <https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644>\
**Category:** Proposals\
**Created:** [October 7, 2026, 6:01pm UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644 "2026-10-07T18:01:29Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 1

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![hos\_official](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/49beb7/32.png) [@hos\_official](https://gov.near.org/u/hos_official)\
**Post date:** [October 7, 2026, 6:01pm UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/1 "2026-10-07T18:01:30Z")

</div>

## Frontmatter

```auto
HSP: TBD
Title: Establish a 24-Month Issuance Ramp to a 1.6% Target Rate Of NEAR Token Emissions
Description: Reduces NEAR's maximum protocol issuance from 2.5% to a target 1.6% target rate on a smooth 24-month per-epoch ramp, retaining the measured 90/10 split.
Author: Sal Ternullo (SVRN), @salternullo
Discussions-to: https://houseofstake.org/proposals/cmuyez8j80000ru0sz6emyqpe
Status: Draft
Track: Decision
Type: Supermajority
Category: Economic Governance
Stakeholders: Validators, delegators, NEAR token holders, House of Stake
Created: 2026-10-07
Requires: HSP-001

```

## Actionable Insights

This proposal reduces NEAR’s maximum annual issuance from **2.5% to 1.6%** on a smooth 24-month per-epoch ramp of roughly 3.75 basis points per month (0.0375%), with the measured 90/10 staker-treasury split retained exactly.

**Only one parameter changes.** No new emissions mechanism, no redirected validator rewards, no new spending program, no oracle, no administrator. This is the simplest protocol change that delivers a material reduction.

Modeling indicates the ramp avoids **11.8M NEAR of issuance over two years and 66.1M over six years** which is a supply 4.36% smaller than the status quo and worth roughly $153M at today’s price, while gross staking yield declines **from 4.80% to 3.93% and 3.07%** across the first two years.

The cost to a token holder that is staking their assets is small and measurable. A holder staking 1,000 NEAR ends year two with about **20 fewer NEAR** than under the 2.5% inflation regime. In this context, NEAR needs to be worth **1.66% more, or 7.9 cents** , for that holder to be exactly whole.

Every holder who does not stake, which is currently 57.3% of supply, is better off immediately and with no offset at all.

Impact on validator viability is real and disclosed: on measured ownership, **24 of 405 pools** lose economic self-sufficiency at spot at the target rate, however the measured evidence in Section 4 shows issuance was never sustaining the long tail in the first place.

Solana ratified an equivalent change on **28 August 2026 (SGP-0002, 67.001% of stake)**. NEAR’s proposed path reaches a **higher target yield (3.07% vs 2.25%) on a shallower yield cut (36% vs 62%)** while delivering a **deeper six-year supply reduction (4.36% vs 2.60%)**.

Every simulation below is measured against NEAR mainnet at block 216,701,043 on 22 September 2026, at a **spot price of $4.30** cross-checked across Kraken, Coinbase, and CoinGecko, and reproduces from public endpoints using the method in the Reproducibility section.

## Abstract

This proposal reduces NEAR’s maximum annual protocol emissions issuance from 2.5% to 1.6% over 24 months on a smooth per-epoch ramp, retains the measured 90/10 split exactly.

**Why this, and why now.** On August 20 Illia Polosukhin withdrew the Sovereign Fund proposal and, in doing so, named the problem more precisely than forum discussions previously had. A fund that generates yield needs discretionary management to determine where capital allocation and determination of who receives it; both are judgment calls; and replacing validator rewards that are algorithmic today with an allocation, however well governed, converts security from something the protocol guarantees into something a human process decides. In his words, these are “risks the protocol should not internalize.” He asked that the alternatives raised in that thread be proposed on their own terms. This is one of them.

SVRN engaged in that discussion on August 5 in support of the fund’s direction and proposed a controls framework for it. The feedback that followed from validators, token holders, and finally from Illia persuaded us that the problem was discretion itself, not the controls around it. This proposal is what follows from taking that conclusion seriously and iterating on the idea. In this proposal we suggest a change to one parameter on a published schedule, with no fund, no administrator, no allocation, and nothing left for anyone to decide.

**What this proposal does not do.** It creates no spending program, no eligibility test, no oracle, and no registry. Earlier drafts paired the ramp with a treasury-funded Node Floor guaranteeing machine-cost coverage for validators; every construction we tested required either a price oracle and an administrator, or a beneficial-ownership registry to resist Sybil farming, which is incompatible with the privacy architecture NEAR is building. The evidence that motivated the floor is retained in Section 4, because it is the reason the ramp is defensible. The mechanism is not.

**It does not touch protocol revenue.** Intents fee-switch buybacks, and any other revenue removed from circulation, stay removed. Nothing in this proposal creates a path for that NEAR to re-enter the market, and nothing here should be read as reopening that question.

Every simulation below is measured against NEAR mainnet at **block 216,701,043** and reproduces from public endpoints using the method in the Reproducibility section.

## Context

Three measurements taken directly from mainnet drive this proposal.

**First, the issuance split is 90/10.** Measured by observing total supply growth against treasury.near inflow over identical block windows of 7, 28, and 92 days: the treasury’s share is 10.13% in every window, and gross realized issuance is 2.45%, slightly below the 2.5% cap because transaction fees are burned. This supersedes the commonly cited 96/4 figure.

Note for implementers: the protocol\_reward\_rate config field returns 0/1 following the July 2026 network upgrade and must not be used to verify the split. Supply-drift measurement over an identical window is the reliable method.

**Second, the long tail of the validator set holds almost no capital of its own.** We labeled all 406 active pools by owner identity, delegator count, and owner staked balance. In the 163-pool entry cohort between 30k and 60k of stake, the median operator runs 40,130 NEAR of delegated stake against 19 NEAR of its own, which is 0.05% of the capital. The median owner’s liquid balance is 1.4 NEAR. Across the whole set the median owner self-stake is 128 NEAR.

**Third, stake is leaving while the price rises, and that tells us something about what retains it.** NEAR has appreciated 86% in the two weeks before this measurement, from $2.31 to $4.30. Over the same fortnight the staking ratio fell from 46.92% to 42.71% as roughly 54.5M NEAR was unstaked, and the active set contracted from 424 validators to 406. Gross staking yield did not fall during that period; it rose, from 4.796% to 5.268%, precisely because the denominator shrank.

This matters for the central question this proposal is asked to answer. If yield were what retains stake, a period of rising yield would retain it. Instead stake left into price strength, and the proposal queue grew from 416 candidates to 459 — more candidates now wait for a seat than hold one. Stake responds to price and to the opportunity cost of liquidity, not principally to the emission rate. The active set stands at 406 validators, 100 block producers and 306 chunk-only.

### The network measured on September 22, 2026

| Metric | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Measurement block | 216,701,043 |
| Total supply | 1,306,946,399 NEAR |
| Total staked | 558,165,227 NEAR (42.71%) |
| Active validators | 406 (100 block producers, 306 chunk-only) |
| Proposal queue | 459 candidates |
| Minimum active stake | 9,428 NEAR |
| Issuance split | 90% to staking participants / 10% treasury (measured 10.13%) |
| Realized gross issuance | 2.45% (below the 2.5% cap; fees burned) |
| Distinct pool owners | 397; no owner controls more than 3 seats |
| Median owner self-stake | 128 NEAR (entry cohort: 19 NEAR) |
| Gross staking yield | 5.268% at 2.5%; 3.372% at 1.6% |

## Problem

NEAR emitted roughly $51M more per year than validator economics require, and continues to do so. The bootstrapping job that high issuance performed is largely complete: the network is established, the validator set is oversubscribed, and continued elevated issuance now adds sell pressure without the offsetting distribution benefit it once purchased.

**Dilution is a transfer with deadweight loss.** Issuance beyond the security threshold transfers value from holders who do not stake to holders who do. Just over half of NEAR supply at 57.3% is not staked and receives nothing in return for that transfer.

**Tax drag leaks value out of the network entirely.** Staking rewards are ordinary income in many jurisdictions, so a portion is sold to cover tax. At the roughly 17% effective drag estimated in the Solana debate, NEAR leaks about 20M in emissions per year`. This proposal reduces that leak by $8M to $17M annually. That value does not move between NEAR holders, it just gets absorbed by tax authorities.

**Persistent issuance distorts the price signal.** At 2.5%, NEAR issues about 89,517 new tokens every day. In equity terms this resembles a company consistently selling shares in the open market indefinitely. Most charts and dashboards do not properly adjust for it. At the target rate, daily issuance falls to 57,291.

## Approach

**The ramp.** Maximum annual issuance declines linearly from 2.5% to 1.6% over 24 months, applied per epoch at roughly 3.75 basis points per month, with no step dates to anticipate or defend. The measured 90/10 split is retained exactly. A grace period of 90 days follows before the first basis point comes off, allowing wallets, exchanges, custodians, and staking providers to update disclosures.

![image](https://api.houseofstake.org/api/upload/image/public/new/3b1d19a1-1620-4dba-99ce-b1d9c2242e69.png)

_Figure 1. Maximum issuance and gross staking yield under the 24-month per-epoch ramp._

| Anchor | Issuance cap | Gross staking yield |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Adoption (M0) | 2.500% | 5.268% |
| Month 6 | 2.275% | 4.622% |
| Month 12 | 2.050% | 4.320% |
| Month 18 | 1.825% | 3.847% |
| **Month 24 (target)** | **1.600%** | **3.372%** |

_Notes: ~3.75 bp/month, no step dates, staking ratio held at 42.71% as measured_

## What This Means for NEAR Holders

Staking rewards are a transfer from holders who do not stake to holders who do. Cutting issuance shrinks that transfer: a token holder staking receives fewer new tokens, and every holder’s ownership share is diluted more slowly. Both sides are computable.

