We appreciate the proposal’s transparency, but would like to see additional information and analysis before making a final decision.
What we see at this stage:
- All figures are modeled on the maximum issuance cap rather than actual net issuance after fee burn and Intents buybacks.
- The yield estimates assume the staking ratio stays at 42.71% throughout the ramp.
- The price upside assumes a constant network valuation.
- Treasury inflows also fall by ~36%. The proposal does not assess the impact on treasury-funded programs.
- There is no pause mechanism or set-health safeguard. Once the ramp starts, any correction requires a new proposal.
- The stated long-term direction toward zero issuance does not yet answer who pays for network security.
- The 2025 precedent does not clearly support the case. NEAR fell from ~$2.10 at the halving to below $0.90 in February 2026, so dollar revenue per staked NEAR dropped sharply after the cut. The subsequent recovery coincided with the growth of NEAR Intents, which makes it difficult to attribute to issuance policy.
What would help us reach a decision:
- Analytical justification of the expected price impact of lower issuance, including evidence from comparable PoS networks and separation of the issuance effect from demand-side drivers such as NEAR Intents.
- Modeling based on net issuance, with staking-ratio sensitivity
- An assessment of the treasury inflow reduction and its effect on treasury-funded programs.
- Explicit set-health thresholds (active validators, Nakamoto coefficient, staking ratio) with a defined pause mechanism.
- Analysis of how the ramp affects validators that depend on liquid staking and validator-support delegation.
- A dated path for the revenue-funded security discussion.
Thank you!