### The breakeven for a token holder who is staking

A token holders count grows at 0.9 × π ÷ staking ratio. Compounding the ramp monthly against the current system in which issuance stays at 2.5% forever:

| Horizon | Cap | Gross yield | Shortfall | **Breakeven price move** | **At $4.30** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Today (M0) | 2.500% | 5.268% | - | - | - |
| Year 1 | 2.050% | 4.320% | 0.434% | **+0.434%** | **+3.9¢** |
| Year 2 (target) | 1.600% | 3.372% | 1.827% | **+1.827%** | **+16.2¢** |
| Year 3 | 1.600% | 3.372% | 3.770% | **+3.770%** | **+16.2¢** |

A token holder staking 1,000 NEAR ends year two with about 20 fewer NEAR than under 2.5% forever. NEAR needs to be worth 7.9 cents more for that holder to be exactly whole which is about 1.1% a year over three years.

The breakeven percentage does not depend on price. The cents figure does:

| Scenario | Price | Breakeven price | Cents needed | Shortfall per 1,000 NEAR staked |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Bear (half of spot) | $2.15 | $2.186 | +3.9¢ | $42.85 |
| Spot | $4.30 | $4.379 | +16.2¢ | $85.71 |
| +25% | $5.38 | $5.473 | +9.8¢ | $107.13 |
| +50% | $6.45 | $6.568 | +11.8¢ | $128.56 |
| +100% | $8.60 | $8.757 | +15.7¢ | $171.42 |

### Where the breakeven comes from

![image](https://api.houseofstake.org/api/upload/image/public/new/b27cec35-7378-4b66-bf18-1315b9adcb72.png)

_Figure 2. The price move required to make a token holder who is staking whole, and how much of it the supply reduction delivers on its own._\

By month 24 the ramp has issued 11.8M fewer NEAR, a supply 0.857% smaller than the current system. At an unchanged network valuation, a supply 0.857% smaller is a price 0.857% higher. So of the 1.827% a token holder who is staking needs, 0.857% arrives from the supply reduction itself, or a little over half, and the remaining 0.970% must come from the network being valued more highly.

We state that rather than assert that lower issuance pays for itself. Measured against the current state which holds 2.5% indefinitely, it does not quite do so for a token holder who is staking. Two things work in the holder’s favor beyond the table and neither is assumed in it: as yield compresses, some stake unbonds, and a lower staking ratio mechanically raises the yield for everyone who remains; and the current 2.5% rate is not a stable baseline, but a policy under active challenge.

### The non-staking holder

For the 57.3% of supply that is not staked there is no offset at all. The full supply reduction accrues as avoided dilution of roughly $86 on a $10,000 position at the target rate with no price change whatsoever.

### Cumulative effect

| Horizon | Issuance avoided | Supply reduction | Value at spot |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2 years | 11.8M NEAR | 0.86% | $51M |
| 3 years | 24.5M NEAR | 1.74% | $106M |
| 6 years | **66.1M NEAR** | **4.36%** | **$284M** |

None of this is spent. It is simply not emitted.

### Time is of the essence

The saving is a function of when the ramp starts. Measured over a six-year window:

| Ratification delayed by | Issuance avoided | Forgone vs acting now |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 0 months | 66.1M NEAR | - |
| 3 months | 62.8M NEAR | 3.3M NEAR ($14M) |
| 6 months | 59.6M NEAR | 6.5M NEAR ($28M) |
| 12 months | 53.0M NEAR | 13.1M NEAR ($56M) |

**Every month of delay costs roughly $4.7M in emissions that could be saved.**

## Why the Rate Was Never What Protected the Validator Set

This section is the evidence base for the most common objection to any issuance cut: that it will break small validators.

The table below counts the number of validators whose measured revenue, which is commission on their actual stake plus yield on their actual owner balance, covers machine costs at published benchmarks of $500/month for block producers and $200/month for standard nodes which are deliberately conservative. The finding below holds at any cost assumption we tested, including halving both figures, under which the 300-node level remains unreachable at every rate and every price.

### Validator viability against issuance.

_The dotted line shows the hypothetical in which every operator self-stakes the stake it actually runs; the gap between it and the solid lines is capital the long tail does not have._

| Issuance rate | Bear (2.15) | Spot(4.30) | +50% (6.45) | +100%(8.60) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2.5% (today) | 133 | 170 | 191 | 209 |
| 2.0% | 118 | 159 | 178 | 197 |
| \*\* | 1.6% (proposed target) | 105 | 146 | 169 |
| 1.0% | 77 | 118 | 143 | 159 |

![image](https://api.houseofstake.org/api/upload/image/public/new/deb230f8-130b-430d-8b92-8bd49d724433.png)

_Figure 3. Validator viability against issuance. The dotted line shows the hypothetical in which every operator self-stakes the stake it actually runs; the gap between it and the solid lines is capital the long tail does not have._

Three findings follow, and they are the reason this proposal is a rate change rather than a support program.

**No issuance rate at or below 2.5% sustains 300 self-sufficient validators at any price tested** , including a doubling of the token. At today’s rate and a doubled price, only 209 of 405 cover their own costs. The 300-node level is not reachable by adjusting the rate in either direction.

**The long tail runs on delegation, not issuance against their own stake.** The _dotted hypothetical_ reaches roughly 390 viable validators at spot, but only because it assumes operators own the stake they run. They do not, by a factor of about 700 so cutting issuance does not remove protection the tail was receiving, because the tail was not receiving it.

**Therefore the inflation rate is the wrong instrument for validator support, in both directions.** Raising it would not fix the tail and lowering it does not break the system.

## Risks and Limitations

**Operators who hold no NEAR have no offset.** vadim\_hom put this precisely in the Sovereign Fund discussion: a real share of the validator set holds no token at all, and for them an issuance reduction is pure downside; their revenue is being reduced, and they have no upside from price because they never held the asset, which our analysis confirmed. Median owner self-stake in the entry cohort is 19 NEAR. The breakeven analysis above does not apply to these operators; they lose roughly 36% of commission revenue. What we can say is this: their revenue is commission on delegated stake, and delegation follows service quality and fee competition rather than the protocol rate. Any discretionary alternative, i.e. a subsidy program, was rejected by this community and by the fund’s author in writing; Solana accepted equivalent attrition three weeks ago; and an algorithmic support mechanism proposed separately would have our support, if one can be designed without an oracle or a registry.

**Validator attrition is real.** On measured ownership, self-sufficient validators fall from 170 to 146 at spot and from 133 to 105 at the bear anchor, losses of 24 and 28 respectively. As a share of the set that is comparable to the 30-of-738 attrition Solana accepted in ratifying SGP-0002. The mitigating evidence is Section 4: these operators are largely sustained by delegation rather than by issuance. But this is a cost, and we do not present it as anything else.

**Yield compression may reduce the staking ratio.** Gross yield falls from 5.268% to 3.372% at today’s participation. The target figure sits above Solana’s ratified 2.25% and in the range of major proof-of-stake alternatives, but the equilibrium staking ratio at that yield is not known with confidence.

Note that the relationship runs the other way as well: a falling staking ratio raises yield, because the same staker share is divided among less stake. At a 30% participation rate the target yield would be 4.80%, above where NEAR sits today. Participation and yield are self-correcting within a wide band.

**Constituency risk.** The electorate for a stake-weighted vote is composed of the people this compresses. Our answer is the breakeven analysis above, disclosed rather than buried. Two features of the current market make the case easier than it was a fortnight ago: the target yield is now 3.372% rather than 3.069%, because the staking ratio fell, and the breakeven move of 1.827% sits against a token that has just appreciated 86%. The cost is 7.9 cents on a token that moved roughly two dollars in two weeks.

**Measurement bounds.** Owner balances are measured in the owner account, so operator capital held elsewhere is not counted; the effect is to understate operator capitalization, and the entry-cohort finding is large enough to survive a generous adjustment. Historical validator-set membership is not retrievable from public RPC because epoch information is garbage-collected.

## Precedent

Every major proof-of-stake economy has attempted emissions reform. The record is consistent and this proposal is engineered against it.

| Network and measure | Design | Outcome | Lesson |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Cosmos Hub, Prop 848 (Nov 2023) | Halve max inflation 20% → 10%, single step | Passed 41.1% to 31.9%, 72.7% turnout | Breakeven evidence shipped with the proposal |
| Cosmos Hub, Prop 868 (Jan 2024) | Push minimum inflation to zero | Rejected | Communities ratify cuts and refuse zero |
| Solana, SIMD-0228 (Mar 2025) | Dynamic market-based emissions targeting stake participation | Failed at 37.8% vs 66.67% needed | Novel mechanisms and no operator floor lose badly |
| Solana, SIMD-0553 (Aug 2026) | Resource-based fee burn | Failed to reach supermajority | Complexity loses even in a favourable window |
| Solana, SIMD-0550 / SGP-0002 (Aug 2026) | Double the disinflation rate; one parameter | Passed at 67.001% vs 66.67% needed | Simplicity wins |

The most instructive pair is the last two. SIMD-0550 and SIMD-0553 were proposed by the same team, in the same window, to the same electorate. The change to the single issuance parameter passed and the one that restructured a resource-based fee mechanism did not.

### NEAR against the schedule Solana just ratified

![image](https://api.houseofstake.org/api/upload/image/public/new/6ad55a5f-287a-4d58-8f42-dcdd9bc2eb96.png)

_Figure 4. NEAR’s proposed path compared to SGP-0002, ratified 28 August 2026._

| Metric | NEAR (proposed) | Solana (ratified) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Start → target rate | 2.500% → 1.600% | 3.82% → 1.50% |
| Time to target | 24 months | 2.8 years |
| Parameters changed | 1 | 1 |
| Gross yield today → target | 4.80% **→ 3.07%** | 5.84% **→ 2.25%** |
| Yield compression | **36.0%** | 61.5% |
| Supply reduction, 6 years | **4.36%** | 2.60% |
| Validators losing viability | 24 of 405 (5.9%) | 30 of 738 (4.1%) |

NEAR arrives at a **higher target yield on a shallower yield cut while delivering a deeper proportional supply reduction** , because NEAR starts from a lower rate with a higher staking ratio. A delegator comparing the two networks after both schedules complete finds NEAR paying more.

## End-to-End Value Hypothesis

### Objective

Reduce maximum issuance to a 1.6% target on a schedule the market can verify epoch by epoch, and make it the final scheduled change.

### Expected outcome

Holders retain 11.8M NEAR over two years and 66.1M over six that would otherwise be emitted; the schedule is predictable and bounded; monetary policy stops being relitigated.

### Dependencies

This proposal cannot take effect on a House of Stake vote alone. The issuance cap is a protocol parameter, and changing it requires validator adoption through the standard upgrade process, which is the same path the 2025 halving took, at 68.41% approval. House of Stake ratification is necessary, however validator adoption is ultimately what makes it binding. That two-step structure is deliberate: it means the people who operate the network must independently consent to the change, and it answers directly the concern that House of Stake’s current participation level does not by itself constitute a mandate over protocol economics.

## Key Performance Indicators

- **Ramp integrity:** realized issuance versus schedule, per epoch.

- **Set health:** raw and distress-filtered operator counts, queue depth, staking ratio.

- **Supply outcome:** cumulative issuance avoided against the 2.5% current state.

## Technical Specification

```plaintext
cap(t) = 2.5% − 0.9% × min(t, 24)/24

```

where t is months elapsed from activation, interpolated per epoch. Activation occurs one full quarter after ratification. The 90/10 split is unchanged.

## Treasury

This proposal does not make a claim on the protocol treasury or establish a budget request.

## Backwards Compatibility

The ramp is a protocol parameter change requiring validator adoption. No other consensus logic changes, the 90/10 split is unchanged, and no existing contract or staking mechanic is modified. HSP-007 continue under their own terms.

## Security Considerations

Reducing issuance reduces the cost of acquiring stake-weighted influence at the margin. At the target rate NEAR’s yield remains above the level Solana has ratified, and the 24-month schedule provides time to respond to any observed decline.

**There is no trigger under which emissions increase.** The question was asked in the Sovereign Fund discussion whether there should be a security-budget floor at which emissions automatically resume. Our answer is no, and the reason is not indifference to the security budget. An issuance schedule that can rise is a schedule the market cannot underwrite: every institution pricing NEAR would have to price the probability of re-inflation, and every adversary would have an incentive to manufacture the conditions that trigger it. If the network ever concludes that the target rate is too low, the remedy is a proposal clearing the covenant’s thresholds, a deliberate, public decision, not an automatic one.

## Implementation Plan and Milestones

1. **Grace period of one full quarter** after ratification.

2. **Activate the ramp;** cap moves per epoch thereafter.

3. **Quarterly transparency reports:** realized versus scheduled issuance, set health metrics.

4. **target rate in force at month 24**

## Budget & Resources

None requested. This proposal changes a protocol parameter and creates no program, no disbursement, and no administrative function.

## Stakeholders

- **Validators** gross yield compresses from 5.268% to 3.372%.

- **Delegators** roughly 5.00% to 3.20% at the median 5% commission fee, remaining above Solana’s ratified target.

- **Non-staking holders** - dilution falls; the full supply reduction accrues with no offset.

- **House of Stake** - ratifies, then governs the covenant thereafter; cannot bind validators, whose adoption is separately required.

### RACI Chart

| Activity / Decision | Responsible | Accountable | Consulted | Informed |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Prepare proposal, substantiate modelling, submit for voting | Sal Ternullo / SVRN | Sal Ternullo, HSP Author | Validators, delegators, protocol developers | HoS community |
| Finalize technical specification, including grace period and activation conditions | Sal Ternullo / SVRN | NEAR One | Protocol developers; validators | HoS community; NEAR ecosystem |
| Implement, test, and release the protocol upgrade | NEAR Protocol Working Group — | NEAR One — | Validators; House of Stake Security Council | HoS community; NEAR ecosystem |
| Independently adopt the upgrade through the standard protocol process | Validator operators | Each validator operator, for its own adoption decision | Protocol developers | HoS community; NEAR ecosystem |
| Coordinate activation readiness and publish the confirmed schedule | NEAR One — | NEAR One — | Protocol developers; validators | Wallets, exchanges, custodians, staking providers, tokenholders |
| Monitor issuance against schedule, validator-set health, and cumulative issuance avoided | Sal Ternullo / SVRN — | NEAR One — | Protocol developers; validators | HoS community; NEAR ecosystem |
| Publish quarterly transparency reports and verify completion at the target rate | House of Stake team — | Sal Ternullo / SVRN — | NEAR One, protocol developers, validators | HoS community; NEAR ecosystem |

## Reproducibility

**Split measurement.** Read the chain head and an earlier block from the same node; take total\_supply from each header and treasury.near account state at both heights. The treasury share is the ratio of treasury inflow to supply growth over the identical window. We measured over 7-day, 28-day, and 92-day windows and obtained 10.158%, 10.130%, and 10.129%. Do not use protocol\_reward\_rate.

**Validator set and ownership.** validators for the active set and proposal queue; per-pool view calls get\_reward\_fee\_fraction, get\_owner\_id, get\_number\_of\_accounts, and get\_account\_staked\_balance for fees, ownership, delegator counts, and owner self-stake. All 406 active pools were labeled.

**Historical staking participation.** Epoch validator sets are not retrievable from public RPC, but pool state is: get\_total\_staked\_balance resolves against archival RPC at any height. We summed that call across the 150 largest current pools — 96.5% of stake today — at monthly block heights over twelve months, divided by total\_supply from the header at each height, and paired each point with the CoinGecko daily close. Because the sample is defined by today’s composition, it understates the level by roughly 2.2 points at the calibration point (40.55% sampled against 42.71% measured across all 406 pools); the band cited in Clause B is stated on the adjusted basis. The correlation and the direction of the relationship are unaffected by the offset, since it applies uniformly across the series.

**Endpoints.** [rpc.mainnet.near.org](http://rpc.mainnet.near.org) and [free.rpc.fastnear.com](http://free.rpc.fastnear.com); archival via [archival-rpc.mainnet.near.org](http://archival-rpc.mainnet.near.org) and [archival-rpc.mainnet.fastnear.com](http://archival-rpc.mainnet.fastnear.com). Non-archival endpoints garbage-collect epoch validator information, so historical set membership is not retrievable from them.

**Datasets.** The full validator dataset and ownership map accompany this proposal.

## Conflicts of Interest

Sal Ternullo is CEO of SVRN (OceanPal Inc., NASDAQ: SVRN). SVRN holds approximately 55M NEAR, 90+% of which is staked, composing 8+% of staked supply. SVRN operates NEAR validator infrastructure through third party infrastructure partners. SVRN authored HSP-007, the MPC Node Infrastructure Financing Program, and operates an MPC node that receives payments under that program. SVRN intends to vote in favor of this proposal with these disclosures standing.

**What this proposal does and does not touch.** It does not alter HSP-007, does not touch the treasury that funds it, and creates no program from which SVRN could receive an allocation. There is no spending, no eligibility, and no administrator anywhere in it. The only thing it changes is a protocol parameter that applies to every token holder who stakes identically.

**On SVRN’s position.** This proposal reduces the staking yield SVRN earns on its entire staked position from 5.268% to 3.372%, costing roughly 855,000 NEAR per year at the target rate. On the breakeven arithmetic above, SVRN’s position requires the same 1.827% price move as every other token holder who is staking to be made whole, and SVRN is on the losing side of that arithmetic in exact proportion to its size.

**On SVRN’s accumulation.** It was argued in the Sovereign Fund discussion that SVRN’s stated intent to accumulate a significant share of supply already absorbs several years of issuance at 2.5%, and that no reduction is therefore needed. We would put it the other way around. A public company’s treasury allocation is not monetary policy; it can change at any board meeting and a network should not rely on it as if it were. A network whose new supply is absorbed by a single buyer has concentration risk, not health. And a lower issuance rate means SVRN absorbs less of the float over any horizon, not more, which is the opposite of what a company seeking to maximize its share of the network would propose, and which should reassure precisely the people most concerned about SVRN’s footprint.

## Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0 1.0.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![cloudmex-alan](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/user_avatar/gov.near.org/cloudmex-alan/32/31266_2.png) [@cloudmex-alan](https://gov.near.org/u/cloudmex-alan)\
**Post date:** [October 8, 2026, 6:37am UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/2 "2026-10-08T06:37:13Z")

</div>

Following my previous comments, the numbers do a good job justifying the cut, but not the destination.

What is this meant to support: NEAR Intents, agentic tokenomics, AI, or token sustainability? And beyond Intents buybacks, what drives demand and utility for the token?

The discussion post pointed to a fixed supply, while the formal proposal frames 1.6% as the final change. Those are two different endgames.

So I’m leaning no for now. Not against lower issuance, I’d just like to know where we’re going before choosing the road.

_"_ — _Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?_ — _That depends a good deal on where you want to get to."_

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![rdp4by](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/user_avatar/gov.near.org/rdp4by/32/54937_2.png) [@rdp4by](https://gov.near.org/u/rdp4by)\
**Post date:** [October 8, 2026, 9:39am UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/3 "2026-10-08T09:39:42Z")

</div>

I support this proposal as a holder, but I do not host a node myself. Is there a way to find out my validator’s stance on this proposal in advance? If their choice doesn’t suit me, I would like to transfer my tokens to a validator who supports this update.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![SalTernullo](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ce73a5/32.png) [@SalTernullo](https://gov.near.org/u/SalTernullo)\
**Post date:** [October 8, 2026, 12:28pm UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/4 "2026-10-08T12:28:55Z")

</div>

Hi Alan,

Thanks for the note and comments. The word ‘final’ in the post above was intended to refer to the last step down of this proposal to target 1.6% rather than saying this is the end game, which we described in Phase 2.

Extending your analogy, the direction of travel proposed here is clear which is to advance tokenomics towards a target state where inflation does not erode the ownership of holders who do not participate in staking, the network itself does not overpay for economic security, and fail to achieve an outcome where NEAR is meaningfully more valuable over time.

These objectives require work both on the supply side, with this proposal the second in the journey to evolve, and on the demand side which is best exhibited through the continued growth of Intents, NearAI product verticals and other developers / users transacting on the network and burning NEAR.

Hope this is helpful and happy to discuss next week on the ecosystem call if you are joining.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![SalTernullo](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ce73a5/32.png) [@SalTernullo](https://gov.near.org/u/SalTernullo)\
**Post date:** [October 8, 2026, 12:30pm UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/5 "2026-10-08T12:30:15Z")

</div>

Yes you reach out to validator and communicate your stance to express support and in doing so, see where they stand. If they are not in favor to upgrade, and assuming this passes House of Stake, you can unbond and delegate to a validator who is supportive.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![chan42870815](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/c0e974/32.png) [@chan42870815](https://gov.near.org/u/chan42870815)\
**Post date:** [October 9, 2026, 6:03am UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/6 "2026-10-09T06:03:21Z")

</div>

Just do it. Immediately.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![arpoas](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/858c86/32.png) [@arpoas](https://gov.near.org/u/arpoas)\
**Post date:** [October 9, 2026, 10:47am UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/8 "2026-10-09T10:47:46Z")

</div>

## **Introduction**

This proposal is in reaction to the following proposals and discussions:

- HSP-XXX: Establish a 24-Month Issuance Ramp to a 1.6% Target Rate Of NEAR Token Emissions

- NEAR Governance Discussion: Reducing Issuance to 1.6%, and the Path to a Fixed Supply

- Gradual Transition From Emission-Funded to Revenue-Funded Network Security

- NEAR Governance Discussion: Sovereign Fund

I have commented in detail on the Sovereign Fund proposal under username Martin.H (changed username for consistency with other platforms) and I re-use some my comments here.

In general, I am in favor of the direction of all of these proposals. They are all trying to find the best way of ultimately achieving fixed supply and long-term funding of ecosystem development.

I was planning to submit my own proposal, and also comment on the “Gradual Transition From Emission-Funded to Revenue-Funded Network Security” submitted by Ivanov. I have decided to submit my related ideas here, because it is apparent that a meaningful discussion on this subject is taking place here.

## **Importance of net issuance reduction**

There is a sound theoretical basis and empirical data that strongly suggest that reducing net issuance is essential for long-term price appreciation.

As for the theory, there is a basic economic law of supply and demand. One aspect of NEAR is to act as a commodity, a fuel within the NEAR network. So at least partially, price of NEAR is determined by supply and demand laws that affect the commodity markets. As long as “structural supply \> structural demand” the price is destined to go down over the long term (I mean years, decades). Structural supply is the issuance and structural demand is the burn plus the part of the fees that does not get dumped back on the market. There is also speculative and investment demand/supply, but these are just waves (sometimes huge waves) on the long-term supply-demand driven curve.

As for the empirical evidence: In February 2025 Solana abandoned burning 50% of priority fees. Looking at the price chart of BNB, TRX and SOL it is clear that the correlation changed since February 2025. In my view Solana is technologically superior network to BNB and TRX, yet since February 2025 the price of SOL started dramatically underperforming both TRX and BNB that consistently maintained deflationary policy. Solana community realized the problem and (fortunately for SOL) passed a proposal reducing issuance and another proposal for introducing and burning resource-based fees which was not passed will be most likely presented for vote again in updated version.

The same dynamics can be observed when Ethereum drastically reduced fees and burn, and became inflationary again. Since 5th August 2021 to 13th March 2024 when Ethereum was deflationary it underperformed TRX and BNB just around 30% for the whole period of almost 3 years. Since it become inflationary it underperformed TRX 400% and BNB 100% in approximately 2 years. The “supply \> demand” imbalance is no joke.

Also look at Avalanche which is arguably one of the more interesting projects in the industry with good tech, huge amount of RWA, many real world real deal use cases and used by some big players. Unfortunately for AVAX, they barely charge any fees and just let people create subnets for close to free, so the “supply \> demand” imbalance is so huge that AVAX is not even in top 20.

Finally, we can look at NEAR itself. It was suffering for a long time from this same imbalance. But since the issuance reduction and NEAR Intents burn introduction, NEAR became a project with one of the lowest “supply \> demand” imbalances in the industry. Not surprisingly, NEAR price started showing some significant strength.

## **Preserving decentralization**

I can not stress enough how important decentralization is, especially in the case of NEAR.

It is a huge unique competitive advantage that NEAR has right now. How many sub-second blockchains with meaningful usage that have more than 400 validators exist at the moment? Solana will become one once it implements Alpenglow. Avalanche is close but the finality is not consistently sub-second. As far as I am aware, that´s basically it. NEAR and Solana. How many sub-second blockchains or L2´s there are with around 100 validators or less? A lot … Would NEAR rather occupy its current unique position or join the “almost decentralized blockchain” crowd? I don´t mean to degrade the successes of the more centralized blockchains, but the difference in security and censorship-resistance should be clearly acknowledged and valued. It is much easier and cheaper to bully, bribe or shut down 20 or 100 validators than a geographically diversified set of 500. I would personally never leave significant funds over which I intend to have sovereign control on a blockchain with just 100 validators.

NEAR positions itself as a pillar of sovereignty for AI, assets, data and agents. From this perspective, decentralization is absolutely critical for NEAR vision.

### **The problem**

Any major change to economics should take the importance of decentralization into account and be supported by objective data and realistic calculations. I admit that I am not a validator, and my data comes from simple Google AI prompts. Reality check from actual validators is welcome:

- Monthly cost of running block producer on cloud: minimum $240

- Monthly cost of running chunk producer: minimum $50

- Minimum stake 25500 NEAR

- Current minimum block producer stake 600349 NEAR, source: netblocks

- I will assume that a validator must earn all income from delegated stake and commission 5%.

- Suggested terminal issuance is 1.6% leading to estimated yield 3.2%.

Math for smallest block producer: Annual cost is $2880. To earn this at a 5% commission the gross income must be $57600. At 3.2% yield, the value of the stake must be $1800000. With 600349 NEAR staked this gives NEAR break-even price $3.

Math for chunk producer: Annual cost is $600. To earn this at a 5% commission the gross income must be $12000. At 3.2% yield, the value of the stake must be $375000. With 25500 NEAR staked this gives NEAR break-even price $15.69.

Whereas block producers are perfectly fine, there is clearly a problem for chunk producers with small delegated stake.

### **Solution**

How to solve it:

- Make a minimum mandatory commission 5%. This will deliver several benefits:

- Support small validators from NEAR Intents revenue while making sure it NEVER enters circulation. Stake the revenue algorithmically based on fixed objective criteria such as up-time \> 97%, stake size \< 100000 NEAR, and commission 5%.

The SVRN proposal is to reduce the issuance from 2.5% to 1.6% over the period of two years. Revenues from NEAR Intents taken out of circulation for three months Jul-Sep 2026 were 1274075.98 NEAR. Extrapolating the Jul-Sep 2026 data we can estimate revenues around 10M NEAR for two years. Currently there are around 200 validators with stake below 100000 NEAR. They could be supported by 50000 NEAR stake each from these revenues.

If we run the math for small validator again incorporating these suggestions: Annual operating cost is $600. To earn this at a 5% commission the gross income must be $12000. At 3.2% yield, the value of the stake must be $375000. With 25500 NEAR staked + 50000 NEAR stake from NEAR Intents revenue, this gives NEAR break-even price $4.97.

In my opinion, $4.97 is a reasonable break-even level because it is near the current price and:

- BTC according to its 4 years cycle should be now bottoming. I would not bet everything on BTC cycle, but definitely BTC, as well as the rest of crypto market, is not in euphoria stage.

- The reduction of issuance will further support the price, both as a signal to the market that NEAR prioritizes sound economics, and as the inevitable laws of supply and demand shift the market towards more price-supportive state.

### **Advantage of staking compared to revenue distribution**

This solution allows for issuance to be reduced without significant impact on decentralization by disproportionately supporting the validators most affected by the issuance reduction.

If NEAR Intents revenue would be used to offset reduced issuance by distributing it to validators, then, using the same assumption of revenue 5M NEAR p.a and current annual issuance around 32M NEAR, it would enable reduction of issuance to 2.1% The net effect of issuance reduction to 2.1% combined with revenue distribution would be zero on all validators. It would be equivalent to keeping issuance at 2.5% and small chunk producers would need break even price $9.4.

However, if the revenue is algorithmically staked with smallest validators as suggested, then the break even price drops to $4.97 and issuance can be reduced to 1.6%. In the same time, the revenues do not enter circulation, as they would if they were paid as yield to validators to offset issuance reduction. They remain staked forever, effectively out of circulation equivalent to burn, and in the same time continue supporting the ecosystem indefinitely, rater than being spent during the year to cover operating costs.

### **Effect of higher NEAR price due to reduced net issuance**

So far I have focused only on the effects of the yield reduction on the ability of validators to cover their operating costs. While yield is relevant, NEAR price also affect the break-even stake required for a validator to cover his costs. For example, if price of NEAR was $10, then a small validator would need only 37500 NEAR delegated stake to cover his cost at 5% commission and 3.2% yield.

Even more consequential impact of the price trajectory of NEAR is the return on investment on the staked NEAR, which represents the biggest economic investment in NEAR security.

It is true that, if the above solution is implemented, stakers will be getting lower percentage yield. Nevertheless, ultimately stakers will benefit due to the appreciation of their stake relative to the state of higher issuance. Economic theory as well as empirical evidence from crypto space (as discussed above in the section related to issuance reduction) suggest very significant long-term impact of net issuance reduction on asset price. Sooner or later most long-term stakers will realize that it is better to have for example 3.2% p.a. yield on low or zero issuance asset that appreciates 30% p.a., than having 5% yield on asset with systemic over-supply that depreciates 5% p.a.

## **Off-setting issuance reduction with revenue distribution**

There is a proposal “Gradual Transition From Emission-Funded to Revenue-Funded Network Security” which suggest distributing revenues to validators and reducing issuance based on revenues in the weakest month from last observed twelve months.

In principle, I agree with that proposal with slight modification:

- Initially, do not use revenue to directly off-set issuance. Use it to support small validators as described above. With same amount of revenue it allows greater issuance reduction and in the same time greater small validator support.

- After break-even for smallest 200 validators is secured, the benefits from further validator support are diminishing, so any further revenue should be used to offset issuance.

- Monitor the revenues, and once the average revenue for the period of last 4 years (BTC cycle, FED money printing cycle) is higher than issuance, then stop issuance. Alternatively, instead of stopping issuance immediately, automatically set the nearest rounded number of total NEAR in circulation as a target for stopping issuance (such as 1.4B, 1.5B). This way the NEAR fixed supply would be easy to remember and work with for centuries to come.

## **Fixed supply rather than infinite burn**

The objective of all above mentioned proposals is ultimately to move to a state where there is no issuance, and the security and ecosystem development is financed from revenues. This is inevitable natural direction of long-term economic sustainability, which all surviving blockchains will get to at some point. NEAR is now one of very few blockchains that may be soon able to actually afford it.

Once the state of zero issuance is achieved, we are looking at an asset that is not bound to depreciate over the long term due to systemic oversupply. Consequently, the calculus of intelligent investors changes. It starts to make sense to be looking at “P/E” and yield.

At that point, directing all revenues towards staking yield and ecosystem funding will bring more benefits than burning it and further reducing supply for the following reasons:

- NEAR will be more transparent and easier to value as an investment instrument with fixed supply. Instead of several moving parts – issuance, revenue, burn – there is just one moving part: revenue. Money likes simplicity.

- When the asset is not inflationary, then higher yield will motivate all investors to invest and to stake, including professional investors who may have been not motivated by yield during the times of issuance and systemic over-supply.

- The question “What happens when all NEAR is burned?” does not arise. Fixed supply is intuitively a state sustainable indefinitely compared to infinite burn. It is the neutral and balanced long-term choice where the economic model does not have to be touched ever again.

- Having a source of infinite ecosystem funding can lead to new projects that will bring asymmetric benefits surpassing potential price increases from further buy-backs.

## **Proposal summary**

My proposal supports the reduction of issuance to 1.6% as suggested by Sal / SVRN and it introduces additional measures to preserve decentralization, ensure long-term ecosystem funding and move smoothly towards fixed supply.

### **Phase 1: Issuance reduction with decentralization support**

- Reduce issuance gradually to 1.6% as suggested by SVRN.

- Set minimum validator commission at 5%.

- Algorithmically stake revenues with up to 200 smallest validators who meet fixed clearly defined criteria: up-time \> 97%, stake \< 100000, commission 5%.

- Ensure algorithmically that the original revenue taken out of circulation is NEVER unstaked. Technically, parts can be unstaked and immediately staked again for rebalancing purposes as the list of smallest validators changes. By “NEVER unstaked” I mean never leaving the pool intended for staking with smallest validators, and never entering circulation.

- Yield from the staked revenues temporarily direct to equivalent of buy-back account until consensus is reached on how to use it.

- Phase 1 lasts until 10M NEAR from revenue income is staked in support of smallest validators. Then Phase 2 is activated.

### **Phase 2: Replacing issuance with revenue**

- Start adjusting the issuance dynamically after each epoch, day, week, or whatever period is technically easiest to implement. Revenue is paid automatically to validators and issuance reduced by the same amount for the next period. If revenue for given period is higher than issuance, then the surplus is kept in reserve for future periods.

- When the revenue for last 4 years is higher than issuance, then automatically set the nearest rounded number of total NEAR in circulation as a target for stopping issuance (such as 1.4B, 1.5B). Once the target circulation is reached, stop issuance and activate Phase 3.

### **Phase 3: Fixed supply … NEARvana**

- Zero issuance.

- 90% of revenues paid to validators / stakers as yield.

- 10% of revenues to finance ecosystem development.

This phased approach provides economic predictability and minimizes the number of changes to economic model. If implemented in its totality it could actually be the last change to NEAR protocol economics. It accounts for gradual transition towards fixed supply, while adequately supporting most affected validators, and ensuring clear path towards future long-term funding of the ecosystem development.

## **Support of the SVRN proposal**

I don´t see my proposal as competitive or conflicting but rather complementary. The SVRN proposal is “quick simple win” that should be passed and implemented immediately. Mine looks at comprehensive long-term path, and needs careful consideration.

## **Appendix: Voting and House of Stake**

This issue was mentioned several times in the comments in “NEAR Governance Discussion: Reducing Issuance to 1.6%, and the Path to a Fixed Supply”, so although it is outside the scope of this proposal, there is my take on it:

I believe that by initiatives such as “I Am Human” and House of Stake, the leadership is genuinely trying to solve two problems in the context of voting:

- Reduce influence of short-term speculators

- Make sure the ultimate beneficiary owners of NEAR tokens vote rather than custodians such as liquid staking protocols, ETF or CEX.

Whereas both these intentions aim to align long-term prosperity of NEAR ecosystem with voting results, for some reason only less than 0.4% of circulation is staked in House of Stake compared to more than 40% in a regular native staking contract (source: AI prompt). May be the low participation is not a problem of the stakers, but the design of House of Stake? I don´t mean to baselessly criticize House of Stake. I am sure it is well-meant initiative. But sometimes it is useful to look at what the market and user data is telling us. And now, after approximately 1 year after launch, the data unfortunately does not point to a meaningful voting participation.

What may be frank and pragmatic reasons for low participation:

- Extra security / contract risk

- Need for user education and acquisition for new system

- Additional user complexity and friction

- Locking tokens up for future period prior to a significant vote is not fair and is risky for serious investors. If the vote outcome is not what I consider sensible, then I may want to be able to sell the tokens immediately after the vote.

NEAR is experimenting with various concepts to improve governance and I don´t see it as failure. It is research, exploration, evolution.

How to continue this evolution? What are the alternatives?

Enable voting with natively staked NEAR, time-weighted based on period for which the NEAR was staked prior to the vote. Validators vote, but delegators can override the vote for their stake. Preserve the option of delegating voting to white-listed experts.

This has several benefits:

- No extra security / contract risk. NEAR stays just natively staked. Submitting a vote does not move or lock the token anywhere. It is just a vote transaction enabled by having the stake but not touching the stake.

- No need for maintaining another staking contracts.

- Less user friction. Users just hold natively staked NEAR, no lNEAR, veNEAR or any other strange xyzNEAR, and can still vote.

- Time-weighted stake preserves the benefits of reducing influence of short-term speculators and in the same time removes the uncomfortable and, in my view, unfair future lock-up.

- Validator is on average more involved community member than holder or passive staker, so it is likely that their voting will be of higher quality and with higher participation. And to prevent validators from having excessive power, any staker can either override the validator vote, or just move the stake to a validator that is in long-term alignment with his conviction.

The trade-off is that liquid staking protocols, ETFs and CEX will be able to vote on behalf of their users without the holders consent. Also, while these entities may be staking NEAR, the holders of ETF, SVRN or users of liquid staking hold liquid immediately tradable instrument. So the vote does not necessarily represent long-term holders.

According to data from Google AI, 75-85% of NEAR is direct native delegation. So the trade-off can be quantified like this: “Is it better to have 0.4% participation, or have potential of 40% participation of which 6-10% may be not direct holders and genuine staking?” (15-25% is not direct native delegation. 15-25% from 40% is 6-10%).

There is also a question whether it is ultimately unhealthy for CEX, ETFs, SVRN and liquid staking protocols to participate in the voting process instead of retail investors who use them or invest in them. They are entities that are important for NEAR token liquidity and investability, and they invested in bringing NEAR to their platforms, so may be they can have a vote? Also if holders are not happy with the way these entities vote, (in ideal world …) they would move their NEAR somewhere else.

If need for more sophistication and complexity arises, further evolutionary step could be to allow all staked NEAR to vote, including custodial, as suggested above, but give more power to direct native delegation. AI agent can identify custodial entities and give them lower weight. If some account is incorrectly flagged by the AI agent as custodian entity, there can be an option to remove the flag by responding to simple gassless cryptographic signature challenge request (this is simple and 100% anonymous) or by using I Am Human (for those who already have it).

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![vinibarbosa](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/user_avatar/gov.near.org/vinibarbosa/32/54944_2.png) [@vinibarbosa](https://gov.near.org/u/vinibarbosa)\
**Post date:** [October 9, 2026, 4:38pm UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/9 "2026-10-09T16:38:05Z")

</div>

**I support this proposal**!

Ready to vote **FOR** it as [vinibarbosa.near](https://gov.houseofstake.org/delegates/vinibarbosa.near) (300K+ veNEAR).

My support comes both as:

- $NEAR holder
- `thecoding.pool.near` validator operator
- Governance delegate & ecosystem contributor

I believe the reduction to the 1.6% target is beneficial in many aspects and a needed direction.

Yes, we might lose some validators and stake percentage (%). These are expected **direct** negative effects of such a reduction. However, there are many dynamics in play here and the positive aspects could even revert this scenario (as fruit of indirect benefits that reducing emission might cause).

For example, reducing emission reduces holders’ dilution, which encourage more people to hold NEAR for the long run. Holding NEAR for the long run by itself is already net-positive in this scenario, which can compound to staking APY, even when this APY is lower than what it currently is.

Basically:

- Old NEAR holders/stakers may unstake due to the lower APY
- But lower emissions may encourage new holders to come
- Long-term holders can compound the already net-positive holding to staking APY

So, if enough new long-term holders join the ecosystem, this could balance the staking % equation. The same logic applies to departing vs. onboarding validadors.

If the NEAR ecosystem (and tokenomics) is more attractive to a broader audience, we might see new contributors and large stakeholders joining the network and, perhaps, considering being onboarded as node runners and validator operators – building their operations based on the now-approved issuance reduction (1.6% tail emission as a 24-month end goal).

Of course, this is all hypothetical.

Another reason why I support this proposal is because it is well-crafted to work as a solid experiment, with clear guardrails and gradual development, to serve as empirical evidence of whether this proposal is net-positive or net-negative to the ecosystem and NEAR as a whole.

Sal Ternullo (@SalTernullo) and the SVRN team (@SVRN) did a fantastic job here and we have a sound proposal and execution plan to follow.

As a node operator, I will adjust my operations to fit the target rate and I believe it won’t negatively impact them.

My hypothesis is that it may even increase my validator’s long term rewards by NEAR price appreciation and by attracting more contributors, users, services, apps, etc to the ecosystem – all positively compounding for the long run.

As a blockchain researcher, I agree with many other researchers who claim most networks are overpaying for their security, with too high inflation that prevents growth. Nevertheless, I believe this is a thin line to walk over and some issuance is needed for a self-sustainable, decentralized, and permissionless system. I’m against a fixed supply.

The big question lies on: **what the right amount (%) is.**

I don’t have this answer yet. In the past year (since October 2025, when we reduced emission from 5% to 2.5%), the empirical evidence is that the reduction has had low effects into the staking %, number of validators grew (mostly thanks to delegation cohorts, like MetaPool’s), the ecosystem attracted new contributors/stakeholders, NEAR got broader market attention and the token price benefited from it.

I then support a careful and solid experiment to a 35% reduction (2.5% to 1.6%) to watch will happen then and gather enough data and information to decide whether 1.6% is the right and ideal number, if we can discuss a follow-up reduction, or if reducing was the wrong call and we need to increase it back up.

Overall, I believe it will be highly positive. Hope to be proven right.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![SalTernullo](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ce73a5/32.png) [@SalTernullo](https://gov.near.org/u/SalTernullo)\
**Post date:** [October 9, 2026, 5:09pm UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/10 "2026-10-09T17:09:02Z")

</div>

@vinibarbosa thank you, and thanks for putting your perspective in the forum with the different hats you where: holder, operator, and delegate. I think these vantage points give you a unique perspective and I am glad to have your support.

In particular for me, the operator view is critical. The strongest objection to the ramp in both threads is that it pushes small validators out. You run a pool and have looked at the numbers, and its encouraging to know that you will adjust and continue running. That matches what we see in the September validator data and in how the set behaved through the 2025 reduction (342 to 413 validators through a sharper revenue shock than this one). The set has been held up by operators making the same decision you’re making, not by commission margin at the bottom of the distribution.

On the experiment framing, I agree, and it’s why the proposal is built the way it is. Twenty-four months and a linear path provide the basis for us to collect behavioral data over time to inform decisions.

On fixed supply, we may disagree and candidly I will maintain an open-mind to all views, mechanics and prospoals (of which there have been great points raised already in these threads), but ultimately this is not for the current vote. We separated the ramp from the end-state discussion on purpose, so people who want a permanent tail emission and people who want a hard cap can both support the step in front of us. The question of where issuance should ultimately settle and whether some emission is necessary for a permissionless system, deserves its own proposal with its own data and a ton of work across the ecosystem.

Thank you for your engagement, thoughts and support on the current proposal.

-Sal

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![SalTernullo](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ce73a5/32.png) [@SalTernullo](https://gov.near.org/u/SalTernullo)\
**Post date:** [October 9, 2026, 6:01pm UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/11 "2026-10-09T18:01:25Z")

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@arpoas thanks for this. This is one of the most thorough contributions in either thread, and I want to thank you for time, energy and depth of thought to bring the contribution forward. I had reviewed and contemplated your feedback in previous posts under Martin.H. so I also appreciate you helping me link this. This is long-winded but I wanted to properly respond given the quality of thinking and analysis here and I am open to having a deeper discussion on the matters if you’d like.

I am fully aligned and agree with your sequencing. Candidly the ‘End game’ I framed may have been distracting but it was really intended to solicit. Pass the ramp now and then treat the longer-horizon questions as their own proposals.

On the small validator break-even. Your framing is right, but I’d push on the inputs, because we pulled the full validator set in September and the picture is different from what the back-of-envelope suggests.

-424 active validators, 85 block producers and 339 chunk validators. 211 are under 100k NEAR, so your ~200 is correct.  
-At today’s 2.5% and spot price, 269 of those 424 do not cover opex from commission alone. At 1.6% that number is 302. The marginal change from the ramp is 33 pools.  
-In 2025 the protocol took a much sharper revenue shock than this ramp and the validator set grew from 342 to 413.

My point isn’t that small validators don’t matter it’s just that the set is not held up by commission math on marginal pools. Most small operators run for yield on their own stake, for ecosystem reasons, or as a cost center of a larger business. The ramp doesn’t change that calculus which is a major factor for why the 2025 data looks the way it does, as well as the positive impact of MetaPool’s node studio.

On directing Intents revenue to the smallest validators. We modeled a very similar mechanism (we called it the Node Floor) and removed it before posting because it failed Sybil attack modeling. If the protocol stakes 50k NEAR with any pool under 100k that holds 97% uptime, the rational move is to split one operation into five pools and collect five stipends. Uptime is cheap to fake at that scale and stake size is trivially gameable. Every version we tried either needed an identity layer (which brings back the custodian and verification problems you describe in your appendix) or ended up subsidizing the operators who needed it least. I’d rather see that NEAR accumulate in the protocol treasury as a counter-cyclical security budget, which is where the current draft lands, than build a targeting mechanism we know is exploitable.

On the 5% minimum commission I think this is worth its own thread and discussion. Commission is a staking pool contract parameter, not a consensus parameter, so this is a change to the whitelisted pool contracts rather than a protocol economics vote. It’s also a price floor set by governance, and the pools running at 0-1% today are mostly large commercial operators competing on price in a way delegators benefit from. I’m not against discussing it and building solutions around this, but I do think it shouldn’t be bundled with issuance.

Where we agree completely is the end state. Fixed supply, revenue displacing issuance as the funding mechanism, and a cap at a round number people can remember. We envision 1,432,700,000 ;).

Your Phase 2 (revenue offsets issuance period by period, surplus held in reserve) is close to how we think the transition should work mechanically, and the ERSF framework draft from House of Stake is the institutional complement to it. Once the ramp is ratified I think that’s the conversation to have next, and I’d welcome you building it out as a standalone proposal and supporting you on it.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Polkachu](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/user_avatar/gov.near.org/polkachu/32/54997_2.png) [@Polkachu](https://gov.near.org/u/Polkachu)\
**Post date:** [October 9, 2026, 7:02pm UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/12 "2026-10-09T19:02:34Z")

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Polkachu supports the proposed gradual reduction in NEAR emissions from 2.5% to 1.6%. We will support by adopting the corresponding protocol upgrade as a validator.

Thanks for the thorough write-up of this proposal.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Edouard\_StakinTheTie](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/user_avatar/gov.near.org/edouard_stakinthetie/32/54999_2.png) [@Edouard\_StakinTheTie](https://gov.near.org/u/Edouard_StakinTheTie)\
**Post date:** [October 9, 2026, 7:25pm UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/13 "2026-10-09T19:25:40Z")

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Interesting proposal, thank you for putting it together. As a validator and operator, we see the importance of this discussion and its implications for the long-term sustainability of the network. We also see similar trends and initiatives across other networks. We’ll seek feedback from our delegators and invite them to also contribute to the discussion.

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**Author:** ![Axia](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/user_avatar/gov.near.org/axia/32/54750_2.png) [@Axia](https://gov.near.org/u/Axia)\
**Post date:** [October 9, 2026, 8:19pm UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/14 "2026-10-09T20:19:31Z")

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Thank you for the detailed proposal and for being direct about the trade-offs.

**Disclosure:** Axia operates a node through Meta Pool’s Node Studio program. That gives Axia practical exposure to validator economics and delegation dynamics, while also creating a potential economic interest. I will assess this proposal independently.

I see the case for reducing persistent dilution and appreciates the proposal’s simplicity: a gradual 24-month schedule, no new discretionary spending mechanism, and quarterly reporting. However, t **he key decentralization question is not yet fully resolved.**

The analysis usefully models the impact of the target rate on validators under measured ownership. It also shows that many smaller validators rely on delegated stake, rather than self-stake, to retain an active seat. **But**  **it does not appear to separately assess how the ramp affects validators whose active seats depend on delegation from validator-support programs.**

Before taking a final position, Axia would welcome analysis covering:

- the current share of active stake and validator seats supported by validator-support programs;
- active validator count, stake concentration, and Nakamoto coefficient if delegation from validator-support programs changes materially;
- how those outcomes change at the start, midpoint, and target rate of the issuance ramp;
- the specific set-health thresholds House of Stake will monitor, and the governance response if validator exits or concentration exceed those bounds.

I would also particularly welcome input from @Meta_Pool, as well as validators. **Ultimately, validators must ultimately adopt and implement the protocol change, and their practical view on validator economics, delegation dependence, and the viability of the transition should be part of this discussion before governance reaches a decision.**

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**Author:** ![arpoas](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/858c86/32.png) [@arpoas](https://gov.near.org/u/arpoas)\
**Post date:** [October 10, 2026, 5:05am UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/15 "2026-10-10T05:05:58Z")

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Thank you Sal for the feedback and for all the hard a professional work you are putting in.

Regarding the validator support:

I think we have approximately the same data for number of validators and their stakes. Our data differ mainly in the estimated operating costs and that leads to different conclusions. It would be interesting to know if there is some small chunk-producer who actually operates at $50 per month, as the AI told me?

In my calculation I assume all managed stake is delegated, because even if it is my own stake I still have the extra cost of running a validator, compared to delegating it. The only way for me running a validator to be profitable compared to delegating my stake, is if income from the stake delegated to me covers the cost. This is based on purely economic consideration. As you say, there are probably validators running “non-profit” nodes for other reasons.

The concern that the support may be hijacked by big validators splitting into several nodes is legitimate. I wonder whether Meta Pool that is doing something very similar has some empirical data on this issue? There is an inevitable marginal cost of running a new node so unless the income from the subsidised stake is not higher than this marginal cost, direct economic incentive for node splitting is missing. Other thing to consider is the value at risk as a result of implementing the validator support. Let´s assume all 10M NEAR that I propose to use for small validator support is hijacked by big bad guys splitting nodes. If the yield is 3.2% p.a. and they get 5% commission from this yield, then 16000 NEAR would annually go to these bad players. So the maximum value at risk from implementing the 10M NEAR support program is 16000 NEAR p.a. (0.16%). In the same time, protocol treasury would be receiving 304000 NEAR p.a. from the stakes, that could be used for ecosystem development.

I have bundled the minimum 5% commission with my proposal, because the small validator support would be far less effective without it. Let´s assume the support works and several small validators start operating as a result of it. But if large validators charge 0% commission, the new validators will never be able to meaningfully grow stake, will forever operate at near break-even level dependent on validator support, and stake will be increasingly concentrated with the low to zero commission huge validators. I agree that it is not something to vote on as part of the 2.5\>1.6% issuance reduction. It falls more in what you refer to as Part 2 in the discussion preceding this your proposal. But if my validator support proposal was implemented without the 5% commission floor, it might solve the number of validators question but not the concentration question, which is why it would not make sense to implement it at all.

I personally think the validator income will be actually higher after the issuance reduction than what it would be if left at 2.5%. While the percentage yield will be lower, the absolute USD income will be probably higher due to higher NEAR price relative to what the price would be at higher issuance. So from my perspective, I think the validators will be better off anyway, and the proposed small validator support is more of a risk-management measure because I don´t have mathematical model predicting the exact impact of issuance reduction on price. It is also a market signalling measure, making a clear statement that NEAR protocol prioritizes decentralization and will remain decentralized at least at the same level as it is now.

Let´s get the 2.5% → 1.6% reduction implemented and continue the discussion, perhaps also in separate threads as you suggested.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![awstian](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/user_avatar/gov.near.org/awstian/32/52784_2.png) [@awstian](https://gov.near.org/u/awstian)\
**Post date:** [October 10, 2026, 8:09am UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/16 "2026-10-10T08:09:01Z")

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Every time NEAR gets a little price momentum, we seem to develop the same anxiety: **how do we make the token more attractive to the next investor, the next fund, the next institution, the next speculator?**

And every time, the people already here are asked to pay for it.

I am tired of this **mercenary** approach to **tokenomics**. NEAR has spent years trying to become more attractive to capital that has not committed to this ecosystem while progressively reducing the economic reasons for the people who actually did commit to stay.

So I will be direct…

TLDR: **I think this is a shit proposal.**

Not because reducing issuance is inherently wrong. Eventually it probably makes sense. It is a shit proposal because it once again starts from the interests of the future buyer and works backwards, instead of asking what economic contract NEAR should maintain _ **with the people who got it her** _ **e.**

We already ran a version of this experiment.

In 2025, maximum issuance was cut from 5% to 2.5%. Staking APY fell from roughly 8–9% to the 4–5% range. The sales pitch was remarkably similar to what we are hearing now: **“lower inflation = less dilution; less dilution = stronger NEAR.”**

**T** he proposal even talked about duration-based staking between roughly 4.5% and 11% and explicitly promised that “long-term stakers win.”

What happened next matters.

The halving went live around October 30, 2025. NEAR closed that day around $2.10. By the end of November it was around $1.81, and by December 31 around $1.51. **That is roughly a 28% decline from the halving date to year-end.** The broader crypto market was weak too, so I am not claiming the halving caused that decline. That would be intellectually dishonest. What I am saying is that the promised relationship between lower issuance and a stronger token clearly did not work mechanically either. Scarcity did not protect the price.

That distinction is important. If we are not allowed to blame lower issuance when price falls, then we should also stop selling lower issuance as though price appreciation naturally follows from it.

**Price is ultimately a demand problem.**

**And loyalty is a demand problem too.**

The most revealing part of the 2025 halving is what NEAR had to do around it. The ecosystem immediately created complementary programs because everyone understood that cutting rewards by roughly 50% had consequences. HSP-002 subsidized smaller validators. HSP-003 attempted to create additional incentives for governance-locked NEAR. The official 2.9.0 announcement itself presented these programs as necessary to “support this transition.”

Then we got actual data.

HSP-002 paid rewards to 32 small validators. **Every one of those 32 remained an active validator afterward.** Among a comparable group of 29 small validators that did not qualify for those rewards, nine were no longer active: a 31% churn rate. There are selection effects here, the rewarded group also met uptime requirements, so nobody should pretend this is a randomized experiment. But the difference is large enough that dismissing incentives as irrelevant would be absurd.

During the same period, the number of small validators grew from 110 to 174, up 58%, and their combined stake increased from 8.3M to 12.2M NEAR, up 47%. Total active validators increased from 296 on October 1 to 396 by the end of Q4 2025. Gauntlet itself concluded that the program was effective at maintaining and growing small validators, while correctly acknowledging that the design was not sustainable forever.

That is exactly the lesson we should have learned: **incentives work, but they have to be designed properly.**

HSP-003 actually gives us the other half of the lesson. Its veNEAR incentives did not independently produce convincing additional locking. Around 83% of locked NEAR came from only 15 large locking events, mostly around active proposals, and Gauntlet ultimately recommended ending the program in its existing form.

Good. That is useful data.

It tells us that simply throwing rewards at people is not enough. Incentives need to reward the behavior we actually value: duration, participation, contribution and loyalty.

What it does not tell us is that incentives do not matter.

Yet the new proposal wants to take issuance from 2.5% to 1.6%, reducing modeled gross staking yield from 5.268% to 3.372%, without replacing the lost incentive.

And one of the statistical arguments used to justify that deserves much more scrutiny.

The proposal points out that during a two-week period NEAR rallied approximately 86%, from $2.31 to $4.30, while the staking ratio fell from 46.92% to 42.71%. Roughly 54.5M NEAR left staking and the active validator set fell from 424 to 406. Meanwhile staking yield rose from 4.796% to 5.268%.

The author conclude that if yield retained stake, rising yield should have prevented stake from leaving.

I do not think that inference holds.

The yield rose partly because stake left.

When fewer tokens are staking against a given reward pool, APY mechanically rises. In other words, the proposal is treating an endogenous response to unstaking as evidence that yield does not influence staking.

That is backwards.

And an 86% price increase over fourteen days is a terrible window from which to infer the long-term elasticity of staking anyway. People unstake during explosive rallies to take profits, move into DeFi, rebalance, provide liquidity or simply regain optionality.

Fourteen days of price euphoria tell us very little about whether somebody who has supported NEAR for five years will accept another permanent reduction in the economics of staying.

Those are two completely different populations.

This is why my objection is much broader than validator decentralization.

I care about validators, but I also care about the ecosystem that grew around NEAR: liquid staking protocols, founders, developers, delegates, regional communities, governance participants and people who chose to build their businesses around this network when there was no ETF waiting to make NEAR respectable.

These people took duration risk.They took ecosystem risk, provided liquidity, built products, educated users and stayed through multiple cycles.

And every time NEAR begins attracting outside attention, somebody seems to discover a new reason why the economics of those people should be reduced for the benefit of the next buyer.

This is becoming a pattern.

In 2025 it was staking rewards.

In 2026, HSP-027 proposed removing the 30% developer gas rebate entirely and redirecting that value to protocol-level burn. Different mechanism, same instinct, improve token value accrual by taking an incentive that currently flows to an active ecosystem participant and redirecting it toward the asset.

At some point we need to ask what kind of ecosystem we are designing.

Because the most scarce resource NEAR has is not NEAR.

It is people willing to spend five years building around NEAR.

And those people are much harder to replace than tokens are to burn.

Even the ecosystem’s own survey points in this direction. In the Network Economics & Security Working Group survey, most of the 58 respondents had been involved with NEAR for more than two years. Their median preferred inflation rate was around 3%, so these were not people demanding infinite emissions. But they preferred staking APY around 6–7%. When asked what should replace reduced staking rewards, common answers included gas-fee reallocation, validator subsidies, treasury funding and longer lockups.

That is a much more sophisticated position than “issuance bad.”

Reduce monetary expansion, but preserve the premium for commitment.

And there is now another reason this matters: ETFs.

The Bitwise NEAR ETF launched in the United States on September 29. Bitwise explicitly markets staking as part of the product and says it intends to stake the fund’s NEAR, targeting participation in the network’s roughly 5% staking rewards. The fund already charges a 0.75% management fee.

So I do not understand how reducing staking yield toward 3.37% is supposed to be obviously friendly to institutional holders either.

You are removing part of the carry from one of the exact features being used to market institutional NEAR exposure.

Yes, ETF holders benefit from lower dilution but they also lose yield, again there are two sides to the equation.

More importantly, institutional capital does not deserve better economics simply because it arrived later with a cleaner wrapper.

An ETF can sell, a fund can rebalance.A speculator can rotate into another L1 tomorrow. Someone who spent five years building a validator, protocol, company or community around NEAR has made a much deeper economic commitment.

Tokenomics should recognize that difference.

The other argument I do not buy is that NEAR has already reached the stage where real economic activity makes these rewards increasingly unnecessary.

The progress of Intents is real and worth celebrating. But look at the scale.

In Q3 2026, NEAR Intents generated approximately $14.43M in gross swap fees. After roughly $11.37M was paid to solvers and distribution channels, NEAR captured about $3.07M in net revenue, which DefiLlama tracks as NEAR buybacks.

The current issuance regime creates roughly 89,500 NEAR per day. At the proposal’s own $4.30 reference price, that is about $140M of annual gross issuance, with roughly 90% directed toward staking participants. The Q3 buyback run rate annualizes to only around $12M.

That is progress.

It is not yet a replacement security economy.

There is already an alternative framework on this forum that asks what I think is the more important question: instead of choosing the desired issuance rate first, how much issuance has real protocol revenue actually demonstrated that it can safely replace?

**That proposal (Gradual Transition From Emission-Funded to Revenue-Funded Network Securit) suggests supplementing staking rewards with protocol revenue, observing the system for 12 months, using the weakest revenue month with a 2× safety margin, and only then considering an issuance reduction. Security metrics can still override the formula. In other words, revenue determines what NEAR can afford to remove; security determines what NEAR should remove.**

That is the conversation NEAR should be having.

I am not defending 2.5% forever. I am defending an economic principle.

If NEAR wants to reduce issuance, fine.

First build the replacement.

Reward duration. Give somebody staking for five years better economics than somebody staking for five weeks. Use real protocol revenue as it grows. Explore fee redistribution. Design mechanisms for builders and validators whose commitment compounds with the network. Make the opportunity cost of leaving larger because staying is valuable, not because leaving is punished.

That is how you turn loyalty into scarcity.

And ironically, that may be far more effective than simply cutting emissions. A NEAR token locked for years by someone who genuinely wants to remain in the ecosystem is more economically scarce than a liquid token sitting inside a fund that can rebalance next quarter.

NEAR does not need more mercenaries.

Crypto already has enough of them.

It needs builders, stakers and holders who believe that staying longer will make them better off, not people constantly calculating when the next governance proposal will take another piece of their economics away.

The goal of tokenomics should not be minimum issuance.

It should be maximum long-term value per committed participant.

So before taking staking yield from roughly 5.27% toward 3.37%, answer a much simpler question:

What are you giving the people who stay?

If the answer is simply “less dilution,” then this proposal has learned remarkably little from the last one.

Stop optimizing NEAR for people who are not here yet.

Take care of the people who never left.

They are not a cost to optimize away.

They are the moat.

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**Author:** ![arpoas](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/858c86/32.png) [@arpoas](https://gov.near.org/u/arpoas)\
**Post date:** [October 10, 2026, 12:33pm UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/17 "2026-10-10T12:33:59Z")

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In reply to awstian comment:

I agree with optimizing NEAR for people involved long-term, and respect your view and the passion for NEAR community that is felt from it.

My view on the effect of issuance reduction on long-term holders is different:

I would argue that the halving “experiment”, as you call it, actually worked. NEAR Protocol (NEAR) has drastically outperformed the broad cryptocurrency market since October 30, 2025. NEAR Protocol Return: +139.1% compared to Total Crypto Market Cap: -31.5%. Coincidence?

The changes affecting supply/demand dynamics are long-term structural changes that take years to manifest. In short-term, narratives and market moods have stronger effect. When you measure the effect after two months as you did, you are more likely to see the “sell the news” effect rather than the actual supply-demand re-adjustment.

Price is not ultimately a demand problem. It is a demand AND supply problem. If there are 1000000 apples and 100 people, the price will be different than when there is just 1 apple and 100 people. After approximately one year since the „halving“ the same mechanics can be observed on the NEAR price.

It is fair to point out that the dramatic out-performace does not come from the halving alone. NEAR Intents buybacks are also a decisive factor, not just because they also reduce supply, but because they provide “light at the end of the tunnel” hope for long-term economic sustainability.

If you look at AVAX and NEAR charts with monthly candles, you will see that the charts look strikingly similar until the recent economic changes on NEAR. Since the economy changed, the divergence is mind-blowing. It is not because Avalanche is a sleeping project. They have advanced tech and are closing some major deals. But the over-supply is killing their token just as NEAR was being killed prior to the economic changes. Without these changes I am convinced NEAR would keep following the AVAX price path. (I don´t mean to bash AVAX. It just fits my example because it is a legit project with oversupply and the charts were similar).

Frankly, I don´t understand why people involved long-term with the eco-system and holding the tokens many years would not welcome these changes and their results?

I actually believe that SVRN proposal is not a self-serving mercenary temporary token pumping attempt, and I would oppose any such proposal. At the end of the day, SVRN stakes \> 50M NEAR, so even purely from their self-intenrest point of view, they must have a long-term perspective. I believe this proposal, as well as all the recent economics related proposals, aim to fix the over-supply problem, that would basically push the NEAR market cap and consequently the NEAR project into irrelevance.

Although I am convinced that this particular issuance reduction proposal will ultimately benefit long-term holders even in its current form, I agree in principle, that issuance reduction ideally should be accompanied with appropriate balancing incentives or subsidies. I have suggested above a mechanism that would support the most affected validators. What would be your suggestion?

I agree that the proposal “Gradual Transition From Emission-Funded to Revenue-Funded Network Security” is interesting, and above I have suggested slight modification of it. From Sal´s reply to my proposal, I got the impression that SVRN is also working on something similar as Phase 2.

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**Author:** ![rdp4by](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/user_avatar/gov.near.org/rdp4by/32/54937_2.png) [@rdp4by](https://gov.near.org/u/rdp4by)\
**Post date:** [October 10, 2026, 1:28pm UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/18 "2026-10-10T13:28:03Z")

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> [@arpoas](#):
>
> Frankly, I don´t understand why people involved long-term with the eco-system and holding the tokens many years would not welcome these changes and their results?

Information asymmetry. Varying levels of education, different prospects, access to data, and the ability to interpret data. Most of the people preaching about decentralization here are likely small, subsidized validators and their alt accounts.  
You have written some excellent posts in this thread. I agree with everything except the idea of ​​sponsoring individual validators. That is the wrong approach. It is sufficient to create conditions where large holders have an economic incentive to set up their own nodes. The minimum validator commission percentage you proposed provides exactly those conditions.  
It is even possible that the reduction in emissions in this specific proposal is too slow and weak. We need to aim for zero emissions as soon as possible.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![arpoas](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/858c86/32.png) [@arpoas](https://gov.near.org/u/arpoas)\
**Post date:** [October 10, 2026, 1:41pm UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/19 "2026-10-10T13:41:49Z")

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Thanks. I agree that the minimum commission is more important. Minimum commission without subsidies on its own will reduce concentration. Subsidies without minimum commission will not.

As long as there is 0% commission, there is no economic incentives for large staker to set-up own validator.

Commission floor would make the staking business economically viable and more predictable for new entrants in general.

As long as there is 0% commission, random stakers have direct economic dis-incentives to consider smaller validator charging a commission. If the small validators and large validators charge the same commission, then a random rational staker has a slight incentive to stake with the smaller validator as it helps to decentralize the network where his assets are staked.

Regarding staking support … I think the revenues should be staked somewhere to fund ecosystem from the yield, so why not stake it with the smallest validators?

Regarding zero emissions ASAP … absolutely yes, but yield is also necessary. No yield =\> no staking. So the revenues must compensate for the issuance first. I think, subjectively, going to issuance 1.6% (may be 1.5%) and yield 3.2% is probably at the limit of acceptability without replacing the issuance with revenue. At yield 3.2% NEAR has better yield than ETH, SUI, APT and probably SOL when SOL reaches its terminal issuance. FED funds rate is now 3.88% and was between 0 - 5% since 2000. So yield around 3.2% kind of works even from a simplistic market yield comparison perspective, leaving aside the supply-demand mechanics that may be difficult to grasp for part of the market. But I may be wrong on this one. Let´s observe the data once the 2.5% \> 1.6% is implemented.

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**Author:** ![rdp4by](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/user_avatar/gov.near.org/rdp4by/32/54937_2.png) [@rdp4by](https://gov.near.org/u/rdp4by)\
**Post date:** [October 10, 2026, 2:28pm UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/20 "2026-10-10T14:28:32Z")

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> [@arpoas](#):
>
> Regarding staking support … I think the revenues should be staked somewhere to fund ecosystem from the yield, so why not stake it with the smallest validators?

That is where politics comes into play. The very existence of ecosystem funding is controversial. NEAR has a long history of irresponsible, poor-quality, and malicious ecosystem funding. Funding that, for the most part, ended up benefiting the very people responsible for allocating the capital. This is not just a NEAR problem. It is a problem for any organization that allocates other people’s funds, literally any state on this planet. That is precisely why token burning is a brilliant idea. It represents a direct transfer of value to token holders. As for the ecosystem, developers must fund their projects themselves or seek external financing. Only in such an environment can high-quality projects emerge.

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**Author:** ![rdp4by](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/user_avatar/gov.near.org/rdp4by/32/54937_2.png) [@rdp4by](https://gov.near.org/u/rdp4by)\
**Post date:** [October 10, 2026, 2:32pm UTC](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644/21 "2026-10-10T14:32:02Z")

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> [@arpoas](#):
>
> At yield 3.2% NEAR has better yield than ETH, SUI, APT and probably SOL

It’s not about the token yield, but the yield in dollars. No one would want a 100% return in tokens if their dollar price were to drop by half by the end of the year. Conversely, investors will gladly buy and stake an asset with no to very little yield, provided its price rises.

[Next page](https://gov.near.org/t/hsp-xxx-establish-a-24-month-issuance-ramp-to-a-1-6-target-rate-of-near-token-emissions/42644.md?page=2)